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Introduction
The City. Polish and German Interpretations
In this book we present the outlines of a range of possible dis-
cussions between Polish and German researchers in the area of urban
studies. The inspiration for approaching these issues and undertaking
such a discussion was the sociological workshop ‘‘Declining CitiesDe-
veloping Cities’’1. The keynote of this meeting was the exchange of
knowledge and experience, and the development of cooperation between
young sociologists from Poland and Germany.
The idea of this workshop arose somewhere between the Institute of
Sociology at Adam Mickiewicz University and the Institute for Western
Affairs – both research institutions with long and pertinent traditions in
the area of urban studies.
The crux of the idea was to invite researchers who are at a similar
stage in their careers in order to facilitate discussion, and to enable the
creation of a kind of network that might bring about further research
cooperation. We abandoned the typical top-down procedure of establish-
ing contact, and instead directly invited researchers. This is the best
place to thank Dr. Jerzy Kaczmarek from the Institute of Sociology at
Adam Mickiewicz University for his great help in inviting German
speakers.
When sketching the broad scope of the workshop, we started from
the simple statement that for many years urban sociology has been one
of the main fields of interest among sociologists, and that this interest
1 The ‘‘Declining CitiesDeveloping Cities’’ workshop took place in Poznan´ on
November 16, 2007, and was coorganized by the Institute for Western Affairs, the Polish
Sociological Association (Poznan´ Department), and the Institute of Sociology at Adam
Mickiewicz University. It was cofunded by the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation and
Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
was by no means casual. Rather, this attention has resulted from the
conviction that contemporary cities act to focus most of the social
processes connected with change in the contemporary world.
These processes have often been analysed in the context of urbaniza-
tion understood as social modernization, as a part of what we now call
‘‘globalization.’’ Here urbanization means something better, more open,
and granting more chances, more freedom, and a higher quality of life.
However this interpretation does not seem to be sufficient; it is
one-sided, too general and above all too ideological to elucidate the
phenomenon that it attempts to describe. In many cases it fails to explain
numerous processes that, for example, have transformed urban centres
that until recently flourished into places that are now stigmatized by the
degradation and devalorization of the social, economic, and geographical
environment, affected by – in Piotr Sztompka’s words – a kind of
‘‘transformational trauma.’’
The description of these changes found in, for example, Saskia
Sassen’s books, as changes strongly correlated with macrosocial and
economic processes – also results from the influence of immanent
factors such as the level of infrastructural development, cultural con-
ditions, and the character of resources like the wealth of citizens
and their qualifications. This last component would seem to be ex-
tremely important, especially when we perceive the city as a kind
of social platform where innovations are generated. Points of view
such as those developed inter alia by social geography, give a basis
on which grasp the relations between space and social structure, between
the informational infrastructure and changes of management and con-
sumption models.
In our opinion those changes which clearly are not linear challenge
the modernistic point of view in a certain way. Irregularities of develop-
ment express themselves in contrasts: in the miserable condition of some
roads, contrasted with the width and convenient of others; in the range
of communication networks; in the number of freely available nurseries,
libraries, and so on in some of cities, contrasted with the limited life
possibilities of residents in other cities. Such ‘‘systemic conditions’’ may
give access to many resources, but at the same time they may bring sets
of disadvantageous conditions. This may result in the ‘‘brain drain’’ and
‘‘wallet drain’’ of worse locations, because it is worth living in those
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places where everybody appears to have easy access to information, and
– most significantly – where the decisions are being made. These
processes are particularly important outside of continental centres, where
we can simultaneously observe the signs of development and the symp-
toms of the ‘‘development of underdevelopment.’’
The possibilities of the urban development – and of the decline – of
cites are also connected to the use of the cities’ position within the
world-system; which is usually, but not always, related to the central
location within the region or country. Sociologists’ interpretations gene-
rally lean in two directions. The first considers the economic position of
the city within the region, the country, and in some cases the whole
planet. The second approach is based on the subjective feeling of want:
where we want to live, where it is worth living, and where we should
live in order not to be marginalized.
When we discuss the first interpretation using the concept of Im-
manuel Wallerstein’s world-system, it becomes very difficult or almost
impossible to imagine how to improve the position of the city, especially
in the short- or mid-term.
With the second interpretation, it seems that more and more proces-
ses depend on the subjective valorization of space. What we can suggest
is that there is a link between (hard) economic factors and the subjective
interpretation which affect people’s behaviour. This impression of course
refers to the Thomas theorem, and to the valorization notion of Florian
Znaniecki, who worked in Poznan´ in the 1920s. This view is closely
connected to a phenomenon which – from our point of view – can be
described as one of the two major areas of interest: the revitalization of
the city.
Revitalization is understood here as a ‘‘complex of actions’’ which
aims to eliminate the negative consequences of the breakdown caused by
modern industry, the deindustrialization of the 1990s, the selective
growth of the industrial sector, and changing of a dominant industry into
another.
In the traditional context of ‘‘social forces,’’2 revitalization has two
faces. The first and more obvious is brought to bear from above by local
2 In the 1930s, Florian Znaniecki wrote an article on the Social forces in the
Wielkopolska region (2002, Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, no. 3), in
which he analysed the roles of local institutions and the local authorities in improving the
quality of life in Wielkopolska.
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government or other agents. The second is created from the bottom up
– by social activity which aims to change the social environment of its
subjects. That is why we ask the rather fundamental question about the
condition of urban social activity. Although the answer to the question,
‘‘Social activity in the city: is it awakening, stagnating, or falling?’’ is of
course complex, we may try to search for conditions such as the mode
of participation, or the requirements of efficiency in decision making,
which would help civil society to develop freely.
We believe that the above-outlined assumptions of the workshop
have been reflected in both the discussion that occurred during the
workshop itself, and in the selection of papers that we are presenting
here.
***
The most general perspective is presented by Bastian Lange who
– using the example of Leipzig – analyses the methods employed to
position European cities on the ‘‘Declining City – Developing City’’
continuum. He puts emphasis on the production of knowledge, but this
refers not only to knowledge as a resource necessary for further develop-
ment, but also ‘‘knowledge about the city,’’ used as a tool to garner more
resources, and to develop the conditions for being competitive alongside
other European cities.
Knowledge is a key concept of another text presented here, by Heidi
Fichter-Wolf and Thomas Knorr-Siedow, who analyse the Collegium
Polonicum in the Polish-German twin towns of Słubice and Frankfurt an
den Oder as an example of international university collaboration, with
all the opportunities and risks it presents. Their research shows that
creating a European knowledge space is a difficult goal which cannot be
achieved only by actions undertaken by the state and supranational
institutions, but also – and perhaps more importantly – by the process of
negotiation between diverse open cultures.
A city outside of the globalized centre, indeed, an ‘‘ordinary city’’ is
a term that could easily be applied to GubenGubin, here described by
Jörg Dürrschmidt. The question of whether opportunities to develop
exist for a city located outside of the centre, is in this case given
a positive answer. ‘‘Nested urbanism’’ – a concept which describes
deeper relations connecting cities with the global, regional, and local
Introductionx
zones – might here prove helpful in showing a third way between
metropolis-like development and decline.
A similar problem has been approached, although from a broader
perspective, by Katrin Großmann, Annegret Haase, Dieter Rink, and
Annett Steinführer who attempt to describe the changes affecting eastern
central-European cities, using the concept of ‘‘urban shrinkage,’’ instead
of more conventional patterns of development. The term ‘‘urban shrink-
age’’ was initially employed to describe the process of massive popula-
tion loss in the cities of East Germany after unification due to job
migration and low population growth. The authors expand the applica-
bility of this concept to other postcommunist societies.
The issue of revitalization as part of a region-wide restructuring is
the focus of the article by Jarosław Mikołajec. He describes the vicissi-
tudes suffered by the Katowice conurbation during the sequence of
massive changes that have affected this industrial area. Deindustrializa-
tion seem to be most important challenge for local administration.
Konrad Miciukiewicz also describes the processes of revitalization,
but from a different point of view. He sees the transition of Po´łwiejska
Street in Poznan´ as a metaphor of two interconnected but somehow
contradictory processes – revitalization and gentrification. His analysis
shows the existence of a kind of hidden social conflict between those
excluded from and those included in the mainstream of contemporary
urban consumer life.
A more extreme example of revitalization is portrayed by Marcin
Tujdowski. He describes the phenomenon of ‘‘regained cities’’ – postgar-
rison towns in western and northern Poland. The development of new
settlements is a unique chance to observe forgotten truths. On one hand,
it reminds us how vital and enthusiastic new settlers can be; on other, it
illuminates what kind of adversity they can often run into.
The success of the revitalization process depends not only on the
efficiency of the administration, but also on the social activity of
the residents. For this reason, the final section of the book concerns
this issue.
Marek Nowak places this question within the broader perspective of
changes affecting civil society in central Europe. Using the concept of
‘‘social non-movement’’ – a crisis of cooperation and a dominance of
individual strategies – he attempts to describe social activism in urban
contexts. Research conducted in Poznan´ provides a basis for his analysis.
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Social activization as a tool for social inclusion is the focus of
Michał Nowosielski’s article, which points out that Polish inclusion and
revitalization programs seem to be one-dimensional, and for that reason
lack efficiency. After analysing several examples of such programs, the
author comes to the conclusion that only by taking into consideration the
problem of social activization can more positive effects be produced.
Sandra Huning in her article calls up the concept of public space and
its political use. The changing role of urban space, used as a particular
setting for political deliberation and cultural representation, seems to be
an intellectual challenge for those urban researchers who long ago
declared the end of place.
***
Finally it is worth asking the questions, ‘‘What are the Polish and
German perspectives on the city?’’ and, ‘‘Are there any significant
differences between Polish and German urban sociology?’’ Of course,
the volume we are presenting is not intended to be representative, but it
may be to some extent symptomatic. It seems to us that the perspective
of analysis assumed by our German colleagues is a bit broader, or rather
a bit more universal. This suggests that they tend to see the problems
and phenomena they are describing, not only in the local, regional, and
national contexts, but above all globally. The Polish authors who prepa-
red papers for this book seem to pay more attention to locality, and not
only as the subject of their texts (which is natural in urban sociology),
but also as a scope of applicability of their ideas and concepts.
This contrast of universality with particularity – which should not be
seen as a difference in quality or expertise – may come from different
research experience, different engagement in international research net-
works, and above all different sociological traditions. The question, ‘‘To
what point may different perspectives facilitate or impede further co-
operation?’’ remains open. We hope that the ‘‘Declining citiesDevelo-
ping cities’’ project will contribute to bringing Polish and German
perspectives closer together, and to establishing robust relations between
scholars and research institutions.
Marek Nowak and Michał Nowosielski
Introductionxii
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Reconfiguring Europe: Expert knowledge,
EU-projects,
and the formation of ‘‘creative cities’’
Bastian LANGE
Abstract. Understandings of the ‘‘decline’’ and ‘‘development’’ of urban
systems will be considered as modernist concepts of ‘‘catching up’’ with
recent meta-narratives – such as ‘‘creativity’’ and ‘‘knowledge-based’’ urban
developments. They imply economic fields to target, which recently have
been most visible by highlighting knowledge- and creativity-based urban
approaches. Nowadays cities, especially European ones, compete among
each other – not only factually in the fields of innovative talents and
financial investments, but also in the field of production of relevant scien-
tifically based knowledge of the city. The task of this article is to ask how
cities are negotiated in European research projects these days. The leading
question is what kind of methods are established in order to position cities
by categorizing and labelling them as ‘‘declining’’ or ‘‘developing’’?
The production of knowledge about cities is based on expert cultures and
their scholarships, which is very often rooted in urban and regional knowl-
edge cultures. It will be critically asked, how can the case structures of cities
be regarded as a specific way to deal with the distinct locality within the
context of posttraditional knowledge frames? How can a city articulate its
singularity?
The article addresses the analytical and methodological problem of
dealing with parallel-running (socio-economic and socio-spatial) processes in
cities, while overall comparisons of cities in the enlarged EU play a more
important role and systematically suppress individual pathways.
1. Participating in the EU – Problems, Questions,
and Outlines
1.1 Problems and Questions
The achievement of visibility, recognition, and attention for cities
has been based on economic location factors for a long time. In post-
traditional knowledge-based European societies, being on the enlarged
European map is associated with various forms of self-description,
place-making and new forms of positioning (Lange and Stüber, forth-
coming): economically, socially, functionally – but more and more
knowledge- and creativity-based. The shift from material-based forms of
production to immaterial-forms of production especially goes along with
opportunities to brand, label, and narrate anew the novelty of a nation,
a state, a city, or a region.
To a large extent, new forms of expert-based knowledge play a cru-
cial role in the way that cities describe and position themselves in
a rapidly changing European urban environment. But not only lo-
cal-based self-descriptions play an increasing role, as external knowledge
in particular is seen as a growing tool to strategically influence the
cities’ perspective. In this way, new thematic fields have been applied to
large cities, and creative and knowledge-intensive industries are es-
pecially seen as new strategic future-based concepts (Cooke 2002).
These concepts have played a major role for cities in their phases of
transformation, during which a complex process of deindustrialization
has been observed to dominate, and new fields of employment have
been targeted. Urban and economic decline should be overcome by the
invention of new forms of development, mainly creative and knowl-
edge-based industries. This process is not only accompanied by new
factual strategies on future-based economic fields, but mainly by the
production of new scientific, consultancy and advisory knowledge on the
way cities can be understood, and problems identified, operationalized
and potentially developed (Howells 2002).
From this perspective the paper asks about the way in which new
forms of knowledge are produced and disseminated, and what kind of
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methodological formats are established in order to legitimate these kinds
of expertise about the urban. The process of knowledge production is
framed and accompanied by various forms of enabling legitimacy, either
by specific methods, scientific networks, or financial, network, and
publication resources. Increasingly, it is not only various scholars, but
organized project-based research networks, often funded by the EU, that
contribute to this production process (Bresnen, Goussevskaia, and Swan
2004). These knowledge networks also work toward legitimacy. They
are funded by either state-based universities, private or corporate univer-
sities, or in particular the EU. These research programmes have a high
degree of public visibility, scientific legitimacy, and policy recognition.
In order to understand these network-based projects as a new form
creating knowledge and expertise, it is important to highlight how
distinct, transferable knowledge is produced, disseminated, and conden-
sed for policy-makers, stakeholders and the decision making processes.
Looking closer at the way these knowledge forms are consciously
produced, disseminated, and distributed into local and regional political
arenas, it is first of all important to understand the modes of production
and their ways to reach legitimacy. Furthermore, it is important to
understand the methodologies that have been applied in order to produce
the communicative basis for the formulation of new urban creativity and
knowledge-based strategies. Rankings, groupings, and other forms of
comparability play a major, if not decisive role, in clustering, positio-
ning, and placing cities on a European map. Creative and knowledge
attributes especially are applied in order to promote newly emerged
markets, segments, and branches of industry. In this manner, several
problems can be addressed.
1.2 Outline
Chapter 2 asks to what extent creative knowledge industries can be
seen as an overall narrative in the stimulation of urban development? It
will be asked how creative industries and their core creativity-based
segments can be considered as unique, place-specific industries, when they
are based on distinct logics of their local cultural, historical constitutions?
‘‘Creativity’’, ‘‘creative city policies’’, and ‘‘creative-knowledge-based
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urban developments’’ are critically presented as new forms of societal
development intended to overcome urban decline, and aiming to stimulate
transformation and reenable urban evolution. Furthermore, this chapter
critically asks the question, how have ‘‘creativity and knowledge-based’’
policies recently served as semantic, discursive, and communicative
tools for organizing exit opportunities out of urban economic decline,
and stimulating new urban development? Apart from the growing factual
knowledge basis of new forms of production (Kunzmann 2004), it is
becoming more and more important to understand the interrelation
between the creation of knowledge, and the process of its constitution in
postindustrial economies. It will be asked, to what extent do various
scholars and research networks influence the representative body about
the present state of the city? What are the analytical indicators, methods
of benchmarking, and modes of representation within competing the
arenas of European cities nowadays, in which cities struggle to position
themselves in first place? When only top-rank positions count – for
urban politicians, stakeholders and others – what kind of effect does this
‘‘culture of positioning’’ have on how this ‘‘relevant’’ knowledge is
produced?
Chapter 3 will briefly present empirical and insight material from
which conclusion to these questions may be drawn. The material stems
from an EU comparative project entitled ACRE – Accommodating
Creative Knowledge – as well as one of its case studies, the city
of Leipzig. This empirical material will serve as a background which
can be queried to uncover the applied methods and the methodological
approaches, as well as their modes of inventing forms to deal with
a substantial paradox: the singularity of a city (such as Leipzig or
any other city), in the context of EU-based efforts to compare, rank,
classify, and categorize cities under new creativity- and knowl-
edge-driven paradigms?
Chapter 4 deals with communicative resources such as language,
knowledge, and scholarly cultures and their effects on structures and the
structural power to form relevant and robust knowledge about the city.
Apart from these diagnoses, an alternative model of analysing cities
will be introduced and briefly presented as a concluding statement in
chapter 5. Referring to case-sensitive approaches of distinct pathway
analysis, the recently presented concepts of the ‘‘city habitus’’ are
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introduced in order to put forward for the singularity of a city as
a means to overcome neoliberal formats, such as rankings. The article
concludes by asking for a more relational understanding of the urban as
a distinct category from which to make conclusions concerning not only
the distinct paths that a city follows, but also how it places and positions
itself on the European landscape.
2. Creativity and the City
2.1. On the Relation between Creativity, Knowledge,
and the City
Talking about the city as a privileged field of creativity seems almost
redundant, at a time when creativity is often seen as the decisive human
power, and would thus appear in every human action. Still, it is worth
looking closer at the relations between the two and the way they are
mutually constituted. Apart from celebrating the creative city as a won-
derland, a critical perspective is applied in the following in order to
deconstruct major narratives of hand-knit, quickly made causalities be-
tween them.
The international – mainly anglophone – discussion in the past few
years has been dominated by a delirious, imaginative, and self-projected
representation of the so-called creative city (Landry 2001). Almost
unquestioned, it is supposed to be the solution to all urban problems:
economic stagnation, urban shrinkage, social segregation, technological
ageing, global competition, and more. New efforts by public-private
alliances, real estate managers, and also urban professionals focus on
place-marketing, and therefore often tend to work toward establishing
the creative city as a future reference model for urban development
(Jessop 1998; Drake 2003). Within the framework of the so-called
creative city concepts, strategies of place-making refer to it to simul-
taneously address community building and neighbourhood integration
issues (Fürst, Lahner, and Zimmermann 2004). With regard to the
contextualization of the production and formulation of place beyond its
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geographical fixation that is found within the debate on so-called cre-
ative cities, only a few systematic and critical approaches can be
named (Jessop 1998). Critical diagnosis of the societal use of ‘‘cre-
ativity’’ and its representatives has been presented by Bröckling, Osten,
Peck, and Lange (Bröckling 2004, 139-144; Osten 2003; Peck 2005;
Lange 2005c, 2007).
The emergence of new creative industries in other European met-
ropolitan regions is accompanied by new entrepreneurial agents in the
field of creative and culture production (Lange 2005a, 2005b). Very
often, in the context of economic stagnation, failed growth expectation,
and fiscal collapse, new cultural entrepreneurs in creative industries
– the so-called culturepreneurs – might demonstrate suitable con-
text-sensitive efforts to establish new markets and to construct new
professional fields. ‘‘Context-sensitivity’’ takes into account the specifici-
ties of place and the particular ways that certain milieus or economic
segments are constituted. Yet, from an analytical perspective, these
agents are confronted with structural paradoxes that are inscribed in their
entrepreneurial practices. As a major focus group of the so-called crea-
tive city, they might be seen in the following as representatives of new
modes of labour, with their adjacent governance practices in the field of
creative industries.
Broadly speaking, creative industries have been to a large extent
analytically related to urban development (Hospers 2003), to urban
competitiveness (Florida 2005; Youl Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004), as
well as to organizational changes within small and medium enterprises
(Grabher 2004; Wilson and Stokes 2005; Rae 2004; Scott 2006; Neff,
Wissinger, and Zukin 2005), and to other processes; these all take into
account the fact that new combinations of innovative ‘‘knowledge’’
restructures anew economy, public administration, entrepreneurship, and
its socialities. Gernot Grabher in particular has focused on the in-
ner-organizational dimension of the emergent network-based project
ecologies, and their entrepreneurial and socio-spatial practices in these
industries (Grabher 2004; DeFillippi, Grabher, and Jones 2007). Rapidly
changing project-based constellations within flexible network formations
pose some structural constraints, not only on enhancing learning among
temporary team members, but also on sustaining what is understood as
‘‘traditional,’’ long-standing learning cultures (Cameron and Quinn 1988,
Bastian LANGE8
8). Apart from learning processes, several structural paradoxes are close-
ly related to creative industries and their entrepreneurial agents.
Major paradoxes include (a) the need to reconcile tensions between
the work ethos and human resource practices in creative and more
routinized activities, and (b) the need to balance the advantages of
flexible and temporary organizations with the advantages of tight inte-
gration. Two paradoxes play a crucial role in the articulation of work
practices: the ‘‘globalization paradox’’ and the ‘‘identity paradox.’’ The
‘‘globalization paradox’’ addresses the ambivalence of these newly
emerged creative milieus and their territorial embedding practices. The
ability to operate practically worldwide, socio-spatially integrated ‘‘com-
munities of knowledge’’ has gained increasing importance in providing
the necessary embedding ground for these translocal knowledge workers
(DeFillippi, Grabher, and Jones 2007). The ‘‘identity paradox,’’ on the
other hand, addresses the ambivalence between individual or collective
careers, identities, and reputations. Inventing static concepts of entre-
preneurs is not very productive, because mavericks and outsiders, as
well as independent creative artists are the major protagonists in this
market (ibid.).
2.2. Places, Spaces, and Place-Making
A specifically geographical reading of the emergence of a flexible
workforce in creative industries as a result of socio-economic transfor-
mation processes has to bring the spatial dimension to the fore. Central
to the understanding of space and place is the seminal work of Doreen
Massey. First of all place is to be seen as constituted through human
relations and practices, actions repeated in daily routines, or habitualized
in everyday life. These everyday spaces of action, do not, for example,
take place in a fixed and predetermined empty ‘‘container’’ waiting to be
filled, but rather are produced communicatively and constantly contes-
ted. Secondly – and this goes far beyond the first point – place, in its
turn, influences the social forces that have created it. It is not just
a passive product, but becomes a constitutive agent of new social
relations. Thirdly, place is seen as ‘‘relative and relational’’ (Massey
2005), rather than as a ‘‘bounded’’ location. It is constituted through
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interconnections with, rather than through oppositions to, other places.
Finally, place is not seen as stasis, but as a point of negotiation
and mutual constitution of space and time. All of the above leads
to an understanding of place as the nodal point of interrelations through
space and time. This by no means obliterates power relations as a consti-
tutive element of this interrelatedness, but on the contrary enables
to examine them.
Based on the conceptual framework of Doreen Massey, the German
urban sociologist Löw (2001) has developed new theoretical tools that
can be further applied to the empirical analysis of the diverse social
formations of new agents and their place-making strategies in an urban
system. Here, space is to be understood as the result of an act of
synthesis based on the specific strategies and tactics of individual
protagonists. The term ‘‘spacing’’ describes the active process by which
an individual relationally orders social goods and bodies (Löw 2001,
158). Based on this understanding, space constitutes itself as a process
through the synthesis of these social goods and bodies, by means of
perception, memory, and feeling. In the postindustrial city, individual
strategies of differentiation are symbolically and culturally formulated.
The socio-spatial structure expresses itself ever more strongly in local
politics, through which the individuals not only create a symbolic
difference, but also attempt to arouse attention through positioning
tactics anchored in the location. Focusing on the applied practices and
action patterns in the field of creative industries, milieu and scholarly
models can be highlighted. Seeing the spatial dimension as a conceptual
background for understanding urban practices by different agents around
the action field of creative industries, urban space can be deconstructed
according to the way it is negotiated, coded, divided, and communicated,
according to professional demands, administrative logics, as well as
milieu-specific demands.
2.3. Knowledge and Space: Experts as Place-Makers
In capitalist industrial societies, according to Gibbons, Nowotny, and
Scott, a fundamentally new mode of knowledge production has emerged
(Gibbons 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). This mode had
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Table 1. Modes of knowledge production
‘‘mode 1’’ ‘‘mode 2’’
Characteristics of
knowledge
– Bounded to societal subsys-
tems
– Long duration
– Universal, free of context
– Explicit
– Reflexive, connected
– Short half-life
– Local, bounded, and
contextualized
– Implicit ‘‘tacit knowledge’’
Institutional forms – Working in isolated action
settings
– Working in networks and
project groups
– Monodisciplinary – Intertrans-disciplinary
– Traditional hierarchies – Flat hierarchies
– Durable organizations – Temporary organizations
– Separation of science and
practice
– Networking of science and
practice
Sources: after Matthiesen and Bürkner (2004); Gibbons (1994); Nowotny, Scott, and
Gibbons (2001).
been caused by the differentiated ways of knowledge production, as
a part of the extension of communication technology and the changes
toward communication (or rather information) societies.
According to them, the emergence of a new form of knowledge
production is an indicator of a fundamental change in the structure of
society (Bender 2004, 149-158). Since the mid-1990s, attempts have
been made to describe this process using the terms ‘‘mode 1’’ and
‘‘mode 2.’’ While mode 1 involves being institutionalized in the form of
a subsystem separated from the rest of society, and finds the solutions to
problems out of this context in a disciplinary way and in organized
hierarchy, mode 2 operates specifically, transdisciplinarily, heterarchical-
ly, reflexively, and in an application-oriented way. In addition, mode 2
operates using locally oriented definitions of problems. Mode 1 creates
spatially clearly defined organizations and institutions, thus representing
a traditional form of knowledge production; whereas in the new constel-
lation of mode 2, work products are not primarily communicated and
maintained through institutional channels, but by and among individuals.
In the context of these limited-in-time organizational forms, highly
specialized project teams work under extreme resource pressure. These
teams, together with innovative scientists – specialists in particular
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technologies – symbolic analysts, economists, consultants, and patent
agents, as well as planners and politicians, work to achieve highly
competitive forms of development. Thus, being the competent bodies in
processes of the mode 2 type, humans represent the main resource of
knowledge production (Bender 2004, 151).
With Orlikowski, knowledge is ‘‘enacted – every day over time
– in people’s practices’’ (Orlikowski 2002, 250). Working in trans-
national contexts also means that people are confronted with other
social and cultural contexts, so they have to ‘‘improvise new practices
as they invent, slip into or learn new ways of interpreting and ex-
periencing the world,’’ and thus ‘‘continually reconstitute their knowing
over time and across contexts’’ (ibid., 253). Knowledge employees
– and also urban geographers, among others – who work in international
contexts embody geographic and cultural diversity, mentioned by Im
and Orlikowski (Im, Yates, and Orlikowski 2005, 254), and they differ
not only in expert and product knowledge, but especially in their
local milieu and institutional knowledge. This is why Orlikowski points
out that there are several boundaries – ‘‘temporal, geographic, social,
cultural, historical, technical and political’’ – that international kno-
wledge workers are confronted with (Orlikowski 2002, 255). So in-
ternational companies and research networks today are anxious to pro-
viding their employees with international experiences in order to acquire
cultural knowledge, and to learn to cope with these boundaries in
their everyday and work lives. From these findings, the materiality
of knowledge can be inferred: knowledge is subject to increasingly
rapid changes, and is not tangible but personal. ‘‘It immigrates or
migrates, depending on the carriers of the respective knowledge, and
on their networks’’ (Matthiesen and Bürkner 2004, 75-77).
As a result of the increasing competition for economic locations, in
the course of which a pool of highly qualified employees seems to be
a guarantor for regional competitiveness, resource ‘‘knowledge’’ is beco-
ming a decisive location factor (Meusberger 2000; Cooke 2002). How-
ever, due to the unequal global distribution of knowledge sources, in
addition to the question of the number and quality of scientific in-
stitutions such as universities, research institutes, technical colleges, and
others, the question of access to knowledge and, thus, the question of
suitable embedding conditions for experts, into their respective local
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context, as well as of their local interaction, is gaining new importance.
In this regard Orlikowski (Orlikowski 2002, 256) mentions three prac-
tices, ‘‘aligning effort, learning by doing, and supporting participation,’’
which describe how people ‘‘coordinate on complex projects, knowing
how to develop capabilities for doing product development and knowing
how to innovate within global operations.’’
Because they are embedded into local, regional, and global networks,
local agents ‘‘know how things work on site’’ (implicit local knowledge).
Thus, they know how and with which constellation of agents to address
and tackle problems. By exchanging knowledge with others and, ultima-
tely, by using and implementing this experiential knowledge, knowledge
spillover occurs. Thus under conditions of mode 2 knowledge produc-
tion, ‘‘on-site’’ opportunity structures, which serve as points of contact
for an intensive face-to-face communication, seem to be indispensable.
Skilful agents – forming suitable constellations (such as public-private
partnerships) and using network communication – are able to efficiently
bridge gaps in the market, to develop innovations, to establish successful
forms of marketing, and in the end to keep up with global innovative
trends. With the construction of a mission statement, urban planners,
consultants, and politicians, as well as employers hope to create a speci-
fic urban identity that speeds up the face-to-face communication and
cooperation in the city, and within the company.
3. Evaluating ‘‘Creative Leipzig’’
3.1. Decline and Development of Socio-Economic Fields
in Leipzig
As a former major commercial, trade fair, and cultural platform in
the heart of Europe, as well as a city that became heavily industrialized
in the GDR, the city and region of Leipzig have faced substantial
ongoing multilayered transformation processes since 1990. With a cur-
rent population of approximately half a million inhabitants, the city has
had to develop new, future-oriented knowledge-based economies, as well
as service industries that have had to be implemented and adapted to
meet the needs of the existing regional workforce (Lange et al. 2007).
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Parallel to the implementation of the new market system, a rapidly
established housing market challenged urban policy from the early 1990s
onward. As a result, new urban structures involving large suburban
single-family housing areas, as well as newly renovated fin de siècle
houses from the turn of nineteenth century in the inner city, and large
quantities of derelict industrial plants have led to the description of
Leipzig as a structurally ‘‘perforated city’’ (Lütke-Daldrup 2004).
The rapid decline in manufacturing industry, and the loss of more
than a hundred thousand jobs in the 1990s could not be compensated for
by the new job opportunities arising from the state-subsidized large
infrastructural, transportation and modern manufacturing projects; the
city’s expected demographic and economic growth prospects failed in
the late 1990s. High rates of long-term unemployment, social imbalances
between the new elites and the less qualified marginalized groups
– especially the city’s youth – represent the major social problems
facing Leipzig today. The brain drain of young and relatively well
qualified women, especially in the 1990s, must be seen as a reaction to
rare job opportunities in the regional labour market. Over the course of
this development, disillusionment with local politics because of disap-
pointed expectations, forced the public administration from the
mid-1990s onward to strengthen and to reconsider Leipzig’s urban,
cultural, and economic potential. Newly defined urban policies and
cluster strategies intended to create and extend existing strengths led to
ambitious goals (such as the application for the 2012 Olympics, which
ran until 2005). Since 2000, a small but steady growth in population has
taken place. These positive demographic developments are an exception
in eastern Germany, but cannot be explained away by positive develop-
ments in the labour market: to this day, approximately 18-20% of the
workforce has remained officially unemployed.
3.2. Leipzig and its Representation in the ACRE Project
With regards to Leipzig’s part in the ACRE project (Lange et al.
2007), there are two relevant empirical points: Firstly, the city of
Leipzig will be presented briefly as a individual case, based on its
distinct historical background. Secondly, in respect to quantified data
sets that aim to provide a result relating to the degree of creative- and
knowledge-based economies, the influence of small creative cells will be
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highlighted. These existing creative networks have been so far undetec-
ted by the first approach, although they play a decisive role in how the
city is recognized worldwide. Apart from the first perspective, a second
dimension has to be unfolded: the in which way experts, such as urban
scholars and others, produce a scientifically legitimated representation of
the degree of ‘‘creativity’’ and ‘‘knowledge’’ in European cities. There-
fore, I assume that not only should the methodological and theoretical be
seen as fields of negotiation, but also we should include the way in
which methods, theories, and expertise cultures are communicatively and
interactively established. Distinct forms of performance, modes of nego-
tiation, and modes of communication determine these cultures; in brief,
expert systems shape urban representation by their rootedness in scien-
tific scholarship.
The process of producing a creative-knowledge city region in scien-
tific terms is followed by numerous systematic steps: First of all, the
degree of creativity and knowledge in the case of Leipzig in the ACRE
project was based on the number of occupations in related creative- and
knowledge-oriented fields of employment, the number of companies, and
the turnover (gross domestic product) of selected industries and seg-
ments. These indicators have been applied to ‘‘quantify’’ the individual
creative and knowledge potential of a city.
Second, these single indicators have been framed by historical,
social, and demographic description that should provide a ‘‘thick descrip-
tion’’ of the path development of the city. The historical position should
provide the answer, if the observed potential of the creative and know-
ledge-based assets nowadays refers to its historical roots, or if they have
been applied and invented without having roots and grounds of origin in
the city-region. Thirdly, the ‘‘thick description’’ of a single city, a nar-
ration so far based on historical indicators, has been integrated in the
sample of 12 cities.
3.3. The Current Situation in the Creative-
and Knowledge-Intensive Industries in the City Region
of Leipzig
In 2005, the city of Leipzig had approximately sixty thousand
employees in the creative- and knowledge-intensive industries, and
the surrounding counties had slightly more than twelve thousand such
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employees. Between 2000 and 2005, more than approximately seven
thousand jobs have been created in this field, especially in Leipzig; that
is 14.77% more than in 2000. Nevertheless, this growth could not
compensate for the loss of 39,660 jobs between 2000 and 2005 in other
economic segments of the city-region of Leipzig; the surrounding state
of Saxony lost 12.73% of its workforce. Growth in creative industries
was taking place in the core area of the city-region – the city centre of
Leipzig – while losses were registered in the neighbouring counties of
Delitzsch, Muldentalkreis and Leipziger Land (Lange et al. 2007).
3.4. Profile of the City of Leipzig – Official
and Hidden Potentials
Although huge federal and state financial investment has been direc-
ted into forward-looking fields of knowledge (mainly in mobility, R&D,
high-tech infrastructure, and communication technologies), the research
effects – such as the number of patents, and the amount of research
funding – do not yet fully justify the financial investment. The weak
ratio between the number of inhabitants and the number of highly
qualified, skilled engineers in comparison to the neighbouring cities of
Dresden and Chemnitz, demonstrate in particular that further efforts
must be undertaken by public authorities and corporate companies, in
order to attract highly qualified, creative human resources into the city
of Leipzig. Furthermore, creative industries in general have not yet been
identified as a strategic field of action by local government in the city of
Leipzig. With respect to the positive factual performance in this field,
primarily in the media industry, integrative public-private partnership
strategies between educational institutions, R&D facilities, cultural pro-
duction, and a coherent urban and economic policy have also not yet
been registered. In order to position creative industries as a, if not the,
potential future economic field, a further integration into Leipzig’s
cluster policy, as well as into the creation of the metropolitan region
known as the ‘‘Saxon Triangle,’’ appears to be needed.
Existing creative scenes (core creative producers in the field of
design, art, painting, fashion, film, music, architecture, photography, and
other) play a crucial, though not very visible role in the everyday life of
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the city of Leipzig. Numerous creative agents in Leipzig – despite being
internationally renowned – are not yet seen or labelled as ‘‘ambas-
sadors’’ for Leipzig, although they contribute to the attractiveness and
quality of the cultural, intellectual, and everyday life in Leipzig. These
heterogeneous entrepreneurial scenes and creative milieus can be deno-
minated as diverse cultural urban dimensions, so that they contribute to
the attractiveness of the cultural economy in Leipzig. Their precarious
socio-economic status reflects the instability, project-orientation, and the
flexibility required of this economy.
4. Modes of ‘‘Producing’’ Creative-Knowledge Cities
– the Expert Perspective
4.1. Production of Representation; or, It’s the Stats, Stupid!
Although historical path developments, regional policy implications,
national policy guidelines, and unexpected regional circumstances have
been mentioned within the representational body – in this case the
reports produced by each research team – the most important sources of
information are national and European official statistics. Looking closer
at the knowledge resources that play a decisive role in the production of
scientific and political legitimacy, it is very obvious that large quan-
tifiable data sets especially serve as an informational background for the
comparison of cities. Single-factorial indicators such as gross domestic
product (GDP), employment and unemployment rates, levels of foreign
direct investments, and others provide an ‘‘objective’’ unquestionable
ground from which conclusions on city performance can be made. These
highly aggregated data, often single indicator-based approaches, serve as
analytical tools to group, categorize, and rank cities as pearls on a hierar-
chical chain. The process of grouping, categorizing, and ranking cities
systematically ignores the impact of specific individual path develop-
ments, the impact of nondisplaceable local circumstances, unforeseeable
political happenings that may have tremendous impacts on the city’s
evolution, and the level of development or stagnation that led to the
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emergence of a singular city profile. The nature of knowledge and
creativity are in particular not adequately identified in respect to their
influential effects on the performance structure of the city’s ‘‘Gestalt.’’
In brief, the methodological approach of single-indicator based com-
parisons presupposes the possibility to compare variables that have an
incomparable ground: the singularity of a city and its distinct differen-
ces. In posttraditional knowledge-based societies and urban systems, the
value of creativity and knowledge is hardly measurable, and is evaluated
on the basis of quantifiable indicators, when taking the specific value
and the nature of creativity seriously. Very often so-called hidden
champions play a decisive role in defining the profile of a city and its
recent potential for identification. In the case of Leipzig, a relatively
small number of artists who had silently resided in the Academy of Fine
Arts during the socialist period, later transformed an old style of painting
to a new leading painting style, recognized worldwide, which is now
association with the city as the ‘‘New Leipzig School’’ (Neue Leipziger
Schule). In the course of this success story, a cluster of supply services,
from galleries to material services, emerged – which in themselves have
no statistical relevance to employment, gross domestic product, foreign
directs investment levels, or other indicators. On the contrary, it has
propelled a new image of Leipzig around the globe, and infiltrated an
artist- and artist-related-network.
4.2. City-Regional Trajectories
Within the proceeding project, urban regions have been located along
four dimensions. Their position can be seen as hypotheses (see figure 2).
The economic dimension is here represented by the strong presence of
heavy industry, the ‘‘societal’’ dimension is represented by the region’s
status as a decision-making centre, the third dimension refers to the
stability of this decision-making status, as when we compare old and
new capital cities.
The key highlighted distinguishing factors separate older, historic
cities from others, and distinguish between those whose development has
been strongly shaped by policy intervention from those where this has
not occurred. Older capital cities also tend to be cultural and educational
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centres, and to carry forward important traditions in these fields. How-
ever they do not have a monopoly on positive attributes or the skills,
diversity, and inventiveness associated with successful modern cities,
which have often flourished partly because older cities were more closed
to new ideas and enterprises. The picture that can be derived from this
classification should help to evaluate the starting conditions for the
creative- and knowledge-based industries by the early 1990s. Some two
thirds of the research’s urban regions are decision-making centres. More
than a half of the cities are internationally known as historical-cultural
centres.
It is symptomatic that heavy industry remains important for the
economic profile only in the postsocialist cities (Sofia and Riga), with
Budapest and Leipzig already standing one step ahead in industrial
restructuring. Those of the western European cities, which have previous-
ly been known for their industrial or seaport activities (Birmingham,
Barcelona, and Amsterdam) have passed the stage of radical economic
restructuring much earlier, and are in the process of leaving this catego-
ry. Innovation and technological policy after 1990 is the only parameter
in this picture which reflects the effort made to achieve restructuring in
recent years. The matrix shows that policy efforts (especially those
which are successful) are much more evident in the Western cities (with
the exceptions of Helsinki and Milan). The question of whether it is
success that stimulates efforts for regulation and improvement, or whe-
ther, on the contrary, efficient policies provide the conditions for econo-
mic success, remains open. Furthermore, the placing of cities in one
category does not explain their relationships to the other, less important
evaluated categories.
4.3. Knowledge, Power, and Urban Scholarly Cultures
in Europe
Apart from the use of official statistics as an objective way to
categorize pathways and socio-economic performances of cities, specific
forms of knowledge seem to have a great influence on the way cities are
relative to each other. While one might assume that these relational
positions depend on transparent comparable figures, a rather subtle
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process in the way cities are positioned can be detected: Not only do
different statistical data sets, and different spatial demarcations (along
urban, regional, or city-regional dimensions) lead to different pictures of
the research units, but also the way that these differences are verbally,
aesthetically, and strategically articulated among project teams lead to
various forms of their integration into the body of knowledge, and so
into the body of our understanding of European creative cities.
Furthermore, strong differences can be detected in how project teams
position themselves and perform within research networks. Cities with
positive employment situations, such as Milan, Amsterdam, and Bar-
celona emphasis a Western type of creative urban dimension, by refer-
ring to historical conditions. On the contrary, cities such as Poznan´,
Riga, and Sofia have developed a rather different urban understanding of
performing and practicing ‘‘creativity’’; especially in socialist times, the
label ‘‘jazz club’’ could have been considered a synonym of ‘‘officially
accepted counter culture,’’ where creative and politically motivated ar-
ticulation took place. It can be assumed that these silently accepted
creative practices were not openly communicated, or in the course of
time associated with a specific (not to say non-Western) communicative
way of expressing and articulating this style. Looking especially at the
articulation of culture and creativity in cities, distinct western and
eastern European ways of articulation can be addressed. Especially
within liberal capitalist societies, Western cities had early established
modes of self-promotion and self-marketing, aimed at improving visibili-
ty and attention worldwide.
On the contrary, since the fall of the iron curtain, eastern European
cities have been often neglecting the socialist era – its buildings, styles,
and values – and refer instead to either the glorious presocialist times, or
to a breathtaking super-modernity with sharp socio-economic effects, in
order to visually hide the ruptures of the era of transformation (an
example of this is Moscow). Highlighting this ambiguity of the post-
socialist era, as well as its possible individual trajectory in respect to
Western-based understandings of urban development, is a tricky en-
deavour. It may confront the much stronger Western position (with its
scientific networks, and national and international financiers) and its
view of urban development, with the less powerful and less influential
scientific perspectives of the weaker states – in this case the recently
integrated states of eastern Europe.
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Research in an enlarged Europe is therefore considered a playground
with a hidden power agenda: acceptance in EU-funded (or other) net-
work projects is not only accompanied with an agreement to fulfil its
outline, but it is also based on an agreement to ‘‘contribute,’’ to ‘‘par-
ticipate,’’ to ‘‘network,’’ but not to differentiate or to opt for difference
– not to say separation.
Another relationship seems to be important: the socio-economic
success of cities such as Milan, Barcelona, and Amsterdam goes along
with the emergence of prominent scholars in urban and regional studies
who originate from these cities. These scholars have established a body
of knowledge of cultures in scientific community worldwide. In par-
ticular, the recent trend to brand a prosperous city with the label of
‘‘creative city’’ or ‘‘knowledge city,’’ has enabled the scholars of these
regions to speak for ‘‘their’’ region, and to participate in the city-regional
success.
Some illustrations of this are found in the success of the California
School, closely linked with the tremendous socio-economic success of
the Silicon Valley area; in the booming film and TV business in and
around Los Angeles; or in the rise of the ‘‘third Italy’’ debate – not only
connected to specific manner of doing geographical research in north
Italy, but also to a wider debate on ‘‘regionalism.’’ The formation of
a ‘‘school’’ is often based on the factual presence of positive regional
economic development. A ‘‘school’’ on the model of the California
School cannot be found in cities such as Detroit, Riga, Leipzig or others.
4.4. Does Language Separate or Unite?
The ideology of forming an integrative knowledge body based on
EU-funded research networks operates on the basis of a single language:
English. Although the EU finances a huge body of translators, in
practice it is English that dominates as the working language within
research projects. Robert Hassink (2007, 1282) recently summarized
a growing debate in spatial studies about how in ‘‘recent papers, edito-
rials, and commentaries the growing use of English as the main language
of communication in academic human geography’’ has been discussed
critically. Many institutions and their associated journals in many
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non-English speaking countries have decided to use English as their only
language, in order to become more attractive internationally. This has
led to a hegemonic situation, and forced many non-English speaking
countries to change their attitude toward this dominance. The perspective
that the Anglo-American viewpoint is dominating and thereby narrowing
the discipline by suppressing diversity is considered to be poorer and
less capable of understanding an increasingly complex world in which
diversity matters.
Transferring this briefly diagnosed situation to the work practice in
the case of the EU-project ACRE, the use of English seems to be an
unquestioned presupposition that everyone agreed to silently, or else has
not yet reflected on. One might think differently about this situation,
when ‘‘fine differences’’ of urban cultures are verbally articulated in
interviews and later analysed or interpreted in qualitative empirical
surveys. In a nonessentialist understanding, the contemporary globalized
worlds are articulated with their distinct translocal language, style, and
habits, thus guaranteeing an empirical access to a deeper understanding
of the constitution of the specific variety of ‘‘urban.’’ This would require
a quasi-ethnographic approach involving participant observation.
On the contrary, one might argue that first of all a common language
opens up the opportunity to exchange thoughts, perspectives, and ap-
proaches at all. Within such a global or European community, there
should be a literary space sufficient to articulate individual perspectives,
different approaches, and different outcomes toward leading (Wes-
tern-based) positions. But access to conferences, research networks,
papers, and publications is based on hidden anglophone alliances regula-
ting these approaches. So Hassink (2007) concludes that ‘‘geographical
discourse has been geographically partial.’’ He refers to Gutierrez and
Lopez-Nieva (2001, 67), who indicate that ‘‘so-called international jour-
nals are to a limited extent truly international, as the lion’s share of their
authors stem from the UK and the US.’’ They calculated that these two
countries account for 73.4% of the authors between 1991 and 1997,
whereas Germany and France each have scores of around 0.5%. The
dominant use of the English language has thus produced a global human
geography which is – on the contrary – still fragmented into national and
linguistic communities with their own, from a global point of view,
unheard positions and perspectives.
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The major argument related to the ACRE project is that this En-
glish-speaking research network has not yet established an analytical
perspective, and that there is a still unclear relationship between urban
cultures, language, and their representation in the scientific products of
the research network. In the case of understanding creativity- and know-
ledge-based urban development, it is obvious that in social networks in
particular, tacit and network knowledge becomes more and more impor-
tant, and thus the value of language increases. To conclude: if you want
to understand creativity-driven urban development in, say, Riga, you
have to speak the local language, although agents could also operate
worldwide and prefer to speak English. To become an insider in the
creative milieus thus requires not only the ability to speak the local
language, but also to have an insider position within scientific com-
munities in order to guarantee the dissemination of your acquired know-
ledge. The predominant use of English both unites and separates. A re-
flective (not to say supervisory) proceeding within research activities
might be needed in order to catch the ‘‘fine differences,’’ which are
articulated between the lines and often get lost when specifics are either
translated or squeezed into an predominant concept of, for example,
creativity or knowledge. This is especially relevant when looking at
urban development and urban decline in the transnational perspective.
5. Critique is not Enough, or a Proposal
as a Concluding Statement
This explorative article started with the question of how urban
decline and development are negotiated in EU-funded transnational
research networks, when analysing the impact of creative- and knowl-
edge-based economies on the degree of urban competitiveness. The
question was framed by theoretical concepts such as projects ecologies
(Grabher 2004) and mode-2 (Bender 2004, 149-158), in order to reflect
on the way that relevant knowledge is produced within research net-
works. The approach tried to understand the production of knowledge
about cities and not just of cities. This approach opened the opportunity
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to critically ask for the relation between the representation of the urban
as well as its production by scientific scholars, and the specific local
conditions articulated in reports, and in direct verbal interaction. Based
on a critical methodological reflection applied in the scientific reports, as
well as on language as a means to communicate between project
members, the following results can be suggested in conclusion, in
reference to the case of Leipzig and the EU project ACRE:
1. By attempting quantitative comparisons in the field of creative
and knowledge intensive industries, reasonable indicators for the specific
articulation of ‘‘creativity’’ and ‘‘knowledge’’ are rare, and often do not
touch upon its specific nature.
2. Referring to the EU-funded project ACRE, it can be observed that
creative and knowledge-intensive economies especially have to relate
their work performance to specific local contexts, as well as to inter-
national standards. The ambiguous situation of local rootedness and
global connectivity requires new competences and new forms of network
knowledge for entrepreneurial agents, in order to successfully survive in
the target market – or even to access the market at all. This is relevant
for cultural entrepreneurs as well as for spatial researches. Analytically,
it can be stated that cities have produced individual forms of represen-
tation of the urban that is implicitly rooted in local and regional research
cultures, and their scholarship (for example, the so-called California
School).
Epistemologically speaking, it can be concluded that a systematic
research outline should have been implemented in European research
networks in order to have the chance to supervise this relationship, as
well as the impact of scholarship, knowledge cultures and their distinct
forms (and traditions), in order to represent the ‘‘urban’’ at all. It is of
minor importance to highlight the fact that most of the internationally
known leading scholarship is located in growing and developing regions,
and not in declining, shrinking, stagnating regions.
3. It can be observed that the use of the English language unites as
well as separates transnationally oriented research networks such as the
ACRE project. Although each of the participants employs fluent English,
the influence of distinct local traditions of expertise and of knowledge
resources about the forms of representation in each city (not to say the
‘‘product’’) should not be underestimated in its relevance. Habitual and
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verbal everyday cultures, and the use of language to express specific
circumstances are factors that have to be taken more strongly into
consideration when dealing with less-established economies, such as the
newly emerging creative industries. Furthermore it can be concluded that
any form of representation is associated with power relations and that
– in the case of Leipzig – small informal networks of professional and
semiprofessional creative professions in particular do not yet have
a common form of representation or institutionalized lobby that pro-
motes these economies.
Finally, and without aiming to raise criticism, it is intended to
integrate a new reflexive perspective in transnational project cultures,
based on the assumption that national scholarly cultures and their know-
ledge competences have had, so far, much less problematic influences on
the representation of the urban. Knowledge about cities as well as of
cities plays an increasing role in the formulation of city marketing and
city branding strategies (Lange and Stöber, forthcoming). Furthermore
this type of reflexive city knowledge becomes more and more relevant
in relating single-city activities to the wider transnational context, as
well as to the city networks and their cooperative structures. Nowadays
expertise about the urban is required alongside new competences to
properly articulate and adequately express urban potentials, in order to
be able to highlight the distinct local specifics, as well as the inter-
nationally comparable assets. Briefly, one has to understand the local as
well as the international language about the city, although they might
both be the same spoken language.
When addressing the increasing relevance of new knowledge forms
of the city as a heterogeneous, but at the same time globalized or
homogenous object, recent debates have introduced the concepts of the
‘‘habitus of the city’’ (Lindner 2003; Matthiesen 2005; Berking and Löw
2005, 9-24). For instance, Lindner asks for the emergence of ‘‘land-
scapes of taste’’ that make distinct locations visible by means of cultural
practices and their material products. He concludes that these landscapes
of taste are by no means without prerequisite or instantly producible, but
are highly influenced and infiltrated by specific local economies and
cultural traditions.
Basically, the authors refer to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bour-
dieu 1982) in order to analyse the local dispositions, norms and prefe-
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rences that are inscribed in a city, those which are historically rooted
and can be seen as a ensemble of preferences of taste, lifestyles,
aesthetic preferences, conventions, and routines, which first of all ar-
ticulate the singularity of a city. Thinking further about these perspec-
tives, it becomes obvious that the constitution of a city depends also on
its reflexive knowledge about its origin. The singularity of a city seems
to become more important in globalized and homogenized worlds.
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Abstract. The article deals with the management of the complexity and
dynamics of urban and institutional transformation of cross-border entities.
That these are often characterized by parallelism and fractures of shrinkage
and growth, by rapid change and stubborn persistence, is seen as an obstacle
to the development and social cohesion that the EU sees as a precondition
for the competitiveness of places. Based upon research in the twin towns of
Frankfurt an der Oder and Słubice, which dealt with cross-border urban
development and university cooperation, we suggest in this article that
utilizing the heuristic concept of ‘‘KnowledgeScapes’’ allows a better under-
standing of factors supporting or hindering development. Turning the con-
cept around to actively further context-oriented building of communicative
capacities, it could help to enhance opportunities which are particular to
border situations. In two case studies, the authors found that ‘‘misfits’’ and
barriers existing on an institutional level and between different milieus may
be a driving force for learning processes, and could be encouraged by
providing institutionalized and milieu-sensitive opportunities for contact and
discourse in urban development.
1. Introduction
It was one of the EU’s goals in the Lisbon accord of 2000 to speed
up the development of the knowledge society as a basis for economic
growth and wealth-based social cohesion. Taking up the challenge pre-
sented by the different speeds of development that threaten the homo-
geneity of development, and that would eventually lead to greater
disparities in Europe, was among the major targets of this agenda for the
future. However, many data indicate that since then, and despite con-
siderable effort, the socio-economic and cultural rifts produced by the
different paths and paces of transformation in Europe are deepening,
rather than being levelled out. Whereas there exist dynamic centres of
excellence and openness toward the adaptation of new knowledge as
a basis for social and economic growth, other regions are seemingly
driven by parallel developments of growth and decline, leading to
a polarization that results in closing out innovations, and these regions
falling further behind on the track toward the knowledge society.
The department of the Leibniz Institute for Regional Development
and Structural Planning (henceforth IRS) researching the ‘‘coevolution of
knowledge and space’’ considered that looking at scenarios of rapid
transformation, and at locations where extreme socio-spatial and cultural
contrasts meet, could lead to an enhanced understanding of the reasons
for these differences in adopting knowledge as a driving force. However,
as an institute dedicated to practical and governance-oriented basic
research, the expectation was also that understanding factors which
further and inhibit knowledge based development would lead to results
that could be turned into policies, and promising forms of governance.
The paths in the development toward the knowledge-based society
are manifold and complex, as the German postunification transformation
is showing. It was an early postunification assumption that it would
probably take a decade to develop a homogeneous east-west balance
with respect to knowledge-based governance. Some even thought that
the new eastern states (Länder), exposed to rapid institutional moder-
nization and supported by the most up to date infrastructures, might
overtake the west and turn out to be the locomotive of knowledge-based
change. Two decades later, as shrinking cities (Oswalt 2004) and brain-
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-drain (Matthiesen 2004) rather indicate a slow-down of development,
especially in the peripheral eastern regions, it has become apparent that
this is not the case. Institutional transplantation and good infrastructure
are not sufficient to kick-start an enhanced use of knowledge in develop-
ment. Physical factors, such as distances to centres, or the availability of
natural resources are playing a role. But the post-unification experience
in Germany shows that openness toward knowledge and innovations is
rather based upon a mix of cultural factors. The social history of regions
(Fichter, Jähnke, and Knorr-Siedow 2004; Lange, Büttner and Mat-
thiesen 2003; Schmidt 2004) seems to be as important as current specific
milieu structures or the connectivity of actors and their milieus within
a region, and toward global development. Thus it is not beyond expec-
tation, that despite a concentration of post-unification public investment
and consumption subsidies in the east, growth has appeared only in
certain spots. Development was much more positive where a culture of
knowledge and innovation has embedded development policies; and
where reserve and a structural conservatism had remained dominant,
innovations have often been fended off.
However, a look at eastern Germany’s post-unification development
shows more than just regional differences. As transformation takes place,
former homogenous milieus are separating into often rather smaller
innovative sectors, and those uncoupled from development. There is
a close social and spatial proximity between the different speeds of
development, and growth and decline. With respect to knowledge as
a driving force, Germany has developed into a highly differentiated
landscape of high urban hills and mountainous ranges of metropolitan
regions (Kujath and Schmidt 2007), and of large plains and deep valleys
falling off toward the peripheries. And whereas mountainous knowledge
ranges are interlinked across some southern and western borders (such
the Basel triangle; Cologne, Aachen, Maastricht and on toward Lille),
such peaks of knowledge are rare along the eastern borders, particularly
along the German-Polish border. Looking at neighbouring Poland, the
indications are the same. As major metropolitan regions and narrow
transit corridors are becoming knowledge nodes, peripheral Poland is
losing out (Kuklinski 2004).
Border regions are especially prone to becoming uncoupled from
knowledge-based development as they are often peripheral from both
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countries’ perspectives. Whereas in the first postsocialist decade, high
transaction barriers impeded cross-border action – despite efforts at
building joint Euro-regions – since the lowering of the physical borders,
the cultural inhibitions to interchange are becoming more important in
determining whether borders are remaining places of division and low
activity, or whether they can be turned around into becoming bridges of
interculturally enriching communication and of wealth generation based
upon a proactive use of knowledge.
This article focuses on two case-studies carried out in the Po-
lish-German twin towns of Słubice and Frankfurt an der Oder, a typical
point of interchange for two otherwise rather peripheral regions – eastern
Brandenburg and the western Polish border region of Lubusz voivo-
deship. The thematic focus is on (a) urban development and planning,
and (b) an outstanding case of international university collaboration,
and the pitfalls and opportunities encountered in enhancing the knowl-
edge cultures ‘‘at the border.’’ From our perspective, these cases are
of a paradigmatic importance for understanding the different paces
of opening up to knowledge-driven development and incorporating the
border as a positive element of added value through incorporating
difference and proximity. Whereas managing the urban region of Frank-
furt an der Oder and Słubice is an opportunity to understand the
challenges of postsocialist normality along the border, the Collegium
Polonicum is one of the outstanding models for a cross-border knowl-
edge-space developing in Europe.
2. A Border Region in Transition – and Shrinking?
The region of Frankfurt an der Oder and Słubice has been in
constant transformation since the end of the Second World War. How-
ever, whereas Frankfurt an der Oder soon became one of the fourteen
district capitals of the German Democratic Republic and ‘‘rose out of the
ruins’’ (as the GDR’s national anthem had it) as the proud ‘‘City of
Semiconductor Works,’’ Słubice, once the smaller ‘‘Damm-Vorstadt’’
across the river, remained more of an underused transit-post until 1990.
But from a knowledge perspective, Frankfurt an der Oder also never
made it beyond a certain threshold. While its population grew until the
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Figure 1. Map of central Frankfurt an der Oder and Słubice.
Source: Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning
early 1980s, and the town offered housing and all basic amenities for
production workers, the knowledge-intensive basic semiconductor re-
search was carried out in the republic’s southern centres. With respect to
urban life and cultural institutions, ‘‘except for a rich musical life,
nothing outside of the mainstream happened ... Berlin’s attractions
probably lay too near.’’ As early as during the mid-1980s, the population
of some 87,000, which at one stage was planned to rise to over one
100,000, started to shrink, and since the 1990s the decline has drastically
accelerated. The town currently has a population of about 67,000, and
estimates for the 2020 population vary between an optimistic 54,000,
and a mere 44,000 with a dramatically growing proportion of the
elderly.
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After German unification, Frankfurt an der Oder received a heavy
blow in the loss of its district capital status and the crashing of its
semiconductor industry. Thousands were sent into redundancy and
through the rotating doors of no-exit training schemes. Since then the
local unemployment rate has remained near 20 percent, although many
active technical personnel have left.
2.1. Postunification Hopes for a Turn – Back to the
Industrial Future?
The materially well cushioned east German transformation path
perpetuated the notion held by many – residents as well as politicians
– that possible development had to be centrally induced through go-
vernment initiative, rather than as a result of civil self-governance.
At around the turn of the millennium, the Communicant semiconductor
facility promised a turnaround from decline into growth – back to
into an industrialist future. When it failed to materialized at a great
loss of public funds and private hope in 2003 (O’Brian 2004), it
became apparent that the Brandenburg approach of putting the political
emphasis on grand single-issue options had led away from other op-
portunities, and that the milieus that carried these had been partly
marginalized (interview 4)1.
In Frankfurt an der Oder innovative projects to strengthen the devel-
opment from within the local civil society – owner- and neighbour-
hood-driven renewal, attempts at bundling smaller-scale investments
locally (interviews 1 and 9) – were never embraced by the majority of
decision-makers as possible core initiatives for a diversified future. Even
the energetic establishment of a university – Viadrina European Univer-
sity – that really took off as an element of growth, inviting young
people, academic knowledge, and considerable public and private invest-
ment to the region, was for a long time hardly seen by the majority of
urban decision makers as a robust stepping stone on the way to turning
the town toward a knowledge-oriented future. Thus neither the Col-
legium Polonicum – a unique and real cross-border collaboration between
1 Quotations from interviews translated by the authors.
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Viadrina and Poznan´ University – nor the cultural concept of a trans-
national location, ‘‘Slubfurt,’’ promoted by the artist Kurzwelly were
seen as more than peripheral options. With their profile (law, economics,
humanities, and cultural sciences) these new institutions were neither
well enough linked to the past, nor to the neoindustrialist mainstream
visions of the town’s future.
Developments that lay outside the industrial path and cultural con-
cepts played an astonishingly small role in determining the town’s
habitus. Considering that for more than a decade, a turn back to an
industrialist future had seemed less likely than a postindustrial and
knowledge driven future, the response to the concept of a ‘‘university
and transnational double town’’ (Stadt Frankfurt an der Oder 2005)
remained vague and had almost no urban planning consequences.
2.2. Knowledge Relations across River and Border
During the period of state socialism, ‘‘the officially emphasized
cross border friendship was restricted to official administrative contact
and some folklore’’ (interview 3), and except for the short period
of thaw, the barriers in fact rose, because from the mid-1970s onward,
the Poles were officially pronounced ‘‘unsafe comrades’’ in the socialist
camp. Also after 1990, Frankfurt an der Oder’s relations with Słubice
and the rest of the region across the river ‘‘have hardly been pursued
proactively and with persistence’’ (interview 1). The same, however,
applies for Słubice, which even after 1990 ‘‘had much less room
for manoeuvre ... due to the centralist government system in Poland,
and a feeling that local collaboration was not really encouraged by
Warsaw’’ or by the German side (interview 4). Although there was
a general understanding that the future lay in opening the borders,
old established reservations and disbelief in possible win-win oppor-
tunities of cross-border initiatives have led to official cooperation re-
maining mostly formal (interviews 1 and 2).
The persistence of the closure against the Polish ‘‘other’’ was not
only felt in official contact, but surfaced openly during the so-called
‘‘war of buns.’’ The quarrel was whether the cheap but undeniably good
Polish bread rolls should be sold across the border in Frankfurt an der
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Oder. But although the notion dominated in Frankfurt an der Oder that
one should buy German goods so long as Germans were unemployed at
such high rates, the cheap Polish market across the bridge, and inciden-
tally near the Collegium Polonicum, boomed with German customers.
And indeed, while growth rates in low-income Słubice had steadily risen
since 1990 due to informal service initiatives, from car repair to
cross-border dentistry, Frankfurt an der Oder’s economy remained in
a relative stalemate. Informal options either had no basis in the resi-
dents’ repertoire of action, or else were subdued by formalities and
plastered over by public subsidies. Also the rejection of a tram connec-
tion across the border bridge, suggested by the mayor, in a 2002
referendum could be interpreted as a signal of harsh closure – or
insecurity – in the confrontation with new opportunities. In 2000, Frank-
furt an der Oder’s harsh milieu structures even made it into widely
debated literature (Mendling 2000). The probably over-accentuating do-
cumentary Neuland (Newland) provided a show of arrogance and
‘‘self-protection’’ – proving most of all that east-west German stereo-
types were as heavily grounded in the local milieus as German-Polish
resentments – with a continuing threat of self-acceleration.
3. A Milieu-Sensitive Look at Two Different
Urban Milieus
3.1. Case Study: Urban Milieus in Policy and Planning
In the first of our two case studies, the focus is on Frankfurt an der
Oder and the role that milieus and their specific knowledge play in
urban and cross border development. Relating to the debates about
evidence-based (Faludi 2006) and milieu-oriented planning, urban actors
from policy makers to planners, administrators and researchers, as well
as members of civil society were asked what the role of professional and
everyday milieus is in filtering expert planners’ knowledge to become
the foundation of action in the local political realm.
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One assumption was that milieu influences and the respective tacit
forms of knowledge often beat the logics of professional networks and
expert knowledge, regardless of any grounding in evidence, as experts
see it. The other assumption was that there are drawbacks as well as
identifiable opportunities related to the dominance of milieus which can
be utilized in a better grounded and more promising development
discourse.
Cross-Border Perception in Policy and Planning
For a long time, urban planning in Frankfurt an der Oder has
virtually turned its back on the river and the border. In a striking
contrast to the international hype over waterfronts, town planning stran-
gely treated parts of the historic inner city and the waterfront as an
urban periphery, while peripheral panel estates were upgraded long after
the risks of a shrinking population had become evident. For many years,
rehabilitation projects and new developments happened either in a low
key fashion or, like the planned new semiconductor factory, located
toward the outskirts or along traffic infrastructures – following develop-
ment concepts of the growth-oriented pre-unification period. Urbanity
and vivid mixes in the centre were not on the decision makers’ minds,
and even ‘‘support for those private owners and investors who wanted to
bring urban life back to Berisinchen [the nineteenth century city centre
extension] was muffled’’ (interview 4). Many of these decisions have
a basis in either ‘‘objective’’ reasons, among them the availability of
state rehabilitation funds only for earmarked ‘‘programme areas,’’ or
external investors’ demands. But to an astonishing degree, decisions
were taken that seem to contradict evidence, reason, and state-of-the art
professional planning knowledge.
‘‘... Germany has a really well established theoretical and prac-
tice-oriented system of planning. All types of information are available
... There are the German professional organizations and there is thematic
discourse. The problem starts when that is overlaid by local interests,
against which we as planners are not able to argue – given the concrete
power structures. ... We have for a long time done the wrong things,
although we professionals knew better ...’’ (interview 1).
Besides reflecting the harsh realities of economy, location, and
political structures – which are outside of the realm of local politics
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– Frankfurt an der Oder’s post unification urban development greatly
reflects the strengths and weaknesses of different landscapes of local and
supralocal milieus that influence the professional debate. On one hand,
some of these milieus are the holders of formal and informal power,
while others, indeed, are excluded. On the other hand, their influence on
development is dependent on the degree of interconnectivity of their
respective knowledge-repertoires and their ability to forge coalitions.
Controlling different repertoires of knowledge – expert-knowledge,
everyday-knowledge and institutional knowledge (Matthiesen 2004) – in
a local overlay, they influence the urban development discourse in a way
that even well placed and empirically grounded professional arguments
only come to bear to a limited degree. But apart from professional
knowledge being outplayed by ‘‘strong’’ unitary milieus, it also happens
that culturally based concepts – such as those formulated in the ‘‘Slub-
furt’’ metaphor of a joint urban region – are outplayed in power games.
Weak Civil Roots
Because Frankfurt an der Oder had been a town of a constant inner
German immigration since the end of the war, the local milieus are
characterized by ‘‘weak roots’’ (interview 1). More than 90 per cent
– calculated from a survey conducted during 1980s – of the residents
had come as refugees, or seeking labour. The newcomers ‘‘often found it
difficult to accommodate themselves ... This may be one possible reason
for the persistent inward closure of the various milieus and the juicy
intermilieu conflicts ... never solidly established, they were mostly
related to the workplace, which then broke away’’ (interview 1). After
the ‘‘turn’’ of 1989 and deindustrialization, despite the material cushion
of the German social transfer system, a great many were factually
excluded from economic advancement and societal recognition, and even
more felt so. While many key positions in the economy were taken over
by a new wave of migrants from ‘‘the West,’’ a still-limited new middle
class arose, leading to a pattern of socially and spatially segregated
milieus.
There is only a relatively small group of urban decision makers and
people active in the urban discourse: ‘‘Less than 100 people, including
party activists, some professionals, and a limited number of cultural
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actors [Kulturschaffende] who often show up ... not many in a city of
over fifty thousand.’’ Especially important among them is the so-called
semiconductor milieu that has undergone a change from being a defen-
sive and closed milieu, hesitant toward any new development options
during the 1990s, to an interestingly persistent and influential group.
A third group, and probably the best interconnected, represents the wider
cultural and scientific realm, including parts of the research staff of the
university, and cultural actors like the Slubfurt initiative in their centre.
‘‘The semiconductor milieu, if it can be called that, has taken a lot of
the pre-unification structures to where they are today’’ (interview 3).
Ironically, after many technical personnel had left, it was the ad-
ministrational bureaucratic part of the semiconductor milieu – in col-
laboration with those entrepreneurial specialists who developed small
high-tech companies from the bankruptcy assets (Lange and Büttner
2005) – that strongly supported the move for reindustrialization. After
having infiltrated the newly established postunification institutions of
urban administration, university management, and some innovative
start-ups, this milieu for a long time was strong through its informal
influence, paired with a formal representation in the administrational,
economic, and political networks. After being a blockading factor in
many respects for over a decade, this milieu of persistence has partly
converted to a new openness to the oncoming concept of the solar city.
Other active urban milieus, especially that of the university, have
found it hard to become grounded in the town. Torn between the city
which often understood them as antagonistic – racial aggression being
only the tip of the iceberg of signals perceived – and the attractions of
Berlin, they often succumbed to the ‘‘brain-train’’ (the express to Berlin),
and remained part-time residents. Cross border milieus, outside of obli-
gatory planning networks, began to exist after the border physically
opened, but are small and usually highly dependent on very active
individuals, and not embedded or cross-cutting into any other milieus.
Within the game being of influenced by the struggling ‘‘entre-
preneurs of power’’ (interview 3), the everyday knowledge of resident
milieus – like those non-organized residents living in the large housing
areas – was easily excluded from the urban discourses, except for rare,
but crushingly outspoken public debates in periods of planning conflict.
They showed up during the debate about the tram link across the bridge
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to Słubice, and they featured in the difficulties of communicating about
the partial demolition of panel-blocks within the federal programme of
urban regeneration (Stadtumbau), which was long dominated by the
tactic of withholding information from the residents ‘‘whose dwellings
were to be demolished – out of care that people would be overstressed,
or because planning mediation was overpowered by egotist political
games.’’ Professional planners’ advice about the integrating capacity of
participatory practices was neglected in the face professional advice
from within the administration and from outside advisors (interview 2).
An Approach Toward Integrated
and Communication-Oriented Planning
Time has softened some of the formerly strict milieu-boundaries,
with help from the influence of certain individuals’ personal engagement
– such as the university president, who has engaged in urban debates
– and under the influence of methodical changes in the planning proce-
dures, stemming from integrated planning becoming more
state-of-the-art in Germany. But at least as important are structuring
interventions from outside, which induce learning processes. The federal
and state Socially Integrated City programmes – although not wholeheart-
edly adopted by the urban actors as a programme, which has made
funding physical development more difficult – have left their traces in
supporting an understanding of the interconnectedness of urban actors by
‘‘forcing’’ them to cooperate in order to acquire subsidies for their
projects. The state of Brandenburg’s demand for Integrated Urban Devel-
opment Concepts – under the name of INSEKs – has further encouraged
collaboration within the town and across the border, as a long-term
vision for the urban region was mandatory for acquiring state funds for
urban regeneration. These elements of urban policies have helped to
overcome the autistic path dependencies of the various milieus that still
are to be found in Frankfurt an der Oder – as they are represented by
‘‘eastalgia’’ (nostalgia for the old system and structures) and cultural
dissidence. After over a decade, a new sphere of milieus, partly groun-
ded in the old, but more open toward active encounter than self-defence
seems to be slowly emerging.
‘‘Ironically the attempts by the town’s upper echelons and fearful
power preservationists to keep up their steering capacity by fending off
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public debate and experimental innovations as irrelevant, has led to
exactly the opposite to their desired results. Today, in an atmosphere of
little trust, the politicians and planners find it difficult to control because
they are lacking access to other than their own milieus. Not providing
space and opportunity for urban discourse has not empowered them, but
led to a competition of milieus and new arrangements, that may render
knowledge-based urban planning more difficult’’ (interview 4).
For realizing the now-evident opportunities – solar industry and
university capacity in a more than just virtual Slubfurt region – new
spaces and time allocations should be agreed upon. Learning from across
the fence – in this case from university collaboration – should be
encouraged on the side of town development. Lateral learning (Bueren,
Bougrain, and Knorr-Siedow 2002) in projects of integrated planning
should be pursued across milieu barriers in an institutionalized develop-
ment discourse. If this is to become more than negative coordination
(Scharpf 1998), the instruments of integrated and actor-oriented planning
should be placed centrally for the development of a cross-border vision
of Slubfurt, from its present highly virtual quality to a more
down-to-earth reality.
3.2. Case Study: Academic Milieus in Polish-German
University Cooperation
With the inauguration of a joint Polish-German university, the ‘‘Col-
legium Polonicum’’ (CP) in Słubice, its founders aimed to send a special
signal in this precarious border situation. Under the specific conditions
of the border region, the CP not only functions as a university, it also
takes on an important role within the process of Polish-German conver-
gence. In addition to its academic assignment, the CP acts as a centre of
contact and communication with a multitude of initiatives 2 that are
targeted at the academic realm, as well as at the regional population, to
foster cross-cultural understanding in the region.
The Polish-German university is a joint foundation of the Viadrina
European University in Frankfurt an der Oder and Adam Mickiewicz
2 For example, within the EU Interreg programmes.
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University in Poznan´ (AMU). It is situated in Słubice in a privileged
location directly visible across the river from Frankfurt an der Oder. The
new building was opened in 1998, long after the first joint Po-
lish-German study courses started in 1993 without a space of their own.
In running the university, many actions needed to be carried out without
much of a legal or institutional basis, and on the grounds of informal
agreements based on trust. After a long period of debate concerning the
legal status of this cross-border university, finally in 2002, a governmen-
tal agreement between the German state of Brandenburg and Poland was
signed. As the CP has no legal status of its own, and has no budgeting
rights, the joint university is – in principle – fully dependent on its two
founding universities, Viadrina and AMU. Everyday affairs are managed
by a joint committee consisting of members from both parent univer-
sities. The institution has a self-declared target to not only to contribute
to academic teaching and research, but to become active on all in-
stitutional levels in Polish-German collaboration (see Wojciechowski
2005, 21-22).
It was thus of prior interest to find out what the challenges of
practical everyday university cooperation are, and how the set bench-
marks of collaboration are met. Because it is here that the different
national educational systems and the knowledge culture have to find
their interface, and on this level that the differences show themselves.
This cooperation shows all the signs of being a ‘‘laboratory’’ (Woj-
ciechowski 2005, 25) that enables research about the cross-cultural
institutional learning processes in the realm of the European higher
education system – especially with regards to the opportunities and
problems involved in establishing a joint collaboration between Polish
and German academic institutions. By researching the interactions that
are taking place between the different knowledge and learning cultures,
universally accepted knowledge can be generated, knowledge which is
transferable to other cross-border university collaborations.
Institutional Misfits – Causes of Conflicts and Opportunities
for Learning
As with urban development and collaboration across borders and
milieu boundaries, cross-border discrepancies between institutions – in-
stitutional ‘‘misfits’’ – are central in influencing the collaboration within
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Table 1. Institutional misfits
Kind of misfit Example
Misfits within formal (codified) institutions National educational system
University law
Organizational structures
Labour law
Social security system
Curricular arrangements
Misfits within informal (noncodified)
institutions
National and regional knowledge cultures
Value systems and norms
Administrational routines
Work and learning structures
Forms of communication
Behaviour in conflict situations
Mentalities
the university realm, and hindering the emergence of an inclusive
knowledge-utilization culture.
Misfits and Institutional Learning in Polish-German
University Collaboration – Empirical Findings
As early as the beginning of the cross-border collaboration to set up
the joint university, institutional misfits presented a considerable stum-
bling block, when a joint legal agreement was to be signed as the
founding document for the CP. The reason lies in the different forms of
responsibility for higher education in Poland and Germany, that is,
within the realm of formal institutions. As the responsibilities for univer-
sities in Poland lie with the central government and in Germany with the
federal states, negotiations had to be arranged between levels of different
political and administrative status. Especially on the Polish side, this
problem of communication between different levels across borders was
perceived as problematic, and the representatives of the state of Bran-
denburg were not accepted on an equal footing. ‘‘For some time, the
Polish side requested ... the presence of at least the German foreign
minister. But the German side did not concede to this demand ...‘‘
(interview 5). This misfit between the formal systems of institutions
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considerably prolonged the debates about the final contract. In the end it
took over ten years, until finally a governmental agreement could be
signed between Poland and the German state of Brandenburg, in which
all rights and responsibilities of both sides with respect to the joint
university were agreed upon. To the present, this agreement is singular
within Polish foreign policy.
But misfits also exist within the everyday practices of the university,
because of the different educational systems; it is a constant challenge to
find working ‘‘solutions in the field of organization, legal regulations,
modern communication techniques, labour law, finances, and – last but
not least – in the culture of everyday work’’ (Wojciechowski 2005,
21-22). Thus, long before the official governmental agreement was
signed, problems regarding the everyday running of affairs had to be
solved. As early as 1997, and outside of any routine practice, wireless
data links had to be established across the national border (Fitzner 2005)
in order to link up the computers. Also for problems of labour law
unconventional solutions were found: German staff working at the CP
– on Polish territory, and in an organization under Polish law – are on
one hand benefiting from the same status as Polish employees, but also
retain the benefits of the German labour and social security systems.
A complicated system of income subsidies had to be developed for
Polish employees, in order to absorb the drastic income differences
between Germany and Poland. During the early years, when certificates
permitting employment across the border were almost unheard of, Ger-
man ABM employees3, officially working in Frankfurt an der Oder,
contributed to the CP by (illegally) crossing the border. ‘‘Both adminis-
trations knew about this, but kept silent’’ (Wojciechowski 2005, 24). The
actors speak of ‘‘passive cooperation,’’ which made things possible long
before Poland’s accession to the EU (interview 5).
The solutions found in the everyday practices of the CP worked well
most of all because a high level of trust between the Polish and German
partners. But additional misfits in the informal realm, and in the dif-
ferent knowledge cultures, also contributed to misunderstandings and
problems in negotiations. Within the university bodies – such as the
standing committee dealing with everyday management – widely dif-
3 Long term unemloyed working in publicly paid nonprofit jobs.
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fering patterns are followed in solving problems by the Polish and the
German contingent (interviews 5 and 6). While the German deputies
address problems openly at the conference table, this raises eyebrows on
the Polish side. According to Polish customs, conflicts are usually not
addressed directly in official debates, but first an understanding is sought
in informal communication, such as over a coffee in the cafeteria
(interviews 5 and 7).
Especially during the early years, neglecting such culturally based
differences made many negotiations difficult. It was understood as
a necessity to address possible solutions as early as the procedures were
developed, in order to minimize the dangers of culturally based conflicts.
Thus decisions are only taken by consensus in the standing committee,
and not by majority vote. The debate is centred on finding joint solu-
tions, and continues until no further objections are aired. This type of
procedure, sensitive to cultural differences and the trust established in
the learning processes, has resulted in improvements in the climate of
negotiations over the years (interviews 5 and 6).
Different knowledge cultures are also found in academia. The stu-
dents also have to face the challenges of intercultural difference on
a daily basis (Hiller 2006). German teachers and students often notice
the reserved behaviour of Polish students in class, while the Germans
appear more aggressive and communicative. These differences are un-
derstood as rooted in the different educational traditions on either side of
the border: while the Polish system is based on learning in a strictly
preformatted environment, the German educational system is rather
dedicated to reflection and communicative learning. These differences
appear as atmospheric factors in the classroom, and also in evaluations
of teachers. As a response to these differences, courses on intercultural
communication have recently been started for all newcomers to the
university.
Learning Processes and Approaches to New Knowledge Cultures
The areas of conflict which derive from the institutional and cultural
misfits emerge in the practice of daily collaboration within the univer-
sity. But at the same time, it becomes obvious that the unconventional
and innovative solutions can also only develop in close interaction
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between members of different educational systems and knowledge mi-
lieus. In order to reach the set objectives, there is a need to devise new
solutions, and to engage in joint learning which can also lead to an
orientational set of knowledge for other cross-border collaborations
among European universities.
An empirical example will be used to illustrate how such an in-
ter-cultural process of convergence – as a hybrid form of different
knowledge cultures – can emerge. In this excerpt from an interview,
representatives of the CP’s management answer the question of how
communication is built up in bilateral negotiations, and in joint univer-
sity courses:
‘‘Well, first there was an attempt to reach multilingual communica-
tion. We do have a management strategy at the CP that everybody talks
in their mother tongue. That is, we Germans talk German, and the Poles
speak Polish. But both sides need to be sure that the other side under-
stands, or if they don’t, that the other keeps on requesting clarification
until they do understand. And then we thought that this should be
a model for teaching, which means that we do not, in the first place,
request that everybody speaks Polish perfectly. But students should be
able to follow a Polish lecture roughly, and be able to ask questions.
That’s a passive [capacity to master the other language]’’ (interview 6).
This solution, which was initiated for practical considerations in
order to facilitate intercultural communication by allowing an understan-
ding of matters to grow, sounds plausible, because often a joint lingua
franca proves insufficient when not all concerned are highly proficient in
this third language.
We here make an attempt to analyse this solution, and to unravel
the deeper meaning and the possible qualities of such a strategy.
The interviewees’ assumption is that such a solution is related to
a number of predeliberate learning processes, and that first outlines
of a new knowledge culture are emerging, as this bilingual solution
implies the following:
1. An understanding that communication in an intercultural context
is limited when it takes place in a language other than the mother
tongue, especially when it comes to discussing culture-related matters.
2. A recognition of the differences between and differentiation of
cultures, which is best expressed through one’s own language. Such
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a bilingual strategy also implies sensitivity concerning existing asymme-
tries between cultures, which may find expression in the form of the
dominating language.
3. An acceptance of distance and obscurity. This means that it is
being accepted that not all aspects of another culture can be fully
understood, and that further intercultural communication needs to deve-
lop reflexive knowledge and awareness of ones one ‘‘cultural lens,’’ by
interpreting social actions in this process.
Learning processes which further intercultural creativity in com-
munication design, are connected to the emerging new knowledge cul-
tures in terms of
– the multitude of European cultures; this leads toward an intercul-
tural understanding which accepts difference and the opportunities ari-
sing out of European cultures;
– the asymmetries in bilateral collaboration; access and knowledge
are developed about the chances of overcoming existing or perceived
assymmetries, and how cultural differences can be made productive;
– ambiguity; It is possible to learn tolerance toward ambiguity. This
means that possible diversions arising from the non-understanding of the
other culture can be endured and taken into account for a while, without
becoming the basis for stereotypes and prejudices.
This opens up opportunities for innovation and a new connectivity
between different cultures. A new way of dealing with difference emer-
ges: the need for homogenization and assimilation is exchanged for an
acceptance of diversity and its use as a potential for creativity.
4. Conclusion
During the empirical phase, the relations between the actors and their
role in formal communication in targeted and strongly structured net-
works and – at the same time – in the informality and fluidity of
milieus, has been researched and interpreted as a landscape of knowl-
edge and as different configurations of knowledge cultures. This heuri-
stic concept of the ‘‘KnowledgeScape’’ (Matthiesen 2007), leading from
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data collection to knowledge and understanding, has – from our perspec-
tive – been highly successful in determining the factors explaining the
openness and closedness of actors in reaching their professionally set
goals. Identifying which role ‘‘formalized’’ professional knowledge and
tacit knowledge play in integrating different perceptions of others, or to
split off the other from ones own perception in urban development and
university collaboration, has also shown that this approach incorporates
a strong proactive element as well. It has been shown that overcoming
misfits in institutions and cultures requires both – the supporting skele-
ton of formal institutions, and the courage to allow an openness of weak
milieu structures to develop, and the recognition that in both types of
organizations observed, the main emphasis should be on allowing the
paradox of institutionalizing the weak ties to happen in order to strength-
en the rationale of strong ties (Granovetter 1973).
4.1. Cognitions from a Milieu-Sensitive Approach
to Urban Development and Cross-Border Transformation
In both case studies, the milieu-based interpretation of cultural codes
and the milieu-related interpretations of difference have been found to
lead to a wide range of misfits – language, institutions, and routines
codes need to be debated in a joint space in order to allow a joint
understanding to be developed, which can then lead to a rational inter-
pretation of the differences, and to a joint understanding. This leads to
the assumption that a clear understanding of the landscape of milieus
together with their cultural grounding is a vital part of the evidence that
needs to be considered when developing a rationale of development, or
– as others call it – evidence based planning (Faludi 2006). Especially
across national borders, and with regards to knowledge as a structuring
element of milieus and networks, it becomes evident that the common
understanding – or the myth, as it often is – of knowledge as a liberator
from stereotypes needs to be re-evaluated.
The findings of both case studies suggest that the development of
a milieu-spanning and promising knowledge culture that can become
a foundation for institutional development based in different forms of
knowledge (Matthiesen 2004) as it is embedded in different milieus, is
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rarely a large design, but rather a small-scale and tentative development.
It happens in the intermediary spaces and niches between cultural
milieus before it reaches the organizations as such, and needs to be
given experimental space along with strong network ties. We have found
that a socio-spatial (re)construction of the communications between
border space and knowledge space happens in small steps, as a coevolu-
tionary and dynamic process between spatial development, the interac-
tions within and between milieus, and the emergence of new knowledge
and cultural understanding. These processes, however, rarely develop in
a linear and straightforward manner. Instead they are characterized by
halting and even backward turns, if they are not supported by strong
milieus that have the ability and the backing in local society to let them
carry on experimental paths, and spread the knowledge they have found
to be of importance to bridge intercultural difference. New knowledge
cultures contain a refound or newly found combination of knowledge
forms, that each have strong roots in the different cultures. And these
can be brought to bear as elements of a new quality in cross-border
collaboration and urban development in twin-cities with different cul-
tures and milieus. They are manifest in new action routines, habitualiza-
tions, and sets of rules, which together contribute to the construction of
social and spatial reality. We assume that this development takes place
as a coevolutionary process. In figure 2, the ‘‘triple helix’’ represents
a tentative attempt to visualize this coevolutionary process, and to
describe it from a theoretical and conceptual perspective.
Over time, the following steps can be conceptualized:
1. Borders as socially constructed spatial structures have influence
on the interactions and actions in the border space;
2. Interactions and actions reproduce themselves as new modes of
action – also isolated within certain milieus;
3. Repetitive actions lead to new milieu-embedded and more gene-
rally approved codes of conduct, and routines or habits.
4. During this process, new explicit and implicit knowledge about
interrelations between milieu, actions, and space, and the importance of
an open culture of knowledge – in other words, an acceptance of and
seeing the benefits of other types of knowledge and understanding
– emerges and is jointly adopted;
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Figure 2. Coevolution of milieu, knowledge, and space.
Source: adapted from Fichter-Wolf (2008)
5. The new routines or habits already incorporate new informal rules
(institutionalizations), which can also find their expression in experimen-
tal formal and codified institutions – such as plans and regulatory
agreements in urban development, or contracts and joint curricula in
university life.
6. New informal and formal institutions are established across the
boundaries of existing institutions and spatial borders. In urban develop-
ment, a cross-border understanding of an urban region finds its in-
stitutional framework and network structures; and at the same time in
cross-national cooperations between universities, new approaches to
a new knowledge culture can emerge, which reaches an even wider
European level; and borders can change their meaning from social
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constructions of division to socio-spatial structures with an especially
enriching character.
In the empirical processes of the two case-studies, this concept – far
from being understood as normative – served as a methodological tool
of reconstructing processes between the formality of networks, and the
informality and infinity of milieus. The understanding of steps and
actions as they became apparent in the interviews and observations,
could be systematically analysed in their relations to the coevolution of
space, milieu, and knowledge.
4.2. On the Role of Knowledge in the Process
of Socio-Spatial Coevolution
The role of knowledge has a specific value in this conceptualization
of coevolutionary processes. Within processes of intercultural interac-
tions, knowledge in its different forms serves as a system of filters
(Meusburger 2006, 286ff.), as specific forms of knowledge influence the
process of intercultural understanding in different ways. Systematic
expert knowledge – for example, professional and often highly sectoral
expertise, management knowledge, language capabilities, and so on – is
accumulated in often long periods of learning, usually cannot be trans-
ferred ad hoc from actor to actor, and comprises an important part of the
culture of professional milieus. This preunderstanding functions as a fil-
ter because it provides the basis for the understanding of new infor-
mation that ‘‘fits,’’ or the outright rejection of misfits. Another filtering
system – often known as symbolic knowledge (s.b.) – refers to, for
example, religious or ideological convictions, cultural traditions, socially
constructed memories, as well as stereotypes and prejudices. This – most-
ly implicit – knowledge, which is also often called ‘‘tacit knowledge,’’ is
acquired during socialization and acts in the form of belief systems
(Sabatier 1993) as a filter: the concrete form of these knowledge forms
within individuals – and backed up or questioned by their milieu
– determines whether new information fits the visions and habitus of the
actor, or is emotionally barred. However, it seems to be decisive for the
social construction of reality in space that these different filters – and
additional ones of a more physical nature, such as a river can easily be
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imagined – do not function in isolation. Only through their interdepen-
dence, determined by space and milieu, do they influence how ‘‘infor-
mation’’ (or images) are consciously and unconsciously processed, and
evoke mental associations.
It is thus of the utmost importance for intercultural learning and for
the balance between the necessary embeddedness one has in ones own
milieu, and one’s openness toward the other, where (undisclosed) pre-
vious knowledge can be accessed in a border situation, that is, how new
knowledge can be integrated into one’s own knowledge repertoire. The
empirical findings have shown that this happens in ‘‘soft’’ processes of
arguing and bargaining, and by engaging in conflict regulation rather
than in formalized forms of network cooperation through regulatory
agreement. Providing the spatial and temporal opportunities for such
social processes, between the formal network structures and the infor-
mality of milieus, the conscious development of translatory rules and the
development of on-going trust, has been found to be especially vital in
this context. These processes as a whole determine the dynamics of
interaction between the actors across borders, and it becomes obvious
that a balance should be kept between integrating the basic milieu
knowledge and providing the – often external – expert knowledge
necessary to break through the dangers of milieu closures. At best, and
over time, the opportunities then develop for hybrid mixed forms of
different knowledge cultures and specific institutional arrangements.
As our case studies suggest, these processes can show up in
a cross-border ‘‘knowledge space’’ – in urban development as well as in
joint university environments. However, it will not be one unitary or
homogeneous construct, such as a designed-from-above European know-
ledge space, but rather the result of a mix of different but open cultures
that engage in a coevolutionary process on the grass roots level of
different milieus, but supported by the central state and suprastate
institutions.
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Interviews
1. Group interview with urban planners, town administration, and external advisor, Frank-
furt an der Oder, May 2006.
2. Local politician involved in social policy and urban development, January 2007.
3. External planning consultant for the town of Frankfurt an der Oder and the state of
Brandenburg, June 2007.
4. Interview with urban planner, area manager in Frankfurt an der Oder after 1990, and
member of the teaching staff of the Collegium Polonicum in Słubice.
5. Member of the steering committee, Collegium Polonicum in Słubice, May 19, 2005.
6. Member the management, Viadrina European University in Frankfurt an den Oder,
December 15, 2005.
7. Lecturer in a bilateral study course, Collegium Polonicum in Słubice, December
12, 2006.
8. Discussion with a member of the Polish-German management staff during a conference
at the Collegium Polonicum in Słubice, February 22-24, 2007.
9. Interview DGB Berlin, Brandenburg.
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Between Europeanization and Marginalization
– ‘‘Nested Urbanism’’
in a German-Polish Border Town
Jörg DÜRRSCHMIDT
Abstract. Scepticism toward the claim that globalization has been forcing
convergence in social and spatial patterns on a ‘‘global city’’ model has
triggered a new interest in the variations, contradictions, and complexities of
urban and regional development. This has led to a revitalized interest in the
‘‘ordinary city’’ that is on not centre stage of a networked global society.
Rather than transcending their hinterland of national political institutions and
regional cultural landscapes (as global cities are supposed to do), ordinary
cities are ‘‘nested cities,’’ deeply entwined in the complexity of global
connectivity, the national developmental model, regional cultural landscape,
and local tradition. Border cities along the German-Polish border provide
a vivid example of ‘‘nested urbanism.’’ A closer ethnographic look at the
GermanPolish twin city of GubenGubin shows that terms such as ‘‘shrin-
king’’ and ‘‘marginalized’’ city do not sufficiently grasp the trajectory of this
‘‘ordinary city.’’
Introduction
As outlined by the editors of this volume in the introduction, recent
years have seen a resurgence of interest in the dynamics of the city and
city life. This is perhaps unsurprising given the ambivalence of the
contemporary era of social development, and the traditional role that the
city has played as indicator of trends in societal transformations. Thus,
while urban sociology might have lost the privileged position it once
held through the dominance of the Chicago School, it has been argued
that at the beginning of the new millennium, ‘‘the city is once again
emerging as a strategic site for understanding major new trends that are
reconfiguring the social order’’ (Sassen 2000, 143).
While the urban world seems to be omnipresent, and while our world
indeed has turned into an ‘‘urban planet’’ (Girardet 2004), an agreed
definition of its driving force or trajectory has become increasingly
illusive. As Amin and Thrift (2004, 1) point out, ‘‘the city is everywhere
and in everything,’’ yet at the same time ‘‘cities have become extraor-
dinarily intricate, and ... difficult to generalize.’’ Until recently, ‘‘globali-
zation’’ was the umbrella term that was enthusiastically embraced in
order to capture the reconfiguration of society along socio-spatial pat-
terns beyond the confines of the nation state container. And similarly,
the network of ‘‘world cities’’ or ‘‘global cities’’ served to provide an
analytical corset that gave at least some shape to an otherwise supposed-
ly quite anarchic ‘‘space of flows’’ within the new global political
economy of ‘‘disorganized capitalism’’ (Lash and Urry 1994).
But as is the case with all immediately insightful formulas, the
emphasis on a metageography of global cities tends to occlude as much
as it reveals. Not only has it led to oversimplifying generalizations about
the spatial and social patterns of these globalizing cities, it also disregar-
ded the diverse and distinctive worlds of what Jennifer Robinson (2004)
has termed ‘‘the world of ordinary cities.’’ Thus Markusen’s (2004)
connotation of these cities as ‘‘forgotten places’’ quite fits the gist of the
discussion of the 1990s. They were not only perceived as disconnected
from the networked logic of global capital, but also off the map of
mainstream urban sociology (Lee and Yeoh 2004; Hannemann 2004,
11ff.; McCann 2004).
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Ironically, the discourse of ‘‘postindustrial’’ shrinking or ‘‘deindu-
strialization’’ (Cowie and Heathcott 2003), that provides explicit focus
on marginalized cities and regions, is just the other side of the same
coin. For it stays largely within the same abstract metalogic of labour,
capital, crisis, flows, networks, etc. This terminology, however, tends to
be less and less helpful in revealing the social and cultural complexity of
particular places and their trajectories as it fades out the social and
cultural implications of marginalization.
Thus it is no surprise that now there are strong voices that articulate
a ‘‘recent turn toward variation, contradiction, and complexity’’ in urban
studies (Hill and Fujita 2003, 207; May and Perry 2005) which resonates
with a perspective on global transformations that demands strategies of
(re)complexification (Robertson and Khondker 1998, 27). To engage again
with the ‘‘architecture of complexity’’ (Simon, cited in Hill 2004, 374) of
the contemporary city first of all means to relearn to think in contradic-
tions, as indicated in the introduction to this volume: can it be that a city
that is declining in socio-economic terms is at the same time seen as
revitalizing in terms of contributing to an emergent Europeanized society?
Return to more complex and contradictory thinking on cities moreover
tends to rediscover place as more than just a potential intersection of
global flows that needs to make itself attractive to global capital. This in
turn suggests to us that we should place our attention on concrete
configurations of local actors, and the leeway they might have with regard
to influencing the trajectory of their city. Hill and Fujita (2003) have
suggested the concept of ‘‘nested urbanism’’ in order to rediscover the
complexity of a decentred, diverse, and contradictory urban geography.
Nested Urbanism and Forgotten Places
The concept of nested urbanism was initially introduced within
urban studies in order to reclaim the specifics of Southeast Asian
urban developments, against the claim that globalization was forcing
convergence in social and spatial patterns among the world’s metro-
polises (Hill and Fujita 2003). Instead, emphasis was given to the
embeddedness of the city in multilevel spatial and institutional con-
figurations that prevented the urban trajectories of cities like Tokyo
or Singapore from converging on the global city model, as presented
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by its transatlantic paradigmatic cases of London and New York. Rather
than following the ‘‘presentism’’ of the earlier global city debates (A-
bu-Lughod 1999), the nested city approach highlights the lasting impact
of regional history and the complex local configurations of rupture and
continuity within the global urban landscape. Following earlier discus-
sions on ‘‘rescaling’’ (Brenner 1998), the national and regional cultural
and institutional context here was given added weight in relation to the
global. Thus, instead of assuming a fixed hierarchy of institutional reach
and cultural embeddedness, nested urbanism highlights the case-specific
and complex interplay between ‘‘global niche, regional formation, natio-
nal development model and local historical context’’ (Hill and Fujita
2003, 212).
It should not come as surprise that the nested urbanism approach has
found some resonance in the discourse on marginalization and shrinking
cities. If it is now claimed that even global cities did not transcend their
hinterland of national institutions, regional cultural landscape, and local
tradition, then this should even more so apply to the marginalized
ordinary city (Robinson 2004; cf. McCann 2004). Here the emphasis is
on recovering ‘‘conceptual space in counterpoint to the overwhelming
attention given to global cites and major learning or innovative regions’’
as defining norms of contemporary urban development (Lee and Yeoh
2004, 2295). It is argued that the uneven nature of global urban develop-
ment cannot be attributed to an anonymous market logic, but that
‘‘instead, cities are materially and ideologically nested in a diverse
national and regional configuration’’ in which an active ‘‘politics of
forgetting’’ is being played out (ibid., 2297ff.). In other words, the
increasing invisibility of some places and regions is (also) the outcome
of an active social construction of urban development in social discourse
and urban policy. Here we clearly sense an approach that seriously
considers the nestedness of marginalization and shrinking in changeable
configurations of human action.
This is most clearly argued in Markusen’s concept of ‘‘forgotten
places’’ (2004, 2304-2305), defined as ‘‘communities and ecologies that
are deprived of leadership and stewardship by the actions and attitudes
of people both present in and absent from these environments.’’ She
argues that four sets of actors are involved in generating such forgotten
places: ‘‘the deployers of money and physical capital, external allocators
of public sector moneys and infrastructure, external symbolic analysts
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who process understandings and create ideologies about places, and local
resource-wielders, decision makers and knowledge workers.’’ On the
other hand, there are the local residents who oppose the forgetting of
their locality. Next to the return to an approach that highlights active
decision making by groups and individuals as crucial for ‘‘trajectories of
forgetfulness,’’ there are a couple of further aspects noteworthy in
Markusen’s argument. Firstly, she highlights the role of ‘‘ideologies of
forgetting’’ for the cultural reproduction of marginalization. For instance,
‘‘individualism’’ as ideology here refers to the normative modelling of
successful biographies, with regard to their successful pursuit of
self-interest outside the needs of community and family. Complementary
to individualism, we find ‘‘out-migration as strategy,’’ especially in times
of crisis as a legitimate ideology that favours the destiny of the in-
dividual over commitment to community. However, it is due to the
unpredictability of actor-centred local configurations that – according to
Markusen – there is always hope that trajectories of forgetting are
countered by ‘‘routes for remembering’’ (ibid., 2310). Hope here rests
with local people that forge coalitions within and beyond community
boundaries, in order to revitalize their place.
In sum, what the nested urbanism approach provides us with is
a dynamic understanding of place, in the production of which a variety
of nested scales are involved, from the global to the regional and local
(Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2003, 9). Nestedness implies
that the various scales are not neatly separated, but intersect and inter-
penetrate, often in complex ways that in their outcome are not under the
control of local actors. Nevertheless, the dynamics of nestedness cannot
be understood without reference to the active networking and deci-
sion-making (across various scales) of people involved in influencing the
trajectory of a locality. In the following section I will indicate these
dynamics in more ethnographic detail by drawing on the case of a city
in the German-Polish border region.
GubenGubin: From ‘‘European Model Town’’
to ‘‘Dying City’’
The events of 1989 and after have lastingly reshaped the so-
cio-spatial make up of central Europe. Post-Fordist globalization and
European enlargement have by no means led to a ‘‘Europe without
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borders,’’ but rather sharpened our awareness of old and new forms of
cultural difference and economic inequality. At the same time they have
led to a more fluid intersection of social and cultural spaces that were
formerly kept apart by nation state borders.
The immediate encounter of Polish and German society and culture
within the border corridor that stretches along the rivers Oder and
Neisse should make border cities in this region the ideal seedbed
of a European cosmopolitan border culture. The twin city GubenGubin
would seem to provide the paradigmatic case for this setting: divided
by a tiny river, the town is split into two equal halves. You can
both see and virtually hear and smell the other side. The locals here
have the chance to actively enact ‘‘rescaling.’’ While for most Eu-
ropeans, ‘‘Europe’’ is still a very abstract term of transnational iden-
tification, the inhabitants of the borderlands here encounter ‘‘Europe
as lived place’’ (Paasi 2001, 10; Meinhof 2002). Accordingly, with
Poland’s EU accession pending in 2004, during the 1990s there was
heightened political attention to the (European) identity-generating po-
wer of places like GubenGubin. ‘‘Fear of failure’’ of the European
project led to the political elite providing an institutional framework
especially geared toward cross-border cooperation along the seam (at
that time) between ‘‘Europe’’ and ‘‘not-yet-Europe.’’ Notably the ‘‘Eu-
roregions’’ that were founded in the 1990s were meant to play a central
role in this process. It seems plausible that local and regional councils
would jump at this chance of financial support and symbolic enhan-
cement provided by the various EU integration projects. At the height
of these developments Guben and Gubin successfully applied in 1998
to be part of the World Expo 2000 as the pioneering ‘‘Model Experiment
Euro Town GubenGubin.’’ However, the identity-generating power
of these top-down administered projects has been greatly overestimated.
They have rather turned into self-referential projects of symbolic po-
litics, without ever gaining the necessary grass-root support from the
everyday cultures on both sides of the border. Thus a huge gap has
opened up between programmatic objectives (fostering a transnational
civil society) and results (a drift into cultural closure between the
neighbouring societies, and further alienation from the political discourse
on ‘‘Europe’’) (Bürkner and Matthiesen 2001).
This disjuncture becomes plausible when we look at the wider
economic and cultural landscape in which the ‘‘Euro Town’’ is nested.
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The German-Polish border region is now right in the middle of a multi-
layered process of restructuring European space(s) within a globalized
socio-economic landscape. With Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004,
the EU border has moved further east, leaving the German-Polish border
region with less political and symbolic significance. At the same time,
the border zone increasingly becomes part and parcel of what Lash and
Urry (1994) have described as a new mix of ‘‘wild’’ and ‘‘tame zones’’
within the global political economy of disorganized capitalism. In fact it
looks as if here – right in the middle of Europe – one of the ‘‘black
holes of marginality’’ (Castells 1996, 379) within the new global divi-
sion of labour is developing, bypassed by global flows of capital and
information, as well as by the transregional corridors of transport (Hei-
denreich 2003).
The image of a ‘‘Model Euro Town’’ that is supposed to play
a pioneering role in the process of European integration thus stands in
stark contrast to the lived experience of its people. They see themselves
as living in a ‘‘dying city’’ and a ‘‘forgotten region,’’ visibly struck by
industrial decline, unemployment, demographic loss, and resulting break-
down in civic culture. People therefore tend to develop little enthusiasm
for a political rhetoric of glossy Europeanization.
Moreover, its socio-cultural nestedness does not bode well for a revi-
talizing development of GubenGubin. The German-Polish border region
very much testifies to the observation that just when a clear-cut state
border becomes more porous, complex geographies of difference begin
to reveal themselves. It is often forgotten that for most of the time
between 1945 and 1989, the border between East Germany and Poland
had almost the characteristics of an ‘‘iron curtain,’’ despite being a bor-
der between two aligned countries. After 1989, the hidden transcript of
historical cultural landscapes came to the fore again. There is subtle
awareness that the region’s socio-cultural make-up still displays a ‘‘cul-
ture of displacement’’ that goes back to the resettlement policies during
and after the Second World War (Krätke 1999, 638; Janes´niak-Quast and
Stokłosa 2000). These ethno-spatial cleavages, kept under closure by
nation state politics and socialist ideology, nevertheless lingered on in
the collective consciousness on both sides of the border. In consequence,
the prevailing ‘‘low trust environment’’ appears to be a serious develop-
mental blockage with regard to sustainable cross border cooperation
(Bürkner and Matthiesen 2001; Krätke 1998, 250ff.).
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These cultural cleavages are not helped by the fact that bilingual
language competence is heavily imbalanced in favour of the Polish side,
and that considerable differences in cost of living and income in favour
of the German side do not make for a level playing field in terms of
enjoying urban everyday culture. The imbalances are further underpin-
ned by the fact that the respective everyday cultures are embedded in
rather different ‘‘pathways of postsocialist transformation’’ (Stark and
Bruszt 1999). For East Germany this means a ‘‘gradualist’’ transfor-
mation with emphasis on softening the restructuring by extensive welfare
regulations, while the Polish ‘‘big bang’’ strategy favoured private initia-
tive and restructuring via the market. While otherwise these differences
might make for interesting abstract debates in academia, for people in
GubenGubin they mean head-on confrontation with rather different
worlds of postsocialism, within one and the same city.
Thus until recently, the scenery of nested shrinking for a place like
GubenGubin could well be summarized as follows
In this way, a vicious circle developed, hanging over the borderland territory
as a whole, combining economic, political and cultural processes into
a downward spiral, and diminishing local potential and factual learning
processes (individualcollective) (Matthiesen 2005, 56).
The Gubin Church Ruin: The Crystalline Structure
of Place-Making
Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez (2003, 10-11) claim that
even the most complex processes of socio-spatial transformation and
rescaling ‘‘become worked out and are mediated through the built
environment.’’ To the extent that this is true, then the city centre of
GubenGubin provides the paradigmatic case for the embodiment of
‘‘nested shrinking’’ as described above. Located on the Polish side of
town, it is left virtually as an empty space, continuously reminding its
inhabitants of the heavy destruction that the inner city suffered at the
end of the Second World War. Moreover, the catastrophic picture is
completed with the ruin of a church that in its origin dates back to the
thirteenth century (Peter 2007). This is not a ruin in the sense of
a commodified quotation from past times that has been renovated and
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preserved to feed postmodern nostalgia (Cowie and Heathcott 2003).
Even more so than the empty space on which it stands, it impacts the
onlooker like a crystalline structure that holds the city’s complex nested-
ness in past and present. Deprived of its roofing and church tower, and
overgrown with the prevailing life of nature, its walls and columns still
carry the scars of heavy inner city fighting, just as if the Second World
War had ended yesterday.
If, as Sharon Zukin (1995, 259) maintains, public place is the
window to a city’s soul, then Gubeners and Gubiners ‘‘view the catas-
trophe of their own town’’ when looking at the city’s central place
(Hoffmann-Axthelm in Graff 2002, 25). It reflects the embeddedness of
the city in lingering cultures of displacement and low trust. Thus, it
could be argued, the fact that Guben and Gubin for quite a while after
1989 did not attempt to make efforts toward a joined city centre had as
much to do with straight forward communication barriers as with mutual
hesitation to impinge on the other side’s memoryscapes. Not attempting
to deal with the revitalization of the city’s core had as much to do with
the pressing problems of deindustrialization, as with the different every-
day realities of postsocialism and their respective ways of coming to
terms with it.
The consequences of this state of affairs cannot be underestimated.
Identification with the built environment of one’s town is a catalyst for
engaging in urban public life and the amenities of urban culture. Civic
pride in large part feeds on residents’ identification with significant
public edifices. Conversely, the city’s inner city may function as an
architectural expression of a collective commitment to a certain urban
trajectory. While a shared city centre is certainly no substitute for lived
urban togetherness and everyday solidarity, the latter can certainly not
be achieved without some symbolic commitment in the semiotic land-
scape of the twin city. Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that the
downward spiral for GubenGubin will have to be tackled from within
its core – not just in real, but in symbolic terms. For the visual in this
case has a lot to do with vision: the city centre as a model (Leitbild) that
literally puts an alternative urban trajectory – against the familiar one of
‘‘dying city’’ – into the frame. In summary, Hoffmann-Axthelm (ibid.,
24) has aptly captured the situation of GubenGubin at the beginning of
the new millennium, by saying that both sides of town can certainly
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survive to a certain extent within the current state of affairs, but in order
to live they need a shared vision that focuses on the city centre.
Recent years have seen developments toward revitalization. The twin
cities of GubenGubin were part of the ‘‘Stadt 2030’’ programme that
encouraged cities to develop innovative models of urban revitalization.
A redevelopment scheme has been set up that emphasizes an urban
corridor connecting the two cities across the river (mainly via the high
street), rather than focusing on one particular location as the centre.
Supported by external governmental funding, (architectural) change is
already visible (see www.guben.de and www.guben-gubin-2030.de).
However, alongside these externally induced changes in the architec-
tural landscape, there is now another encouraging development that
needs attention with regard to signs of endogenous revitalization. It
refers to a cross-border civil initiative that takes the city’s soul as its
point of departure (to stay with Zukin’s metaphor), namely the church
ruin located in Gubin. In doing so it faces up to the difficult memory-
scape in which the city is embedded, and which needs addressing, if the
twin city is to have a chance of true revitalization – one that is sustained
by a cross-border civic culture. Dating back to the initial enthusiasm of
a Catholic priest on the Polish side of town, the idea to redevelop the
church ruin as a Polish-German centre of communication quickly found
supporters on the German side too. Since May 2005, there has been
a foundation around which the civic initiative has galvanized. At its
centre are the two mayors, a few local politicians, and some other
exponents of the local citizenry. The foundation in its statutes clearly
sets the aim of redeveloping the church ruin as a symbol for the
awakening of the city, by facing up to its past and by generating a spirit
of tolerance and cultural dialogue. The foundation is supported by
donations and actively lobbies for its project in the local and translocal
public(s), with some considerable success. Several public forums have
managed to turn the project into a hot topic in the town. Meanwhile,
there is civic discourse about the concrete shape – both in architecture
and intention – of the communication centre, and a considerable amount
of money has been raised. The most visible success so far is the
reinstalling of the restored church tower in June 2007. Thus this civic
initiative has managed to bridge the gap between the two everyday
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cultures within the twin city, but also to set a visible marker into the
symbolic landscape of the city that announces, ‘‘the civic spirit of this
– supposedly dying – city is alive’’ (see www.stadtkirchegubin.de).
The Difference a Few Years can Make
As a long time participating observer to the development of Gu-
benGubin, one is naturally sceptical to any new project that announces
cooperation between the halves of the city, and that attempts to change
the trajectory of the ‘‘dying city.’’ Too fresh is the memory of other
projects that attempted to foster European society within a revitalizing
city, but were met with grumbling discontent by the local public on both
sides of the border. So why should it be different this time? Why has
this pro-European project of local revitalization met with considerable
enthusiasm, when only a couple of years ago the mayor of Guben was
voted out of office due to his attempt to give life to the idea of
a ‘‘European Model Town’’?
Taking up again the idea of nested urbanism, we can get some clues
to the prospects of this local civic initiative by looking at its embedded-
ness in more general social processes and their intersection.
The first point of reference concerns the general phenomenological
framing of everyday life. One could argue that when people start
taking issue with the centre of their locality or community, this
does indeed reflect a sense of ‘‘centeredness,’’ or a calmness as
borne in the meaning of the Greek sophrosyne (Schroer 2005, 335).
Perhaps for the first time since 1989, people are experiencing what
could be called a ‘‘sedimentation of relevances’’ in their life world.
After years of upheaval, accompanied by reorientation in all spheres
of life, and characterized by hypermobility as far as relocation and
learning are concerned, people in the transformation societies of eastern
central Europe might now enter a period where things are calmer.
Efforts now seem more concentrated, and options are perceived as
less complex and unpredictable. In more substantive terms, we could
say that people have just come out of what Vobruba (2005, 39)
has called a ‘‘double ditch.’’ By this he refers to the sequence of
two periods of radical change that have affected people in eastern
Between Europeanization and Marginalization 67
central Europe: the postsocialist transformation and the integration into
Europe, both coming with demanding consequences in terms of in-
stitutional restructuring and cultural adaptation.
Europe and European integration under these circumstances were
perceived as an additional large scale supranational institutional process
that is imposed from above. This helps to explain the discontent toward
externally imposed institutional structures such as ‘‘Euroregions’’ and the
‘‘Euro Model Town.’’ Only now that the official enlargement procedure
has moved further east, can a sort of ‘‘inner cosmopolitanization’’ (Beck
2002) of the European project take hold of the German-Polish border-
lands. This inner cosmopolitanization here implies that the nation state is
opened up at its fringes, and that Europeanization is perceived as an
inner quality of everyday life, rather than an institutional frame that
imposes itself from outside. Moreover, one could argue that within
a rather small town like GubenGubin this process is supported by the
‘‘inescapability of small places.’’ This, in contrast to the lofty cos-
mopolitan variety of the metropolis, pushes people toward accepting
‘‘banal cosmopolitanism’’ (ibid., 28) as a normal feature of everyday life.
The ‘‘banality’’ of inner cosmopolitanization is, in such a local setting,
more strongly felt than elsewhere. Take, for example, the accession of
Poland to the Schengen treaty in December 2007. For people in Gu-
benGubin this implies the final abolishment of border control within
the city. This will immensely enhance the ‘‘walkability’’ (du Toit et al.
2007) of their city. If there is indeed a link between flâneuring the city
and developing a sense of community based on a sense of place, then
this link should further enhance for Gubeners and Gubiners the feeling
of indeed living in ‘‘Gubien,’’ as the city is now already affectionately
called among some of its more cosmopolitanly inclined citizens. To call
GubenGubin by the name of ‘‘Gubien,’’ thereby symbolically sum-
marizing the name into a country, suggests indeed a horizontal perspec-
tive on Europeanization that sees being part of the society of a city as
just as important as belonging to a nation state.
In addition – and this might sound ironic – the very process of
shrinking might also contribute to further enhancing a cosmopolitan
sense of place in GubenGubin. Namely, still following Beck’s ar-
gument (2000, 80), in so far as people start realizing that shrinking is
a process that is largely ‘‘indifferent to national boundaries.’’ The crucial
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insight here would be that the decisive frame of reference for countering
marginalization is not the nation state but the translocal society of
‘‘Gubien,’’ that has to transcend nation state boundaries in the attempt to
mobilize its full potential.
These tendencies toward postnational society within a city should
finally also be reflected in its memoryscape. It is well known that
collective memory is essential for stabilizing national communities. This
is especially the case in times of crisis when its narrative maintains
a reference point of solidarity within the group, and affirms a sense of
difference to other communities. However, what if people’s everyday
milieus no longer coincide with the national space, as is the case in
‘‘Gubien’’ and other border cities? They might become paradigmatic
cases for what Levy and Sznaider (2002, 89) have described as the
‘‘decoupling of collective memory and national history.’’ This does not
imply the straightforward replacement of ‘‘national memory’’ by ‘‘cos-
mopolitan memory’’; however, it does mean the relativization of the
privileged position of national history as discursive frame of collective
memory and identity (ibid., 89ff.). It moreover implies mutual recog-
nition of the history of the other and future-oriented dialogue over
a shared past (ibid., 102-103). Inner cosmopolitanization thus has its
time dimension in the uncoupling of the quasi-natural link place – iden-
tity – national memory. It is increasingly replaced by ‘‘staged landscapes
of memory that can only be deciphered transnationally’’ (Beck 2000,
99). The envisaged communication centre within the redeveloped church
ruin in Gubin could provide such a stage for transnational dialogue,
within a difficult landscape of memories of war and displacement.
Two processes could further contribute to this being a realistic
scenario for ‘‘Gubien.’’ Levy and Sznaider (2002, 91, 96) highlight
a generational shift with regard to the traumatic events of the Second
World War. They argue that there is a transition taking place from
‘‘social memory’’ (carried by those generations that have personal ex-
perience of the war and its atrocities) toward ‘‘historical memory’’
(carried by those who only have mediated experiences of these events,
and who are more open to reflexive engagement about the complexities
of the past). Postsocialist developments might further stabilize a move
toward cosmopolitan memory. Misztal (2004) draws the rather interes-
ting distinction between ‘‘closed and frozen memories,’’ on one hand,
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and ‘‘open ended and often shared along group lines memories,’’ on the
other. While the first mode of memory is typical for unsettled times
when people tend to freeze their identity to the world and toward others,
the latter is typical for open societies and democratic community. While
the immediate time after 1989 might have favoured the revitalization of
a nationalist past and closed memory, the postsocialist differentiation of
lifestyles and milieus meanwhile seems to favour a fragmentation of
collective memory along the line of reflexive ‘‘memory groups’’ (ibid.,
68, 74). Thus the argument here is by no means one of neglecting
a traumatic and nationalist past, but one of engaging in dialogue beyond
nationalistic myth and propaganda (Misztal 2005, 1331).
Finally, all this ties in with the complex and sometimes unpredict-
able ‘‘socioscapes’’ (Albrow 1997; Appadurai 1990) in which a locality
such as GubenGubin is embedded. The shrinking city is by no means
a place clearly divided by stayers or leavers. The landscapes of mobility
and attachment that have evolved after 1989, here turn out to be more
sophisticated than that. There are of course those who commute in
various cycles of presence and absence. But more surprisingly perhaps,
it is returnees of different age groups who are pushing the civic initiative
around the church ruin. What is surprising here is that people with the
human capital they have acquired elsewhere in the world – and who are
therefore enabled to be anywhere in the world – should return to the
shrinking city. Perhaps what we see here is linked to the first point made
earlier: these returnees might indicate a beginning of a sedimentation of
socioscapes, following a period of hypermobility after the sudden erup-
tion of socioscapes in postsocialist society, in the wake of 1989. It might
just be that the reflective migrant realizes that in his or her continuous
relationship to the world, ‘‘place matters’’ (Markusen 2004, 2310). But
whatever the concrete reasons for their return, it is obvious that these
returnees are likely to embody what Beck (2002, 36) has called ‘‘rooted
cosmopolitanism.’’ Such rooted cosmopolitans, unlike local parochialists,
are not inclined to give in to short sighted localism, but instead tend to
‘‘defend their place as one open to the world’’ – in this case also
implying openness to the other side of the town and its lived experience.
A great asset that these returnees bring to the shrinking city is a relativi-
zation of the destiny of their city. They have seen much better and much
worse places, and thus reflect the town’s faith in a larger perspective.
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Moreover, they do not feel overburdened by the task at hand. As one of
them summed up their attitude, ‘‘We are building Europe here, but so
what? This is Europe in a big wide world.’’ What they bring back to the
locality is thus an active rescaling in life world terms, that is the
reevaluation of local embeddedness in the light of global and European
experience. In practice, this means they can rather eloquently mediate
between the local community and the translocal networks. In other
words, due to their familiarity with both the local and the transnational
world, these returnees are capable of (local) ‘‘politics of scale’’ (McCann
2004). This, for instance, showed very effectively in the role they played
in the difficult process of obtaining from the Polish state the leasehold
for the land on which the church ruin stands. In effect this clearly
indicates nested urbanism as being not just a constellation of intersecting
and overlapping macrosocial processes, but just as much as a ‘‘kairos’’
situation: the right people meeting at the right place at the right time,
and accessing the relevant scales of power (Matthiesen 2005, 59). The
‘‘nestedness’’ of projects of urban renewal from this perspective, then
appears as largely resulting from active networking across various levels
of interaction, power, and influence – rather than suggesting passive
local embeddedness in various large-scale socio-spatial dynamics.
Summary: GubenGubin or ‘‘Gubien’’?
What we are left with is a feeling of ambivalence. Is the Gu-
benGubin church project indeed the beginning of a development toward
a transnational ‘‘Gubien,’’ deeply embedded in real existing cosmo-
politanism? Or is it just another playing field for cosmopolitan elites
who always have the option to leave the place to which they are
supposedly committed? In all likelihood, the project to turn the church
ruin into the Polish-German communication centre of a new ‘‘Gubien’’
is not going to generate many, if any, new jobs for GubenGubin.
So can it be more than yet another act of – however laudable – symbolic
politics, this time not imposed from outside, but generated from within
the locality by a group of rooted cosmopolitans with enough local
‘‘street cred’’? We do not know yet, as this project of civic reem-
powerment is still very young indeed.
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However, even if it was another attempt in symbolic politics, Gu-
benGubin would be in good company, as it is observed that urban
regeneration via pushing ‘‘emblematic projects’’ (Swyngedouw, Mou-
laert, and Rodriguez 2003a, 248) is a common strategy within postmet-
ropolitan regions. Still, the point here is not so much to reveal the
parallels to common governance strategies and tactics of ‘‘actually
occurring regeneration’’ (Henderson, Bowlby, and Raco 2007, 1445), but
to stress the symbolic revitalization of the ‘‘dying city.’’ It is against the
assumption that the open city – one that is ‘‘not ridden by debilitating
spatial and social barriers’’ (Amin and Graham 1997, 422) – is a precon-
dition for any economic revitalization, that the church ruin project has to
be cast. To rediscover the city’s soul in Zukin’s sense would here mean
more than just revitalizing public space as an arena of civility, tact and
trust. It would imply generating a symbolic centre that has the capacity
to hold the twin city together amid the turbulences of postsocialist and
postindustrial redevelopment.
Consequently, that a cross-border civic initiative should identify the
church ruin as such an anchor of cosmopolitan community, seems to
stand for more than just naive and self-absorbed soul searching. This
rather suggests awareness in certain segments of translocal civil society
with regard to the fact that openness of place intrinsically involves the
overcoming of temporal closure via overdue dialogue about conjunctive
collective memories. In other words, GubenGubin could be a trendset-
ter in realizing that the real existing cosmopolitanisms of ‘‘Gubien’’ can
only be turned into a revitalizing element if it is deepened by real
existing ‘‘chronopolitanism’’ (Cwerner 2000). In this way ‘‘Gubien’’
might eventually manage to break out of dominant feelings of apathy
and distrust. In turn this civic recovery of place could then even
contribute to economic recovery. For as Amin and Graham (1997, 427;
Markusen 2004, 2308) maintain, ‘‘a sense of place and belonging taps
into hidden potential and the sources of social confidence that lie at the
core of risk-taking entrepreneurial activity.’’
While the civic initiative evolving around the ‘‘Gubien’’ church ruin
could well be seen as an exercise in ‘‘recovering place,’’ Markusen
(2004) reminds us that to oppose processes of marginalization does not
just require people who actively preserve and champion their locality,
but also needs a change of discourse by (us) symbolic analysts. In the
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first instance that could mean breaking away from the currently almost
normative discourse of ‘‘shrinking’’ in terms of crisis and collapse.
Instead it would require us to be ’’more open to positive interpretations
of change’’ (Amin and Graham 1997, 413) as they might indicate
themselves; for instance, with the church ruin project in ‘‘Gubien.’’ This
in turn implies that we should be attentive to the simultaneity of
shrinking and revitalizing tendencies not just between various localities
and regions but within them (Matthiesen 2005, 53). As the ‘‘Gubien’’
case study suggests, it would seem that ‘‘a scale perspective on the
nonglobal city’’ (McCann 2004, 2317) can help us in recovering some
conceptual space beyond the dominating paradigm of shrinkage. By
investigating the concrete civic networks involved in ‘‘nesting’’ a project
like the ‘‘Gubien’’ church ruin, we abstain from abstract logics of global
capital, spatial restructuring, or urban crisis. This is not to deny the
power of the large-scale dynamics of shrinkage, but to reemphasize the
dynamics of civic action and local policy making which are also invol-
ved in it.
In that sense then we might conclude with Entrikin’s (1999, 270)
observation concerning the intrinsic link between civic (re)empowerment
and ‘‘good place’’: if, as he maintains, ‘‘good places are constructed
through civil society,’’ then the twin city GubenGubin has not suddenly
turned from a ‘‘bad’’ (‘‘declining’’) into a ‘‘good’’ (‘‘developing’’) place,
but the ‘‘Gubien’’ church project might announce that, unexpectedly for
many observers, it is perhaps on the way to becoming a ‘‘better’’ place.
And for a ‘‘dying city,’’ that says a lot.
Internet links:
www.guben.de
www.guben-gubien-2030.de
www.stadtkirchegubin.de
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Urban Shrinkage in East Central Europe?
Benefits and Limits of a Cross-National Transfer
of Research Approaches
Katrin GROßMANN, Annegret HAASE,
Dieter RINK, Annett STEINFÜHRER
Abstract. This article intended as a position paper reflecting on concept-
-building discusses the question of how far the term and concept of urban
shrinkage apply to postsocialist cities in East Central Europe. In addressing
this issue, it touches on the more general topic of the benefits and limitations
of the transferability of scientific terms and concepts. Urban shrinkage, as it
has evolved from the eastern German context, is introduced and discussed in
light of the British and North American debates. The second part of the
paper applies this concept to the urban context of postsocialist East Central
Europe (ECE), using Polish and Czech cities as examples. In our concluding
remarks, we argue (among other points) that it makes sense to work on
a good, robust, and clearly focused conceptualization of urban shrinkage as
a transferable concept for different frameworks, but to be careful and
specific with its application to any concept not only in the ECE context. We
suggest differentiating between process, causes, and consequences of urban
shrinkage.
Introduction and Objectives
During recent decades, cities in East Central Europe have been
associated mainly with post-socialist transition and catch-up moderniza-
tion toward Western structures. Urban change was, accordingly, sup-
posed to go along with continuous growth in terms of population,
economic power, commercial function, and the improvement of infra-
structure and amenities. In this vein, post-socialist urban development
had been assigned to the ‘‘special case’’ category, and was considered to
be hardly comparable with the ‘‘rest of Europe.’’ Throughout the 1990s,
it became more and more obvious that the neoliberal assumptions of
a simple replacement of institutions and mentalities, and of a simple
convergence toward Western-style, post-Fordist modernization were not
sufficient to adequately interpret the transition and post-transition pro-
cesses (Grabher and Stark 1997; Bridger and Pine 1998, 3-7; Burawoy
1999, 303; Hann 2002; Bradshaw and Stenning 2003, 12-14). In our
article we argue, therefore, that such a perspective is no longer up to
date. Recently observed demographic trends that apply to cities throug-
hout Europe have led to urban shrinkage, a new pathway of urban
development that is shared by cities throughout the whole continent and
beyond (European Commission 2007; United Nations 2006; Oswalt and
Rieniets 2006).
Up to the present, research has been focused on capital cities that
more or less show the above-mentioned developmental trends (Kostins-
kiy 2001; Altrock et al. 2005; Stanilov 2007). Other urban pathways in
East Central Europe have remained out of sight. This is especially true
for second-order cities that find themselves confronted with develop-
ments beyond growth. Rather they are characterized by demographic
features such as population losses, ageing and out-migration. Set against
overall European development, this trajectory is by no means unique.
Recent research has identified 40% of all European cities with more than
200,000 inhabitants as shrinking or losing population over short-, me-
dium- and even long-term periods (Turok and Mykhnenko 2007). Accor-
dingly, post-socialist Europe forms a new ‘‘pole of shrinkage’’ with three
out of four cities showing population losses (Mykhnenko and Turok
2007, 47).
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Most terms and theoretical concepts in urban research these days
originate in the Anglo-American debate. Yet urban shrinkage took root
in the eastern German context, where it became prominent after 2000.
The term describes the massive post-reunification population losses of
the cities and towns in eastern Germany, due to job migration, sub-
urbanization, and negative population growth. This has led to structural
housing vacancies, and has forced ageing and oversupply of infrastruc-
ture (for an overview see Großmann 2007a; Kabisch 2006; Bürkner,
Kuder, and Kühn 2005). The term has only very recently entered the
international debate, through the work of German researchers and ar-
chitects, such as the ‘‘Shrinking cities’’ project (Oswalt 2005, 2006).
Turok and Mykhnenko (2007) used it in a cross-European study on the
long-term population development of big cities. The results of both
endeavours clearly show that shrinkage has become an ‘‘ordinary’’
pathway of urban development in Europe. As we will argue, ‘‘urban
shrinkage’’ qualifies better for the international debate than terms such
as ‘‘decline‘‘ or ‘‘decay,’’ which relate rather to economic downward
processes with their spatial and social consequences. The result of the
eastern German experience is the discovery of demographic influences
on urban development, leading to proactive approaches in both research
and planning, whereas the Anglo-American debate was dominated by the
desire to turn decline around back into growth (Großmann 2007b;
Pallagst 2005).
Set against this background, this article discusses the question of
how far urban shrinkage applies to cities in East Central Europe. Does
the shared socialist past and current post-socialist reality allow for
a transfer of this concept to explain what is going on here today? In
addressing these questions, the article touches on the more general issue
of the benefits and limitations of the transferability of scientific terms
and concepts. It is first of all intended as a position paper, reflecting on
concept building and on selected empirical findings, such as the situation
of Polish and Czech cities. To avoid the trap of producing a simple
textbook transfer, our aim is also to sharpen the concept itself, by
discussing the specifics of urban shrinkage in Germany, the Anglo-
-American context, and East Central Europe.
The article is organized as follows: the first section expands on the
transferability of scientific terms and concepts in a more general way.
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Then the term and concept of urban shrinkage, as it has evolved from
the eastern German context, is introduced. A third section brings in the
British and North American experiences for a first transfer of the
concept; and section four reconsiders the eastern German experience.
A fifth section applies the concept to cities in East Central Europe, using
Polish and Czech cities as examples. Finally, we discuss to what extent
urban shrinkage can be transferred, and what conclusions can be drawn
concerning the concept itself.
Transferability of Concepts – Ambitions, Prospects,
and Constraints
To answer the question of to what extent the concept of urban
shrinkage as it evolved in the eastern German context can help to
explain recent processes of population loss in East Central European
cities, some reflections about the transferability of scientific concepts in
general should be made.
In urban studies, as in any realm of research, concepts and terms are
usually developed against the background of a specific empirical con-
text. Certain observed phenomena call for explanation, and thereby
encourage the evolution of new terms or theoretical concepts. Whether it
is Simmel’s observation of the Blasiertheit (blasé attitude) as being
a certain attitude that he considered typical of the Großstädter (city
slicker), the inner city ‘‘zones of transition’’ defined by the Chicago
School, or whether it is the observation that similar processes of upgra-
ding inner city areas coincide with an exchange of residents that leads to
the concept of the invasion-succession cycle, or later the concept of
gentrification – it is important to underline that all of these concepts
emerged from specific empirical contexts.
Once these concepts prove to explain phenomena in the context of
their origin, they start to travel around the academic world, where they
are tested in other empirical contexts. The main challenges of trans-
ferability are those of applicability, appropriateness, and a common
language of measurement (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, 814; Steinführer
2004, 106-116). This is especially true in cross-national research. As
Johnson (1998, 1) points out: ‘‘In perhaps no other subfield of social
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science and research are issues of methodology and measurement as
open to challenge and criticism as when they are applied in
cross-cultural and cross-national settings.’’ When comparing different
national or regional case studies, the question is, are we really com-
paring equal things, and are we transferring concepts to relevant cases?
(Burawoy 1999, 305; Steinführer 2005).
According to Sartori (1991), there are four problems of transferring
knowledge, terms and concepts: the problems of parochialism, misclas-
sification, degreeism and concept stretching (Mossberger and Stoker
2001, 814-815). Parochialism refers to the tendency to continuously
invent new terms, or to use existing ones in an unintended way.
Misclassification applies when important differences between processes
are ignored. Degreeism means that qualitative differences between cases
are denied; instead they are all presented in a merely quantitative
manner – as matters of degree, and not of quality. Concept stretching
involves removing aspects of the original meaning of the concept, so
that it can accommodate more cases.
For instance, the concept of gentrification originated in North Ameri-
ca, where it was described for the first time by Ruth Glass in 1954, but
it has since then been applied to many European cities. These days, it is
still a prominent concept in researching and explaining the socio-spatial
changes in post-socialist cities. This example meets some of the challen-
ges mentioned above, specifically avoiding the pitfalls of misclassifica-
tion and concept stretching (Skora 2005; Standl and Krupickaite 2004;
Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Bernt and Holm 2005).
In addition, cross-cultural research does not simply mean a one-way
transfer of knowledge; it always involves improving the original terms
and concepts, and providing feedback even to their context of origin
(Steinführer 2005, 95-96; Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Reflecting on
the shifts of urban regime theory, a concept transferred from the Cana-
dian to the European context, Stoker (1995, 66) claims that, ‘‘Studies
need to move from theory through empirical application and then back
to theory.’’ In doing so, theoretic concepts either show their limits or
prove to be able to explain phenomena in different contexts. Most
commonly they experience shifts and changes caused by the specifics of
the context that were incorporated in the concepts in the first place.
According to Stoker, this reconfiguration of theoretic concepts and
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redefinition of terms during their adaptation to other empirical contexts
is an essential part of conceptual work. The aim of this work is to
develop robust and flexible frameworks for further research.
In short, when we apply it to these other empirical contexts, trans-
ferability raises questions such as, to what extent is the ‘‘old’’ concept
appropriate to explain the ‘‘new’’ phenomena? Where are the significant
differences? Should the concept be reformulated to match the context it
is applied to? We will come back to these questions in the discussion.
Urban Shrinkage: A Newly Evolving Concept?
Urban shrinkage is a term that began to spread round the world
starting – for a change – in East Germany. First coined during the
West German discourse of the late 1970s (Göb 1977; and later and
most prominently Häußermann and Siebel 1988), it attempts to describe
a type of city that, following its economic decline, faces population
loss, and therefore provides a new subject to urban sociology (see
also van den Berg et al. 1982, 44). This claim was based on the
empirical context of old industrial regions in Germany such as the
Ruhr area. Yet the opportunity to undertake scientific discussion on
this topic was ignored by the broader research community until new
hotspots of ‘‘shrinking cities’’ appeared about a decade later in the
eastern part of Germany.
The empirically observed emergence of vast numbers of housing
vacancies all over eastern German cities in the late 1990s, accompanied
by a sudden drop in housing prices, provoked a political and scientific
discussion that is best characterized as an intense niche debate, since it
was at first treated as a dramatic but specifically eastern German
phenomenon that does not apply to cities in other places. After years of
no progress, a report from a state commission initiated the public
discourse in 2000 (Pfeiffer, Simons, and Porsch 2000), by suggesting
a state-sponsored demolition programme to reduce vacancies. What had
happened? After decades of housing shortages, there was suddenly
a massive oversupply of flats in all kinds of structures: in the old
housing stock – whether refurbished or not – in pre- and post-war
estates, as well as in large housing estates from the socialist period.
Katrin GROßMANN, Annegret HAASE, Dieter RINK, Annett STEINFÜHRER82
Examining the causes of these vacancies, three main sources were
discussed: out-migration because of economic breakdown in a large
number of formerly industrialized cities, an overall decline in birth rates
to below-mortality rates, and suburbanization (Lang and Tenz 2003;
Hannemann 2003; Bürkner, Kuder, and Kühn 2005). Hannemann (2003,
18-19) emphasized the processed involved by exaggeration, speaking of
‘‘Deökonomisierung’’ (the erosion of the economic base), ‘‘Depopula-
tion’’ and ‘‘Deurbanisierung’’ (disurbanization) – three trajectories of
a downward spiral which led to shrinking cities. A trend not found in
most definitions, but contributing significantly to the evolving housing
vacancies, was the state-sponsored building and refurbishment activities
during the 1990s. After the revolution, 420,000 flats in the old neglected
housing stock were vacant because there were technically uninhabitable.
By 2000, about one million flats had become vacant. (Pfeiffer, Simons,
and Porsch 2000, 10, 17).
A huge part of the discussion focused on the effects of shrinkage,
which were perceived differently depending on the interests and perspec-
tives of the commentators. The political and administrative actors con-
centrated on the consequences of population decline: oversized infra-
structure – such as one million vacant flats, unnecessarily large sewer
systems, underused schools, kindergartens, and public transport system
– and shrinking municipal budgets. Planners discussed the appropriate-
ness of planning instruments and discussed a shift in planning para-
digms. Under the conditions of urban shrinkage, planning would no
longer steer growth by guiding and restricting investment. Now, one
needed to manage shrinkage, to reduce the city in a planned way,
instead (Weidner 2005). For the first time, existing housing stock is
demolished with the only purpose being to reduce housing oversupply,
and not to rebuild the stock according to new plans and purposes.
Vacant plots and areas are left behind, usually turned into various kind
of green space. At the same time, land consumption went on at the
outskirts of the cities, although recently it has shown some signs of
slowing down (Köppen 2005; Nuissl, Rink, and Steuer 2005).
The media focused on job-related migration as the source of these
vacancies. National media especially often reduced the phenomenon to
households moving to places where they could find work, leaving behind
empty prefabricated blocks in declining cities and regions (Großmann
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2005; Wiest 2006). The real estate actors spoke about a cyclic decline
in the housing market that sooner or later will cycle up again. Politicians
and administrations faced in their work far-reaching questions and
decisions: Where do vacancies occur? On what parts of the city should
investment be focused? What parts can be given up on in the long run?
By whom and with what instruments can the city be reduced in a plan-
ned way? Can it be shrunk from the outside in, at all? Until now, cities
have rather experienced a perforation of the city structure, rather than
a governed contraction (Lütke Daldrup 2001). Demolition efforts go on
but they are not likely to turn around housing markets. Instead the cities
and their housing markets start to differentiate into areas of investment
and areas of disinvestment – sometimes next to each other. This is
accompanied by intensifying residential segregation, in particular of
low-income groups, even if these trends are far from a polarization of
socio-spatial structures. Vacancies and rising segregation have opened
discussions about downward-spiralling neighbourhoods.
The innovation of the debate about shrinking cities in eastern Ger-
many, however, is the discovery that demographic trends which have
gone on for years had been simply overlooked until vacancies became
an issue of public and professional interest. After centuries of urban
growth and the resulting one-sided patterns of perception and inter-
pretation, demographic forecasts assume nowadays that population dec-
line in the cities will continue on account of changes in fertility. The
average age of inhabitants will rise continuously; urban populations are
ageing more or less rapidly (Bürkner et al. 2007). What differs sig-
nificantly from debates in other contexts is the notion that this is not just
a short-term phenomenon, but a future trend for a lot of cities, especially
in developed countries. Today, dealing with the effects of urban shrin-
kage has become a daily business for many cities and towns (Bundesamt
für Bauwesen und Raumordnung 2003, 2004). Unlike experiences with
population decline in the US or the UK, questions of coping with or
adapting to urban shrinkage dominate the discussions today in both
research and in practice, rather than the search for a silver bullet to turn
around cities’ fortunes. This is due first of all to the strong focus on
demographic processes that – in either scenario – suggest that the
population decline will continue.
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Besides talking about problems and difficulties, another path of the
debate discusses the positive effects and opportunities for the cities. Arts
projects have celebrated kinds of newly evolving ‘‘spaces of possibili-
ties’’ (Oswalt 2005 and 2006; Schröer 2002). Whether or not one agrees
with these positive notions, this kind of debate has departed greatly from
the assumption that the only acceptable kind of city development is
urban growth. Even contributions that evaluate shrinkage in a negative
way have, nevertheless, accepted that it is very likely to happen to
a considerable number of cities, and therefore needs to be managed.
The demographic turn in scientific and in planning approaches led to
an initial transfer of experiences and planning approaches from eastern
to western German cities. Ironically, this has meant that the debate has
returned to those old industrialized cities in western Germany, where the
term ‘‘shrinking cities’’ originated from in the classic texts of
Häußermann and Siebel of the late 1980s. In Germany, urban shrinkage
has lost the status of being a specifically eastern German phenomenon.
Rather, it is assumed that cities in the West will sooner or later face
similar developmental trends (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumord-
nung 2004).
Transferring the Concept of Urban Shrinkage – Diversifying
the Debate
German researchers took the initiative in introducing the debate on
urban shrinkage to other contexts. Their search for comparable cases of
shrinkage has led to a re-examination of phenomena described as ‘‘urban
decline’’ or ‘‘urban decay’’ in Western Europe and North America
(Beauregard 1995). In those places, old industrialized cities – such as
Sheffield, Manchester, or Liverpool in the United Kingdom, and Cleve-
land, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore in the US – have lost population due to
economic restructuring, after the breakdown of traditional industries like
coal mining and steel production. On top of industrial decline, sub-
urbanization has reinforced these trends, which started approximately in
the 1960s.
The ‘‘Shrinking Cities’’ project (www.shrinkingcities.com) was the
first large-scale international arts and research project to transfer the
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term ‘‘urban shrinkage’’ to other empirical contexts. Case studies were
conducted in Detroit, the Manchester-Liverpool region, the Halle-Leip-
zig region, and in Ivanovo in Russia – this last an example of socialist
industrialization that left behind emptiness after the transformation to
a market economy. The outcomes of this project were both academic
and artistic: books, conferences, art projects, workshops, and an ex-
hibition that still tours around the globe. The project initiative was
German, the coordination was based in Germany, and the project also
was funded by the German Federal Cultural Foundation. No wonder
then that the term ‘‘urban shrinkage’’ was applied to all the cases
in this study.
In 2006, an international symposium on Shrinking Cities was held
in Dresden, discussing case studies from France, Slovakia, the United
Kingdom, Australia and Mexico. This symposium was followed, in
2007, by another at the University of Berkeley (Shrinking Cities In-
ternational Research Network 2007), where an international group of
researchers discussed various case studies from Japan, the US and
around the globe.
The discussion of the British and American cases in their national
contexts – which has seen contributions over the course of a few
decades – uses a different terminology and has its own specific foci.
Similar to western Germany in the 1980s, the debate concentrated on
economic issues and strategies intended to economically revive the
cities. The more or less explicit goal was to turn around population loss,
the decay of neighbourhoods, and declining municipal budgets. ‘‘Urban
decline’’ and ‘‘urban decay’’ became terms dominating this discourse.
There the negative, emotional impact is even higher than in relation to
the term ‘‘urban shrinkage.’’ The emergence of the physical decay of
neighbourhoods was automatically linked in discourse to issues of race
and poverty (Lang 2005; Pallagst 2005; Großmann 2007b).
In the US, attention was especially paid to the population loss caused
by suburbanization. The case of Detroit became a significant example of
the so-called doughnut effect. Waves of suburbanization left behind
decay, blighted areas, and even vast, empty fields in former inner-city
neighbourhoods. Burned-down buildings, houses in the later stages of
decay, empty overgrown fields, and single still-occupied streets or hou-
ses dominate the picture. At the administrative borders between the
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suburbs and the city, this picture changes, and vibrant and well kept
communities appear (Gallagher 2004, 242-248). In cases like Pittsburgh,
suburbanization hit the administrative city not as heavily. Blight and
decay occur only in certain areas, usually in the black and poor neigh-
bourhoods first. Pittsburgh is also an example of a city where urban
shrinkage and suburban growth has led to conflicts in issues of gover-
nance. Problems of equity in tax revenue, and infrastructural expenses
have remained unsolved for years, leading to an almost bankrupt state of
the city’s budget (Miller 2002). In these American contexts, population
decline due to low fertility rates did not play an important role, since
both Detroit and Pittsburgh are immigration destinations, with most
immigrant families showing higher birth rates.
Reconsidering the Term ‘‘Urban Shrinkage’’
and the Eastern German Experience
The comparison with American cases points to one decisive diffe-
rence: the influence of demographic trends on urban development. In
eastern Germany, demographic ‘‘discoveries’’ clearly showed that urban
shrinkage is not a dependent on only economic development. This is, in
our point of view, the main difference between the concepts of urban
decline as it was discussed in Western countries in the 1970s and 1980s,
and the eastern German experience. Decay and decline are not analyti-
cally suitable names for this pathway of urban development, since they
involve even stronger negative notions than shrinkage. Therefore, rather
than transferring these more negative terms to other, international con-
texts, from our point of view the term urban shrinkage has applicability
in the international context.
Nevertheless, population decline seems to be a kind of focal point of
the development of shrinking cities, no matter what processes caused it.
Many of the problems discussed in context arise from shrinking popula-
tions: housing vacancies, decay and blight, underutilization of the tech-
nical infrastructure, and correspondingly rising maintenance costs, at
a time when municipal budgets are shrinking. The extent to which these
problems occur is directly related to the extent of population decline.
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After looking at these international cases, the specifics of the eastern
German experience become more obvious. Eastern German urban shrink-
age represents a special case of post-socialist transformation charac-
terized by an overlapping of simultaneous processes. Deindustrialization
and subsequent out-migration, as well as suburbanization contributed to
a negative migration balance. At the same time, massive drops in birth
rates after the reunification of Germany led to a negative natural popula-
tion development. Together with the simultaneous heavy investments in
housing stock and technical infrastructure that was encouraged by high
tax revenues, the overall population decline led to significant housing
vacancies that then became the starting point of the ‘‘shrinkage’’ debate.
Economic decline, suburbanization, population decline, and disurbaniza-
tion are not parallel characteristics of shrinking cities: they are interlin-
ked processes, one being a consequence of the other. In the cases
considered, shrinkage is a multidimensional development with different
pathways. Migration processes due to deindustrialization and suburbani-
zation are elements of all the Western European cases. Demographic
change is becoming more important all over Europe, but it is not yet as
relevant for cities in those countries that are destinations of migration
(United Nations 2006).
A first systematization of urban shrinkage would therefore involve
distinguishing between causes, process, and consequences. Global trends
with local consequences lead to population decline, which is at the core
of the process of urban shrinkage. Population decline can be driven by
migration as well as natural population development. It then – together
with further building activity – leads to a mismatch of the cities’
capacities with their respective densities of usage and demand. The
consequences can vary significantly. Cities with clear social differen-
tiation and residential segregation show selective neighbourhood decline,
while others might become perforated across the entire city.
Post-socialist cities share a lot of the features discussed, for example
the demographic ‘‘shock’’ after 1989 (indicated e.g. by ‘‘lowest-low’’
fertility rates dropping below a total fertility rate of 1.3 children per
woman; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002), economic restructuring and
decline, in some cases out-migration due to rising urban unemployment,
and ongoing suburbanization. The next section will investigate whether
in East Central Europe there are cities that, according to the outline
developed so far, would qualify as shrinking cities.
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Urban Shrinkage Meets Post-socialist Transition
– Applying the Concept to East Central European Cities
A recent study at the University of Glasgow concluded that three out
of four cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in the post-socialist
countries are shrinking. The authors summarize the situation thus: ‘‘the
absolute and relative position of cities has deteriorated sharply since the
fall of state socialism. Shrinkage rather than growth or recovery has
become the dominant trajectory’’ (Mykhnenko and Turok 2007, 2).
But the perception of scholars and officials is rather different. Since
housing prices are skyrocketing in Poland and the Czech Republic at the
moment, and the construction of new housing estates is booming, the
common perception of city development is far away from the idea of
shrinking developments. When discussing the eastern German experience,
it is usually treated as an exceptional case, not comparable to others. ‘‘We
don’t have these problems that you have in eastern Germany’’ is a state-
ment we have come across a number of times in our field work.
Sensitized by the eastern German experience to demographic develop-
ment, we suggest a different point of view (see also Haase et al. 2008).
Eastern German and East Central European cities share a socialist
past and the experience of post-socialist transition with its far-reaching
economic restructuring. Just as in eastern Germany, the revolution in the
political and economic systems resulted in a massive and sudden decline
in birth rates. At the same time, the mortality rate stagnated and even
increased. After the fall of state socialism, fertility rates dropped drama-
tically, due to rises in childlessness and postponements of marriage and
childbearing. Vaishar (2006) showed for the Ostrava region trends very
similar to those of eastern German cities. Additionally, there is an
increasing impact of migration in different forms and directions, in-
cluding a strong suburbanization trend (Sy´kora and Ourˇednícˇek 2006).
This has led to a drop in population, and to ageing city societies.
As in all the contexts discussed here, old industrialized regions are
hot spots of population decline. These cities lose population due to
job-related, age- and gender-selective out-migration; but also, the natural
population decrease is larger than elsewhere as a result of the increasing
death surplus. Ło´dz´, for instance, between 1990 und 2005 lost 11% of its
inhabitants; Katowice, 16%; Sosnowiec, 15% (see table 1). Also, Czech
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Table 1: Population decline in selected Polish and Czech cities
City
Population
development
1990-2005 Causes of population decline
absolute relative
Poland
Ło´dz´
Katowice
Sosnowiec
Bytom
Poznan´
Gliwice
Bydgoszcz
81,000
50,000
33,000
26,000
22,000
15,000
15,000
11%
16%
15%
11%
4%
7%
4%
Death surplus, out-migration, intraregional migration
Out-migration, death surplus, intraregional migration
Death surplus, intraregional migration, out-migration
Out-migration, death surplus, intraregional migration
Death surplus, suburbanization
Out-migration, death surplus, interregional migration
Suburbanization, death surplus
Czech
Republic
Brno
Plzenˇ
Ostrava
Olomouc
26,000
12,000
21,000
7,000
7%
8%
7%
7%
Suburbanization, death surplus
Suburbanization, death surplus
Out-migration, death surplus
Suburbanization, death surplus
Sources: GUS [Gło´wny Urza˛d Statystyczny]: Ludnos´c´. Stan i struktura w przekroju
terytorialnym. Warsaw, various years; CˇSÚ [Cˇesky´ statisticky´ úrˇád]: Vy´voj základních
demograficky´ch ukazatelu˚ ve vybrany´ch meˇstech. Prague 2006.
cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants lost about 7-8% in the same
period. Population losses are stronger within the administrative boun-
daries of cities, while suburbs continue to grow; this affects both
infrastructure and municipal budgets. However, particularly in recent
years, the population decline in the bigger Czech cities has slowed
down; currently one could rather speak of – in absolute quantitative
terms – a ‘‘stagnating’’ number of inhabitants
Urban shrinkage is not in fact a new phenomenon in East Central
European cities, and has not only arisen in the post-socialist transition.
Since the end of the 1970s, old industrial cities in Poland like Ło´dz´, and
cities in the Upper Silesian industrial area have been experiencing
population decline. This was then reinforced by structural changes after
1989, when new engines of population decline, like suburbanization and
job migration, appeared in cities such as Brno, Ostrava, Poznan´, Cracow
and Bydgoszcz (Haase et al. 2007).
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Shrinkage is not only part of the present for most eastern European
cities; it might well be their future too. According to the prognoses of
national statistical offices, the population of cities – especially in Poland
– will fall dramatically (see table 2). The population prognosis of the
Polish national statistical office (GUS) claims that populations will
further decline until 2030; in some Polish cities rather dramatically (up
to 30%), and in some Czech cities rather steadily (approximately 5%).
Independent of the necessary methodological discussion about the relia-
bility of these forecasts, urban shrinkage is a fact, not fiction in East
Central Europe.
In the long run this will affect labour and housing markets, the
use of social and technical infrastructure, budgets and the socio-spatial
patterns of the cities. Since the populations of East Central European
cities are not expected to reproduce themselves, possible growth can
only arise from new waves of in-migration and – as a qualitatively
new phenomenon – (foreign) immigration. At the same time, the further
spread of rampant suburbanization needs to be counteracted. In different
contexts, the quantity of population loss and its consequences might
be more or less dramatic. The future development will show what
types of cities are affected, and to what scope (Haase, Kabisch, and
Steinführer 2006).
But there are also important differences between Polish and Czech
cities in comparison with shrinking cities in eastern Germany. The main
difference is that housing vacancies are not yet an issue, nor is infra-
structure oversupplied. The housing markets are still rather tight, and so
the real estate markets and new construction projects in the bigger cities
are booming. The housing markets continue to differentiate, with sub-
urban districts growing, and spot-gentrification occurring in parts of the
inner city. There is a tendency to restructure older built-up areas. Large
housing estates differentiate into better and worse addresses, depending
on the age of the estates – the older the better – and on their images,
which depends on the quality of their surrounding landscape and in great
part on their ownership structures and related resources for restructuring
and maintenance (Murie, Knorr-Siedow, and van Kempen 2003).
Finally, there are neighbourhoods in the cities that have been neglec-
ted for quite a long time – areas that are stigmatized as ‘‘problem places
home to problem people.’’ In the Czech Republic this applies mostly to
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Table 2. Population in selected Polish cities (2002), with prognoses to 2030
City Population (2002)in thousands
Population forecast
until 2030
Katowice
Sosnowiec
Gliwice
Cze˛stochowa
Gdan´sk
Bydgoszcz
Ło´dz´
Kielce
325.0
231.5
202.6
250.9
461.7
372.1
785.1
211.8
28%
25%
25%
23%
21%
21%
21%
21%
Source: GUS. Prognoza ludnos´ci na lata 2003-2030 (www.stat.gov.pldane
–
spol-gosp
ludnoscprognoza
–
ludnosciindex.htm; access date: 19.2.2007)
districts with a high concentration of Roma people, in Poland to inner
city districts that are home to what officials call the ‘‘pathology.’’
When talking about the influence of population decline on a city to
present, experts mention a catch-up to Western norms of average hou-
sing space. Households of three generations that were once forced to live
in one flat may now satisfy their ‘‘hunger for housing.’’ Since only
better-off households are mobile, we suppose that under conditions of
population loss, further spatial and social fragmentation might occur in
these cities, leading to pockets of growth and simultaneously to pockets
of decline.
Discussion and Outlook
The application of concept of urban shrinkage fosters awareness of
demographic issues, and the possible futures of East Central European
cities. It thereby proves an initial explanatory power across contexts. The
consideration of migration patterns and demographic shifts bring a cer-
tain set of cities into the focus of research on urban shrinkage: those
larger cities that are not capitals, that are – or were – older industrial
centres, and share the experience of a breakdown in their industrial
economic base. As long as the focus of research that compares cities
internationally remains on capitals and ‘‘catch-up’’ modernization in
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post-socialist societies and cities, developmental trends which depart
from the growth paradigm stay out of the spotlight. Yet there are already
some works which talk about ‘‘demographic stagnation’’ (Andrle 2001)
or ‘‘depopulation’’ (Parysek 2005, 99, 104; who euphemistically also
calls this ‘‘qualitative growth’’), but the quantitative growth paradigm
still forms the most important frame for urban development.
Reconsidering the pitfalls involved in transferring concepts from one
context to the other, we summarize:
Concerning parochialism – the tendency to continuously invent new
terms or to use existing ones in an unintended way – it would bring
international comparative research on urban development forward to
focus on just one term, instead of using ‘‘decline’’ and ‘‘decay’’ in the
English-speaking context, ‘‘shrinkage’’ in the German context, and ‘‘stag-
nation’’ or ‘‘depopulation’’ in the eastern European context. We suggest
working on a good, robust conceptualization of urban shrinkage. Out of
all the terms, it is the least stigmatizing, yet still clearly names the
phenomena: the opposite of city expansion. Thus, the ‘‘invention’’ of yet
more terms to describe the population losses in East Central European
cities leads no further. Instead of separating out all pathways of shrin-
kage according to their different causes and consequences – for example,
‘‘weak market cities’’ or ‘‘perforated cities’’ (Brophy and Burnett 2003;
Doehler 2003) – we instead suggest developing a qualitative typology
based on those clusters of shrinking cities which have a similar complex
of causes and consequences. The core dimension of urban shrinkage
should therefore be the factor at the heart of all these processes: a rather
long-term loss of population.
But not all losses of population automatically qualify as urban
shrinkage. It would be misclassification, to apply the concept of urban
shrinkage to all cities in East Central Europe that lost some population
in whatever small timeframe. If a city loses population, but does not
show any of the characteristic consequences of urban shrinkage, it is not
at this moment a shrinking city. So it is not yet clear whether it will be
meaningful to apply the concept to the larger Czech cities at any future
point in time. A recent analysis of the case of Brno demonstrated that, in
spite of some population losses between 1991 and 2005, the city cannot
be classified as ‘‘shrinking’’ (Maas 2007). If demographic prognoses
suggest a future drop in population numbers, as in most Polish cases,
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then these cities are likely to become shrinking cities – but we have
argued that the significant difference between processes of shrinkage and
other pathways of urban development is the question of whether a de-
cline in population numbers leads to a mismatch between usage and
physical urban structures. To call this kind of urban development some-
thing like a ‘‘slight shrinkage’’ would be a case of degreeism, denying
important qualitative differences.
Urban shrinkage should, however, not be confused with regional
shrinkage. Shrinking cities do not only occur in regions that lose
population as a whole. They might also occur in growing regions, or in
growing metropolitan areas. The most impressive example of this type
of shrinkage is the case of Detroit. Since suburbanization is one of the
predominant development trajectories of cities in East Central Europe,
this route should be carefully observed, especially in cases where the
national population does not reproduce itself. Applying the concept of
urban shrinkage to just one particular neighbourhood in a region would
be case of concept stretching.
The transfer of the concept of urban shrinkage into research on
eastern European cities shows, in our point of view, clear benefits. First
of all, the concept might challenge ‘‘business as usual,’’ the strong
research focus on capital cities that dominates international debates. The
transfer leads to new questions that integrate the demographic dimension
in classic fields of research such as residential segregation, neighbour-
hood development, housing research, and so forth. Processes that have
been overlooked and ignored for a long time in eastern Germany might
get early attention and informed policy responses in East Central Euro-
pean cities.
Also the concept of urban shrinkage benefits from the transfer. The
population development so far seems to qualify as a core indicator to
describe the process of urban shrinkage independently of the actual
causes. The eastern German debate mixes the description of the process
with causes and consequences. Also the description of urban shrinkage
as a downward spiral is too narrow, and hinders international debates
about shrinking cities.
We suggest a differentiation between process (at the core), and
causes and consequences (in the frame) of urban shrinkage. So far,
economic restructuring seems to be one major cause worldwide, affec-
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ting cities that have or had their economic base in the fading industries.
Also, falling fertility rates prove to be a common source of urban
shrinkage in most countries and cities of Western Europe and North
America. Looking at the consequences, these cities seem to develop
inner-city peripheries: areas of disinvestment – whether in the form of
industrial brownfields, neighbourhoods in decay, or clusters of vacant
houses. The social and technical infrastructure becomes underused. First,
kindergartens, and then schools close down. Planning strategies need to
shift from steering or limiting growth, to the management of shrinkage.
Still, one needs to carefully look at the differences between cities
and national contexts. One of the challenging questions in concep-
tualizing urban shrinkage is, at what point can a city be classified as
a shrinking city? What size population loss in what time period is
significant, and what phenomena are core to shrinking cities? Due to
historic and other context specific factors, the socio-spatial patterns in
shrinking cities are different. For instance, the presence or absence of
minority populations might make all the difference for neighbourhood
pathways that share many common features otherwise. The performance
of the national economy, the state of regulation of housing markets, the
property ownership structures, and so forth – are all very decisive in
steering the development of a specific shrinking city. Also, similar
findings in different contexts do not necessarily need to have the same
causes, for instance when interpreting housing vacancies.
A lot of research still needs to be done. More case studies might
shed light on the phenomena and causes of urban shrinkage. We appeal
for the combination of large-scale socio-statistical analyses with qualita-
tive micro-scale research in order to understand the specific pathways
and to qualify the concept. Cross-national cooperation will be beneficial
in detecting blind spots in research perspectives, and raise innovative
questions.
References
Altrock, U., S. Güntner, S. Huning, and D. Peters, ed. 2005. Zwischen Anpassung und
Neuerfindung – Raumplanung und Stadtentwicklung in den Staaten der EU-Ost-
verweiterung. Berlin: Verlag Uwe Altrock.
Andrle, A. 2001. Demografická stagnace našich nejveˇtších meˇst. Urbanismus a územní
rozvoj 4, no. 6.
Urban Shrinkage in East Central Europe? 95
Atkinson, R., and G. Bridge, eds. 2005. Gentrification in a global perspective: The new
urban colonialism. London: Routledge.
Beauregard, R. A. 1995. Voices of decline: The postwar fate of US cities. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Berg, Leo van den, R. Drewett, L. H. Klaasen, A. Rossi, and C. H. T. Vijverberg.
1982. Urban Europe: A study of growth and decline. Urban Europe 1. Oxford:
Pergamon Press.
Bernt, M., and A. Holm. 2005. Gentrification of a particular type: The case of Prenzlauer
Berg. In Gentrification in a global perspective. Ed. R. Atkinson and G. Bridge.
London: Blackwell.
Bradshaw, M. J., and A. C. Stenning. 2003. Introduction: transformation and development.
In East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union: The post socialist economies.
Ed. M. J. Bradshaw and A. C. Stenning. Harlow: Pearson.
Bridger, S., and F. Pine, ed. 1998. Surviving post-socialism: Local strategies and regional
responses in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. London: Routledge.
Brophy, P., and K. Burnett. 2003. A framework for community: Development in weak
market cities. Denver: Community Development Partnership Network.
Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung. 2003. Dokumentation zum Bundeswettbewerb
,,Stadtumbau Ost‘‘ – für lebenswerte Städte und attraktives Wohnen. Berlin: Runze
& Casper Werbeagentur.
------. 2004. Stadtumbau West. 16 Pilotstädte bauen um. Berlin, Oldenburg: Druckwerk.
Burawoy, M. 1999. Afterword. In Uncertain transition. Ethnographies of change in the
postsocialist world. Ed. M. Burawoy and K. Verdery. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Bürkner, H.-J., O. Berger, C. Luchmann, and E. Tenz. 2007. Der demographische Wandel
und seine Konsequenzen für Wohnungsnachfrage, Städtebau und Flächennutzung:
Working Paper. Erkner: IRS Leibniz-Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Struk-
turplanung.
Bürkner, H.-J., T. Kuder, and M. Kühn. 2005. Regenerierung schrumpfender Städte.
Theoretische Zugänge und Forschungsperspektiven: Working Paper. Erkner: IRS
Leibniz-Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturplanung.
Doehler, M. 2003. Die perforierte Stadt: Chaos oder Methode? Deutsches Architektenblatt,
April.
European Commission. Directorate-General for Regional Policy. 2007. Urban Audit.
http:www.urbanaudit.org.
Gallagher, J. 2004. Suburbanisierung Detroits. In Schrumpfende Städte. Band 1, Inter-
nationale Untersuchungen. Ed. P. Oswalt. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.
Göb, R. 1977. Die schrumpfende Stadt. Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaften 16.
Grabher, G., and D. Stark, eds. 1997. Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies,
linkages, and localities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Großmann, K. 2005. Abriss Ost. Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte no. 12005.
------. 2007a. Am Ende des Wachstumsparadigmas? Zur Transformation von Deutungsmus-
tern in der Stadtentwicklung. Der Fall Chemnitz. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Katrin GROßMANN, Annegret HAASE, Dieter RINK, Annett STEINFÜHRER96
------. 2007b. Schrumpfung zwischen Tabu und Thematisierung. Berliner Debatte Initial
18, no.1.
Haase, A., K. Großmann, S. Kabisch, and A. Steinführer. 2008. Städte im demographi-
schen Wandel. Perspektivenwechsel für Ostmitteleuropa? Osteuropa 58, no 1.
Haase, A., S. Kabisch, and A. Steinführer. 2006. Aufschwung der inneren Stadt in Europa?
Reurbanisierung unter den Bedingungen des demographischen Wandels im inter-
nationalen Vergleich. Europa Regional 14, no 4.
Haase, A., A. Steinführer, S. Kabisch, and D. Gierczak. 2007. How inner-city housing and
demographic change are intertwined in East-Central European cities: Comparative
analyses in Polish and Czech cities for the transition period. In Housing and Environ-
mental Conditions in Post-Communist Countries. Ed. B. Komar and B. Kuchar-
czyk-Brus. Gliwice: Wydawnictwo Politechniki S´la˛skiej.
Hann, C. M., ed. 2002. Postsocialism: Ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia. London:
Routledge.
Hannemann, C. 2003. Schrumpfende Städte in Ostdeutschland – Ursachen und Folgen
einer Stadtentwicklung ohne Wirtschaftswachstum. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 28.
Häußermann, H., and W. Siebel. 1988. Die schrumpfende Stadt und die Stadtsoziologie. In
Soziologische Stadtforschung. Sonderheft der KZfSS 29. Ed. J. Friedrichs. Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Johnson, T. P. 1998. Approaches to equivalence in cross-cultural and cross-national survey
research. In Cross-cultural survey equivalence. Ed. J. A. Harkness. ZUMA-Nachrich-
ten Spezial 3. Mannheim: Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen.
Kabisch, S. 2006. Stadtumbau Ost und West: Chancen und Grenzen von Schrumpfung. In
Grenzwerte, Tagungsbericht und wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen des 55. Deutschen
Geographentages Trier 2005. Ed. E. Kulke, H. Monheim and P. Wittmann. Berlin:
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Geographie.
Kohler, H. P., F. C. Billari, and J. A. Ortega. 2002. The emergence of lowest-low fertility
in Europe during the 1990s. Population and Development Review 28.
Köppen, B. 2005. Stadtentwicklung zwischen Schrumpfung und Sprawl: Auswirkungen der
Stadt-Umland-Wanderungen im Verdichtungsraum Chemnitz-Zwickau. Tönning: Der
Andere Verlag.
Kostinskiy, G. 2001. Post-socialist cities in flux. In Handbook of urban studies. Ed.
R. Paddison. London: SAGE Publications.
Lang, T. 2005. Insights in the British debate about urban decline and urban regeneration:
Working paper. Erkner: Leibnitz-Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Struktur-
planung.
Lang, T., and E. Tenz. 2003. Von der schrumpfenden Stadt zur Lean City: Prozesse und
Auswirkungen der Stadtschrumpfung in Ostdeutschland und deren Bewältigung. Dort-
mund: Dortmunder Vertrieb für Bau- und Planungsliteratur.
Lütke Daldrup, E. 2001. Die perforierte Stadt. Eine Versuchsanordnung. StadtBauwelt 150.
Maas, A. 2007. Schrumpfendes Brünn? Quantitative und qualitative Analysen. Diploma
thesis, University of Leipzig.
Miller, D. Y. 2002. The regional governing of metropolitan America. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Urban Shrinkage in East Central Europe? 97
Mossberger, K., and G. Stoker. 2001. The evolution of urban regime theory: The challenge
of conceptualization. Urban Affairs Review 36, no. 6.
Murie, Alan, Thomas Knorr-Siedow, and Ronald van Kempen. 2003. Large housing estates
in Europe: General developments and theoretical backgrounds. In RESTATE Report 1.
Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University.
Mykhnenko, V., and I. Turok. 2007. Shrinking cities: East European urban trajectories
1960-2005. Glasgow: University of Glasgow.
Nuissl, H., D. Rink, and P. Steuer. 2005. The consequences of urban sprawl in a context of
decline: The case of Leipzig. Leipzig: UFZ.
Oswalt, P., ed. 2005. Shrinking Cities 1: International Research. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.
------. 2006. Shrinking Cities 2: Interventions. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.
Oswalt, P., and T. Rieniets, ed. 2006. Atlas of shrinking cities. Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz.
Pallagst, K. 2005. The end of the growth machine: New requirements for regional
governance in an era of shrinking cities. Paper presented at the Association of
Collegiate Schools of Planning Congress, October, in Kansas City, MI.
Parysek, J. 2005. Development of Polish towns and cities and factors affecting this process
at the turn of the century. Geographia Polonica 78.
Pfeiffer, U., H. Simons, and L. Porsch. 2000. Wohnungswirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel in
den neuen Bundesländern. Bericht der Kommission. Im Auftrag des
Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen. Berlin: Empirica.
Sartori, G. 1991. Comparing and miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics 3, no. 3.
Schröer, A. 2002. Stadtumbau und Spaß dabei! Plädoyer für eine Kultivierung von
Schrumpfungsprozessen. Planungsrundschau 5.
Shrinking Cities International Research Network, ed. Forthcoming. The future of shrinking
cities. Conference report, Berkeley.
Standl, H., and D. Krupickaite. 2004. Gentrification in Vilnius: The example of Uzupis.
Europa Regional 12.
Stanilov, K., ed. 2007. The post-socialist city. The GeoJournal Library 92, Dordrecht:
Springer.
Steinführer, A. 2004. Wohnstandortentscheidungen und städtische Transformation: Ver-
gleichende Fallstudien in Ostdeutschland und Tschechien. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften.
------. 2005. Comparative case studies in cross-national housing research. In Methodologies
in housing research. Ed. D. U. Vestbro, Y. Hürol, and W. Wilkinson. Gateshead:
Urban International Press.
Steinführer, A, and A. Haase. 2007. Demographic change as a future challenge for cities in
East Central Europe. Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography 89, no. 2.
Stoker, Gerry 1995. Regime theory and urban politics. In Theories of urban politics. Ed.
D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman, 54-71. London: SAGE Publications.
Sy´kora, L. 2005. Stadtentwicklung und Raumplanung in der Tschechischen Republik und
Prag. In Zwischen Anpassung und Neuerfindung: Raumplanung und Stadtentwicklung
in den Staaten der EU-Osterweiterung. Ed. U. Altrock et al. Berlin: Verlag Uwe
Altrock.
Katrin GROßMANN, Annegret HAASE, Dieter RINK, Annett STEINFÜHRER98
Sy´kora, L., and M. Ourˇednícˇek. 2006. Sprawling post-communist metropolis: Commercial
and residential suburbanisation in Prague and Brno, the Czech Republic. In
Employment deconcentration in European metropolitan areas: Market forces versus
planning regulations. Ed. E. Razin, M. Dijst and C. Vazquez. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Turok, I., and V. Mykhnenko. 2007. The trajectories of European cities, 1960-2005. Cities:
The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, 24, no. 3.
United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2006.
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision. Executive Summary, Fact Sheets,
Data Tables. New York: United Nations.
Vaishar, A. 2006. Demographic prognoses for some seats in the Ostrava region. Moravian
Geographical Reports 14.
Weidner, S. 2005. Stadtentwicklung unter Schrumpfungsbedingungen – Leitfaden zur
Erfassung dieses veränderten Entwicklungsmodus von Stadt und zum Umgang damit
in der Stadtentwicklungsplanung. Leipzig: University of Leipzig.
Wiest, K. 2006. Soziale Grenzen in Städten: Repräsentationen von Wohngebieten in den
neuen Ländern. Europa Regional 14.
Urban Shrinkage in East Central Europe? 99
vacat
Declining CitiesDeveloping Cities: Polish and German Perspectives
Marek Nowak and Michał Nowosielski (Eds.)
Instytut Zachodni, Poznan´ 2008
© 2008 the authors and Instytut Zachodni
Spatial Restructuring
of the Katowice Conurbation
Jarosław MIKOŁAJEC
Abstract. The Katowice conurbation is a classic mining conurbation, like
many others which emerged in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Its restructuring and revitalization process in large mea-
sure involves changes in its spatial order. Since a conurbation is not a single
city, but rather a complex of cities, changes of the spatial order comprise
changes of relations between its components – namely cities and industrial
estates. In terms of restructuring, the Katowice conurbation is backward
compared to analogous industrial areas in western Europe, and for this
reason it can take advantage of their experience.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most important factor
determining urbanization was industrialization. So close a correlation
between urbanization and industrialization has never occurred before or
since. Never had so many new cities and city complexes of purely
industrial origin emerged, and the growth of old cities had never before
been so dependent on industrial development. Those new forms of
spatial order which are characteristic of the capitalistic economy of the
century, namely the coal conurbations, were developed at that time.
In modern times, mining has been one of the most important reasons
for urbanization. In the case of coal conurbations, the mining industry
was the direct reason for the urbanization process. When mining was not
the direct reason for the urbanization, it sometimes – in an indirect way
– contributed to the development of cities. A good example of this might
be the very fast growth of the San Francisco population in the middle of
the nineteenth century, which was directly caused by the California Gold
Rush (1848-1855), for which the city had administrative and service
functions (Korcelli 1969, 36).
The extraction of mineral resources, coal, and metal ores, and the
development of the processing industry were accompanied by the pro-
gressive enlargement of settlements in the Katowice conurbation. This
was followed by real changes in the life of societies, a consequence of
both the accumulation of people and the character of their settlements.
They were industrial settlements which depended on the development of
industry, but the communities of workers’ estates did not have urban
features.
It seems that the period of very close correlation between indus-
trialization and urbanization is gone for ever. Modern urbanization is not
always connected with industrialization. Rapid urbanization of develo-
ping countries – which has led to the creation of monstrous cities with
millions of inhabitants – is an example of the superiority of the urbani-
zation process over industrialization, whereas modern technopolies are
an example of the opposite dependence (Jałowiecki 1978, 103). The
restructuring of the Katowice conurbation has to be connected with the
reformulation of traditional relations between urbanization and indus-
trialization. The disappearance and restructuring of old industry must
have some consequences in the urbanization processes.
Jarosław MIKOŁAJEC102
Because the Katowice conurbation is not a single city, but a complex
of cities, the restructuring and revitalization processes are not identical
to the restructuring and revitalization of a single city, and the problems
of structural changes to the whole region have to be taken into con-
sideration. So next to the restructuring and revitalization of a single
element of conurbation, there is the problem of restructuring and revita-
lizing the whole conurbation. Because the relations between the cities
and estates of the conurbation are in the majority of cases spatial ones,
the restructuring of the Katowice conurbation must come down to the
restructuring of its spatial order.
Shaping the new, postindustrial spatial order – that is, the attempt to
overcome the old polycentric order of a conurbation – can consist of:
– deglomeration of a conurbation;
– reduction of the polycentric order via the creation of several new
centres;
– transformation of a conurbation into a monocentric agglomera-
tion;
– transformation of each element of an agglomeration while preser-
ving its polycentric character.
It is worth noticing that these four processes include phenomena on
different spatial scales. The first and third concern the whole conur-
bation, the second concerns parts of it, and the fourth concerns particular
settlement elements which constitute the conurbation.
These processes do not happen independently, but act together and
are closely related. The history of the Katowice conurbation shows that
each of these phenomena, to some degree, took place at the very
beginning of the conurbation’s existence. The formation of the conur-
bation was a process always linked to its deglomeration, but in different
periods one or the other dominated. Similarly, the process of indus-
trialization was always accompanied by the phenomenon of disappear-
ance of industrial activity which happened, for example, because of the
development of new deposits of mineral resources, and the end of
exploitation of the old ones. The problem of transformation of the
conurbation’s spatial order has always existed, and we can say that it has
been an immanent problem in its history. Nowadays, during the conur-
bation’s rapid restructuring, the problem has merely accelerated.
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Let us now look into the four processes of transformation of the
spatial order of the Katowice conurbation.
The first such process is deglomeration – the opposite to agglomera-
tion – which can be a spontaneous, unplanned phenomenon, but can also
be planned and artificially accelerated. The two most important historic
deglomeration plans for the Katowice conurbation – one Polish and one
German – were created during periods when the whole agglomeration
was part of, respectively the Polish or the German political organization.
The first deglomeration plan concerned with organizing the space of
the Katowice conurbation was one of German origin from the time of
the Second World War. This plan intended to reduce the population of
the central part of the agglomeration by spreading the cities’ population
around the Upper Silesian Industrial Region – known by the abbrevia-
tion ‘‘GOP’’. It was planned to create a city of 200,000 inhabitants to the
northeast of Da˛browa Go´rnicza, to enlarge the population of Tychy to
150,000 people, to expand Łabe˛dy, Tarnowskie Go´ry, Pyskowice, and
other centres, and to develop roads and highways (Gwosdz 2004, 132).
In 1953 the GOP regional plan was created; it was also known as the
‘‘Pien´kowski Plan,’’ after its main architect. Deglomeration was to con-
sist of the relocation from the heart of the agglomeration (the so-called
zone A) of a large number of inhabitants and a major part of the
industry, to the periphery of the conurbation, away from the zone of coal
exploitation. The realization of this plan resulted in the transformation of
Tychy into a satellite of Katowice, for which it fulfilled the housing
functions. But the deglomeration of the heart of the agglomeration was
not entirely successful (Kotela 1995, 11-27).
The contemporary process of deglomeration is, however, a spon-
taneous one and it has assumed a demographic character. Since the end
of the 1980s, the population of the Katowice conurbation has been
decreasing, because of both the negative birth rate and the negative
migration balance. We can take the year 1979 to be the year of
maximum development of industry in the Katowice conurbation; at this
date, the extraction of coal in Poland exceeded 200 million tons annual-
ly, and since then it has been decreasing.
The time variation of the Katowice conurbation population curve is
similar to that of analogous coal-mining regions in western Europe, for
example the Ruhr area in North Rhine-Westphalia, where the cities
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attained their maximum population during the 1960s. The variations
were more drastic in western American mining settlements during the
gold rush, when the population drastically increased for a year or two,
and then drastically declined; after a few years these settlements began
to disappear, creating ghost towns typical of the Wild West. Considering
the decline of population that occurred in the Katowice area, the plans
for the artificial deglomeration of the conurbation – which consisted of
creating new cities and settlements on its peripheries, to be populated by
surplus inhabitants from the centre – were abandoned.
A second potential transformation process in the Katowice conur-
bation polycentric order could be the creation of a number of zones with
their own local centres. One of the main features of the Katowice
conurbation is the lack of a natural centre, a city which would be well
qualified to hold the central position. Katowice, situated on the southeas-
tern edge of the conurbation, holds a dominant position in the conur-
bation mostly by accident (Rajman 1997, 41).
During the history of the conurbation, Bytom, Gliwice and Chorzo´w
have all aspired to the role of its main centre. For a long time Bytom
was the largest city in the region. Gliwice is the only port city and lies
in the western part of the mining zone; it had the advantage of being
connected to the western part of Germany, and so it fulfilled the
function of the conurbation’s ‘‘gate.’’ Chorzo´w’s advantage was its
central position, but between the two World Wars it lost this, because of
the creation of the new Polish-German border through the centre of the
conurbation, changing it from the central city to a peripheral one.
Yet it is not out of the question that during the further evolution of
the conurbation’s spatial order that these cities might regain the position
of local centres around which the neighbouring cities would be assem-
bled. Most often Gliwice is appointed to this role, because it is the
academic and scientific centre from which it was attempted to create
a modern technopolis, with modern industry and a free trade zone.
Gliwice could become the second important centre after Katowice,
which would give the conurbation a bipolar character. To this list should
be added Sosnowiec, the centre of the Zagłe˛bie Da˛browskie region,
whose history is slightly different from the rest of the conurbation.
The third possible mode of evolution might be a transformation
of the polycentric conurbation into a monocentric agglomeration. The
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Katowice conurbation is the biggest urban complex in Poland; yet its
biggest city, Katowice, in 2006 had only 317,000 inhabitants – no more
than 15% of the conurbation’s population. This fact itself is evidence
that Katowice could not be the natural centre toward which the other
cities of the conurbation would gravitate.
But if the cities of the Katowice agglomeration were joined together
in one urban organism, the resulting city would have more than two
million inhabitants, and would become not only the most populated
Polish city, but also the second central European metropolis after Berlin.
The most frequently proposed name for the potential new city is ‘‘Sile-
sia’’ (the Latin name of the region), but there are also other propositions,
such as ‘‘Katowice’’ or ‘‘the Katowice Agglomeration’’ (Aglomeracja
Katowicka).
The character of the future city is controversial. Would it be one city
with a central administration, or a complex of cities which would form
a kind of federation or confederation? First of all, the creation of the city
of Silesia would make one central city of the Silesian voivodeship
dominate the other parts. The population of the city of Silesia would be
ten times greater than that of the next two biggest cities of the voivode-
ship, Cze˛stochowa and Bielsko-Biała.
In the second case, the polycentric spatial structure and the conflicts
of interests between the different cities could be a cause of centrifugal
movements. Unsuccessful examples of the creation of new cities through
the merging of the smaller centres of a conurbation – such as the Rybnik
Coal Region (Rybnicki Okre˛g We˛glowy) adjacent to the Katowice conur-
bation in the south – make scepticism a frequent attitude toward the
possibility of total integration. In the Ruhr area in western Germany,
despite the creation of an urban complex – the Regionalverband Ruhr
– originating in the nineteenth century, total integration has never
happened, and today there is no plan of creating a single integrated city.
I would like to recount here the story of the historic attempt to create
a single administrative unit from the western part of the conurbation
– the German tricity, formed from Gliwice, Zabrze and Bytom. At the
end of the 1920s there was the idea of joining these cities into one body
with a joint administration, but the plan was never realized. Under this
scheme, three cities together with three attached neighbouring com-
munities were to constitute a main administrative unit with a slightly
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strange name, the Bezirks-Zweckverband. The joining-together of these
three cities was to be accompanied by their thorough reconstruction,
creating new green and recreation areas, and new communication lines,
including a highway joining the German part of the conurbation with the
rest of the country (Szczypka-Gwiazda 2003). Because the project was
utopian and very expensive to implement, it was never realized.
The fourth possible path of evolution is a change in the character of
each urban unit of the conurbation, while preserving its polycentric
character. The question of what is the fundamental unit should be
considered here; it seems that the fundamental settlement units in the
Katowice agglomeration are the workers’ estates – very often miners’
estates – rather than the cities themselves. This arises directly from the
origin of the agglomeration: the settlement units which emerged as
a consequence of the development of the mining and processing indus-
tries were workers’ estates.
The development of the city centre was often a secondary phenome-
non, and did not always catch up with the development of the estates.
Hardly ever has the city centre emerged spontaneously, as it did in
Gliwice where there is a market square and a thoroughfare, Zwycie˛stwa
Street, which leads from the square to the railway station. More often
city centres have been created deliberately – frequently by revitalizing
and reconstructing some part of the city (this is true in the cases of
Katowice, Chorzo´w, and Sosnowiec). Similar phenomena could be ob-
served in the cities of the Rybnik Coal Region, such as Jastrze˛bie Zdro´j
and Z˙ory, where the old city centres lost importance because of the
creation of new miners’ housing estates.
An analysis of the distribution of its population shows that the
Katowice agglomeration is in great part a system composed of many
types of workers’ estates, and therefore of many different types of
building. Among them there are the so-called familoki estates (charac-
teristic multifamily housing blocks for the families of industrial em-
ployees, from the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century),
the estates of blocks of flats from the period of real socialism – of which
the best example is the Tysia˛clecia estate (known as ‘‘Tauzen’’) in
Katowice – but also more sophisticated settlement units, whose building
character differs from the standards of the period. For example, we can
mention some workers’ estates in Katowice which were created at the
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beginning of the twentieth century, before the First World War, such
as Giszowiec (German Gieschwald), built between 1907 and 1910,
and which resembles Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities; and Nikiszowiec
(Nikischschacht), built between 1908 and 1911, which resembles Fou-
rier’s Phalanstere; or the estate of Finnish houses in Bieliszowice,
Ruda S´la˛ska.
Workers’ estates are the most typical settlement units in the Katowi-
ce conurbation. Very often, cities in Upper Silesia are mechanical
conglomerates of several independent estates. A classic example is Ruda
S´la˛ska, which is itself a conurbation composed of several elements – the
estates of Ruda, Bykowina, Bielszowice, Nowy Bytom, Godula, Halem-
ba, and Kochłowice. Sometimes the affiliation of estates peripheral to
a given city is a matter of convention, and sometimes it is even
accidental. A good example is Sos´nica, which belongs to Gliwice, but
which traditionally gravitates toward Zabrze.
Mining estates located near mines, or even near a single mineshaft,
were inhabited by communities whose life was closely connected with
the mine. The creation of mining communities in which it is difficult to
see urban features, and which on the contrary rather resemble the
preindustrial Gemeinschaft, was made possible by specific circumstan-
ces. In his classic work concerning British mining communities, Bulmer
(1975) identifies the ideal type of local mining community, which
consists of such elements as spatial isolation from other estates; the
economic dominance of mining, together with homogeneity of profes-
sions; specificity of the work of the miners, which necessitates solidarity
especially in extreme situations such as accidents; a distinct division
within the family between male and female roles, even in free time; and
class solidarity in conflicts with the employer (ibid.)
A good example of a mining estate community that was destroyed
by new socioeconomic conditions is Murcki, the estate analysed before
the Second World War by Chałasin´ski (1935) and more recently by
Nawrocki (1998). Murcki was initially a mining estate, then an indepen-
dent city, and finally a peripheral southern district of Katowice. The
analysis of Murcki shows that when such a conurbation is structurally
transformed by a limitation of coal-mining activity, traditional com-
munities based around mining estates can disappear.
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It should be considered whether or not the process of restructuring
conurbations should be limited to the transformation of the estates
composing it, and whether the question of creating one or several centres
should be abandoned. Is there any point in creating bigger administrative
units? The polycentrism of the conurbation does not need to be con-
sidered an obstacle in the way of its development, but rather a value of
which advantage could be taken. The specialization of each city and
estate could facilitate the economic development of the region, and at
the same time help resolve the problem of unemployment.
But the majority of the mining estates must be revitalized and
restructured – and this costs a lot. What has to be revitalized is space,
both the material space and the social space related to it. Revitalization
is not simply ‘‘renovation,’’ but rather a composite transformation of the
whole space, giving it new sense while, at the same time, preserving its
traditional values.
The Katowice conurbation, as a typical coal conurbation, has been
trying throughout its history to get rid of its original chaos and fortuity.
This disorder affects not only the conurbation as a whole, but also each
element of its parts, including even the smallest mining estates. There
are two different ways of conforming the spatial order to the changing
society: either can it be completely rebuilt, or new sense can be given to
the existing spatial order. A real evolution of the spatial order of the
mining estate would be found somewhere between these two different
possibilities.
The revitalization of a mining estate could consist of using post-
industrial objects for new purposes, such as gastronomy, commerce, or
apartments – but we should not ignore their historical value, either. Even
run-down elements of the natural environment may be adapted to re-
creational purposes, or may become an integral part of the landscape.
Reservoirs and clay pits situated near mines, which in some places
create specific ‘‘micro-lake districts,’’ can become recreation districts;
mining slag heaps may be afforested or even become ski routes. So the
revitalization of mining estates is a complex task (Gasidło 1998).
The Katowice conurbation is one of many similar coal regions which
emerged and evolved, both in Europe and on other continents – their
origin was similar everywhere. Compared to similar regions in western
Europe, the Katowice conurbation is backward; it emerged later and it
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was also restructured later. This was because of its geographic location
and historical circumstances: it was situated on the semiperipheries of
the developing world economic system. Now it is in its developing
stage, which the restructured western European conurbations experienced
many years ago. It seems that the restructuring experiences of the
western European conurbations may be useful for the further evolution
of the Katowice conurbation.
References
Bulmer, M. 1975. Sociological models of the mining community. The Sociological Review
23, no. 1.
Chałasin´ski, J. 1935. Antagonizm polsko-niemiecki w osadzie fabrycznej ,,Kopalnia’’ na
Go´rnym S´la˛sku: Studium socjologiczne. Przegla˛d Socjologiczny 3.
Gasidło, K. 1998. Problemy przekształcen´ tereno´w poprzemysłowych. Zeszyty Naukowe
Politechniki S´la˛skiej, Architektura 37.
Gwosdz, K. 2004. Ewolucja rangi miejscowos´ci w konurbacji przemysłowej: Przypadek
Go´rnego S´la˛ska (1830-2000). Cracow: Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej
Uniwersytetu Jagiellon´skiego.
Jałowiecki, B. 1978. Charakterystyka proceso´w urbanizacji Polski. Studia Socjologiczne
70, no. 3.
Korcelli, P. 1969. Rozwo´j struktury przestrzennej obszaro´w metropolitarnych Kalifornii.
Warsaw: PWN.
Kotela, C. 1995. Gospodarka przestrzenna w GOP na przykładzie realizacji plano´w
zagospodarowania przestrzennego w latach 1945-1989. S´la˛ski Kwartalnik Urbanistyki
i Architektury 1-2.
Nawrocki, T. 1998. Stosunki społeczne w osadzie ,,Kopalnia’’ na Go´rnym S´la˛sku: S´ladami
Jo´zefa Chałasin´skiego. In S´la˛sk – Polska – Europa: Zmieniaja˛ce sie˛ społeczen´stwo
w perspektywie lokalnej i globalnej. Ed. A. Sułek and M. S. Szczepan´ski. Katowice:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu S´la˛skiego.
Rajman J. 1997. Struktura przestrzenna ludnos´ci i osadnictwa aglomeracji katowickiej
w okresie transformacji gospodarczej. Zeszyty Instytutu Geografii i i Przestrzennego
Zagospodarowania PAN 46.
Szczypka-Gwiazda, B. 2003. Pomie˛dzy praktyka˛ a utopia˛. Tro´jmiasto Bytom-Zabrze
-Gliwice jako przykład koncepcji miasta przemysłowego Republiki Weimarskiej. Kato-
wice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu S´la˛skiego.
Jarosław MIKOŁAJEC110

vacat
Declining CitiesDeveloping Cities: Polish and German Perspectives
Marek Nowak and Michał Nowosielski (Eds.)
Instytut Zachodni, Poznan´ 2008
© 2008 the authors and Instytut Zachodni
Po´łwiejska Street in Transition: Gentrification
or Revitalization?
Konrad MICIUKIEWICZ*
Abstract. This paper focuses on identifying and interpreting the ongoing
processes of spatial and social transformation that have recently been hap-
pening on Po´łwiejska Street in Poznan´. Po´łwiejska Street, known to the
wider public for the Old Brewery shopping centre and the minority demons-
tration called ‘‘the Equality March,’’ has become the leading example of
ongoing urban change in Polish cities. This paper reports on the empirical
findings from press analysis and in-depth interviews, commenting both on
socio-spatial transformations and on their cognitive mappings. The case of
Po´łwiejska Street is described in the light of two interpretative grids used for
understanding urban change in social theory: (1) gentrification, and (2) re-
vitalization. The empirical study identifies traces of both gentrification and
revitalization practices, which overlap in the process of urban change occur-
ring on Po´łwiejska Street. The author argues that these two notions not only
describe the processes of urban renewal, but are also employed to construe
discourses on urban change.
* During the preparation of the article in the years 2007-2008, the author held
a scholarship for young scholars funded by the Foundation for Polish Science (Program
Start).
Introduction
Urban space has always been one of the most crucial conditions for
the arising and expression of social change. For philosophers and an-
thropologists, the figure of the city, the rhetoric of its local and global
discourses and practices, has become a metaphor for experiencing the
world in contemporary European societies. The spatial forms produced
by human action express and perform power relationships between the
city, the state, the European Union, and the universe. On one hand, the
planning of urban space, and inhabiting it, should be emphasized as
a key to mapping collective imaginations; on the other hand, one should
also think about political, cultural, and scientific narratives as factors
shaping the social understanding of spatial transformations. Under the
conditions of postmodernity, politicians, urban practitioners, and ordina-
ry urban dwellers employ various discursive strategies to make sense of
the distinctive modes of urban change. The local governments, together
with urban planners, seek legitimization for proposed spatial transfor-
mations, while at the grassroots level, new forms of social and political
struggle involving minorities, races, immigrants, women, and communi-
ty-based coalitions attempt to find successful ways of creating the
counterspaces of politics, cultural practice, and everyday life.
Discourse on urban change reflects the dialectics of inclusion and
exclusion, growth and shrinkage, planning and practice, reality and
imagination, localness and globalness, places and flows, and so forth.
Scientific knowledge, together with political narratives and common
sense, take part in translating urban transformations for the wider public.
One of the types of spatial transition which draws the attention of social
scientists and socially investigative journalists is inner city renewal. This
paper comments on the two main notions used in relation to the renewal
of historic districts – revitalization and gentrification (Miles 2000a;
Smith 2002; Ley 2002; Lees 2002). The author argues that these notions
not only address the processes of spatial and social transformation, but
also are employed to construe political discourses on urban change: the
discourse of revival and the discourse of exclusion.
The paper, however, is not an attempt to theorize on the similarities
between scientific discourses, but to describe the problems of urban
space production in Poland. Although ever since the breakdown of the
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Figure 1. People on Po´łwiejska Street
communist system in 1989 Polish cities have been participating in the
same globalized processes of change as those in Western Europe and
America, the modes and social outcomes of these transformations are
often significantly different. This article comments on the problems of
structuring and restructuring urban spaces in Poland by focusing on the
case of the transformation of Po´łwiejska Street in Poznan´. The original
idea of the empirical research was to look at the ongoing spatial and
social transformations with particular reference to discourses on revitali-
zation and gentrification, as well as to the site-specific consequences of
urban developments on networks of human interaction. Has Po´łwiejska
Street been revitalized or gentrified? What are and will be the social
outcomes of this spatial transformation? How are the changes experien-
ced by ordinary city dwellers? These questions are to be answered on
the basis of empirical findings from press analysis and field work on
Po´łwiejska Street, where 30 in-depth interviews have been conducted.
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Figure 2. The Old Brewery
Uncertainties over the revitalization of Po´łwiejska Street
Po´łwiejska Street has gone through some major spatial, social, and
cultural transformations described by the local government and media as
the most spectacular and successful revitalization in Poznan´. In recent
years on Po´łwiejska Street, the Old Brewery – a huge shopping, cultural,
and business centre – has been built by the richest woman in Poland,
and in the years following its construction it has won prestigious
competitions to find the best shopping centre in Europe and in the
world. The public sector has been involved in the spatial transformation,
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funding the new surface of the street, new street lighting, and the most
popular monument in the city. The landlords have started renovation
works in the historic tenement houses. Po´łwiejska Street has changed:
The Old Brewery – with its hundreds of shops, restaurants, cinemas,
clubs, and galleries – has become an icon of Poznan´, and the most
crowded place in the city. Po´łwiejska Street is full of people at most
times of the day. The newspapers and local authorities have announced
the success of the inner city revitalization. There are, however, some
uncertainties which question the image of the revitalization.
The revitalization process, in its narrow and distinctive sense, should
be understood not only as the social practice which effects the renewal
of spatial infrastructure and the functional revival of transformed space,
but also fulfils the condition of preserving the intentions of town
planning, with regard to the community inhabiting the space in question.
This mode of urban change is realized mostly within special revi-
talization programmes, which have been common in western Europe
since the 1970s. Revitalization in this sense is one of the procommunity
actions of the welfare state (Heller 2005; Billert 2005; Billert 2006;
Guz´dzioł 2005).
Although the socio-spatial transformation of Po´łwiejska Street seems
similar to the changes realized within complex revitalization programmes,
it is significantly different with regard to some important issues. Firstly,
the spatial change consisted of a number of independent transfor-
mation processes, which were not coordinated within a broader frame-
work. Despite their complimentary character, the actors responsible for
each transformation – the Kulczyk family constructing the Old Brewery,
the municipality laying down the new street surface, and various land-
lords renovating their tenement houses – each decided on their actions
and work schedule independently from the others. Secondly, the local
community was not involved in the decision making, and so the spatial
transformation did not fulfil the condition of communicative planning.
The local authorities attempted to consult the local community on their
ideas by launching an advisory body called the Po´łwiejska Street As-
sociation, but these attempts did not prove to be successful (Swianie-
wicz, Klimska, and Mielczarek 2004).
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Figure 3. Laundry
Figure 4. Bar on Po´łwiejska Street
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Figure 5. ‘‘Ink refilling’’
Figure 6. A cigarette break
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Figure 7. Leather goods
Figure 8. ‘‘Retro,’’ in the Old Brewery
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Figure 9. ‘‘Diamond,’’ domestic goods
Figure 10. Museified house behind glass
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Thirdly, the renewal of the old housing infrastructure has been so far
superficial. In most cases, landlords have renovated only the façades of
the buildings, while the interior spaces have remained dilapidated. As
a consequence, Po´łwiejska Street is still the site of major spatial,
functional, and social discontinuities: between the Old Brewery and the
little shops, between the interior and the exterior, between multinational
and local commerce, between the old and the young, between the rich
and the poor, and between the dominant and the marginalized (Ley
2004; Castells 2001). The street has become a containing space for
contradictory aesthetics: the poor, sketchy landscape of the local popula-
tion, and in contrast, the new luxury world of the shopping mall. Finally,
and connected to the previous point, the socio-spatial changes have not
caused the preservation, empowerment, or revival of the local com-
munity. The consequences of the spatial transformation for the local
community seem to be rather the opposite. The poor people who have
inhabited the inner city district for many years are now multidimen-
sionally excluded from their living space. Hence, the urban change on
Po´łwiejska Street is often described and experienced by the poor urban
dwellers there as gentrification.
Is Po´łwiejska Street gentrified?
The concept of gentrification introduces the second discourse on
urban change involved in discussing urban renewal – the discourse of
exclusion. This refers to processes in which poor working class com-
munities are pushed away from the inner city by the middle classes, as
a consequence of the renovation of the historical centre. Contrary to the
discourse of revival found in writings on revitalization, authors who
analyse the process of gentrification focus mostly on the negative
consequences of urban renewal for local populations (Atkinson 2002;
Blomley 2002). Critical leftwing thinkers usually understand urban rene-
wal as one of the processes of public space privatization. Gentrification
in this sense – together with the commodification, aesthetization, and
militarization of the city – is seen as the destruction of urban public
space (Zukin 1995; Sassen 2000; Harvey 1973; Jałowiecki 1988). In the
first phase, as a consequence of the rising prices of services and the
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Figure 11. Whose is Po´łwiejska Street?
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procession of new lifestyles in the renovated districts, poor populations
are pushed away from the public spaces to their homes. In the second
phase, they cannot afford the rising rents, forcing them to leave their
homes and move from the city centre. In a practical sense, this mode of
urban renewal, which has become common in American cities, is under-
stood here as an application of the ‘‘user pays’’ philosophy to urban
space and public services, and as a practice of appropriation of the city
by business and middle classes.
In many aspects the socio-spatial transformation of Po´łwiejska Street
fits into the above-mentioned analysis of urban renewal. Furthermore,
urban change in Poznan´ might seem to be one of the leading examples
of so-called big-investment driven processes of gentrification. It was in
fact the construction of the shopping and cultural centre which stimula-
ted the further spatial changes. Both rents and the price of services in
the area are significantly higher than five years ago, and the street is
populated by more powerful consumers. There is also, however, a major
problem with describing this socio-spatial transformation as gentrifica-
tion: the middle classes are not interested in living in Po´łwiejska Street.
Why? There are at least four points which call into doubt the description
of the process as gentrification.
First of all, urban trends in Poland are fifty years behind the trends
which brought the drive for the inner city to America in the 1980s. The
spatial mentality of postcommunist societies seems to be similar to the
postwar mentality in America. After many years of the domination of
multifamily housing units, Poles do not aspire to move into old historic
tenement houses in the centre, but rather to live in detached houses with
gardens on the outskirts of a big city (Andrusz, Harloe, and Szelenyi
1996; Lorens 2005; Parysek 2005). Second, there is no cultural consum-
ption ethos among the Polish middle classes. The city centre with its
clubs, bars, galleries, and theatres attracts mostly single and retired
people who want to have fun in public spaces. Polish society is still
family- and house-oriented. Third, the drive for the inner city usually
manifests most strongly in culturally rich metropolitan areas inhabited
by multinational corporate personnel, but Poznan´ not only does not have
corporate headquarters, but also has the poorest cultural infrastructure
and nightlife of the larger Polish cities (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007;
Podemski and Zio´łkowski 2004; Zio´łkowski 2001). Fourth, Po´łwiejska
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Figure 12. ‘‘Erotic dreams’’
Street itself is not a place which is likely to attract the middle classes.
Rather, it is a provincial street surrounded by ordinary and unimpressive
nineteenth-century architecture, which through a historical paradox has
recently become one of the most important spaces in the city. Although
it is very attractive to consumers and tourists, it is not likely to seduce
potential middle-class inhabitants.
The local paradox: evictions without gentrification
Despite the unwillingness of the middle classes to move to Po´łwiejs-
ka Street, the old inhabitants express strong fear of eviction. Rents are
constantly rising; the structure of local commerce has changed. This
commerce is addressed to young yuppie consumers, while most in-
habitants are old and poor. The research conducted shows that the
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majority of them already have problems in affording rent, or expect to
face this difficulty in the near future. In personal statements they express
feelings of exclusion and marginalization. The street is no longer theirs.
The everyday world in which they used to live is rapidly disappearing.
Public space has been increasingly colonized by young visitors who
have brought a different rhythm and ambience to the place.
The conflict being fought between Po´łwiejska’s inhabitants and con-
sumers over the symbolic appropriation of space is not the most impor-
tant one. Far more crucial are the growing conflicts between the in-
habitants and the owners. The landlords are simply not interested in
leasing the flats to them any more. Although the middle classes are not
eager to move to Po´łwiejska Street, the landlords, seduced by promises
of future gains, would like to get rid of the troublesome old tenants.
They usually hope to sell the parcels for a high profit, or convert them
into offices or hotels. Although such imaginations about the future
development of the street might often sound unrealistic, the landlords are
ready to take the risk of not having tenants or buyers for the flats. In the
worst case, they could rent the apartments temporarily to students, which
would generate higher income and eliminate potential problems with
evictions in the future.
Conclusions
The socio-spatial transformations of Po´łwiejska Street differ sig-
nificantly from the processes described by the revitalization and gen-
trification theorists. Although the spatial changes fit both of the concepts,
their current social implications and future directions are left unclear.
The discourses of revitalization and gentrification cannot allow complete
interpretation of the concrete processes of urban change; however, they
are very important in shaping the political drives of social change. These
concepts, which are rooted in various socio-cultural demands shaped in
an era of postindustrial confusion and uncertainty about urban manage-
ment, are important not only for the multidimensional analysis of urban
life, but also in shaping the actions of practitioners in space. They are
significant also as a part of today’s urban imagery, referring as they do
to our mental or cognitive mappings of urban reality, and to the
interpretative grids with which we think about places, spaces, and the
communities we live in.
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Regained Cities.
The Renewal of Postgarrison Towns
in Poland
Marcin TUJDOWSKI
Abstract. This article concerns the settlement of postgarrison towns in
western and northern Poland, focusing on three such settlements: Legnica,
Ke˛szyca Les´na, and Podczele. There were many Soviet military bases in
Poland that came into being after the Second World War, and which formed
part of the Soviet hegemony system in central Europe. These bases were
self-reliant, and around some of them small towns were established for
Russian personnel and their families. After the collapse of communism,
Soviet troops were compelled to withdraw. Deserted cities were settled by
Polish inhabitants, who had to establish their own towns from scratch.
1.1. Historical Outline
The Soviet army bases in Poland were a part of the Northern Group
of Forces. Soviet garrisons came into being quite early, in June 1945
– just after the end of the Second World War. The presence of these
troops was for Poland a clear loss of sovereignty, and the Russian side
did not attempt keep up any appearances. In July 1945, the Russians
choose Legnica as their main headquarters for the Northern Group of
Forces. This was conscious choice, because Legnica (earlier known as
the German city of Leignitz) had been planned to be a fortress city.
Army buildings and military facilities were strategically built along the
all routes into city. Both urban planning and architecture were sub-
ordinated to military function.
Legnica was not destroyed during the military offensive in 1945. The
city was taken untouched by destruction, and with all the infrastructure
in excellent condition – including factories, workshops, the water delive-
ry system, the city facilities, etc. The main damage was caused by the
Russians just after war, including the burning of the old city and castle
in May 1945. These arsons were called ‘‘victory torches’’ by the Rus-
sians, who began the burning on May 1, Workers’ Day, and on May 9,
Victory Day in Eastern Europe.
Overall, the Soviet Army had fifty-nine garrisons in Poland, referred
to as the Northern Group of Soviet Forces in Poland (Po´łnocna Grupa
Wojsk Radzieckich w Polsce). During 1945 and later, the Soviets
mainly took previously German garrison towns in western and northern
Poland, on account of their well preserved military infrastructure, often
including barracks, exercise areas, workshops, airfields, and hangars.
Another important factor was the fact that this region was near to
the Soviet bases in the German Democratic Republic, which also
quartered Soviet troops.
Under international law the bases were considered exterritorial areas,
and so were exempt from Polish jurisdiction and excluded from Polish
oversight.
Poland was additionally obliged to maintain some elements of the
infrastructure used by the Soviet troops, such as routes, bridges, train
tracks, and so on. These independent garrisons were called by the
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Russian acronym ZATOs, for ‘‘closed administrative-territorial units.’’1
Closed cities were known to exist in the Soviet Union, kept secret
because of their connection to intelligence services, the military, space
technology, or nuclear and military industry.
Most of the Soviet garrison towns in Poland passed into Polish
management only in 1992.2 On the date of the handover, the territory of
Poland increased by 70,500 hectares. Some of these postgarrison towns,
such as Pstra˛z˙e, were not permitted to transform into civil settlements.
The town of Pstra˛z˙e – previously known by the German name of
Neuhammer, and later Pstransee – was a garrison town that had been
occupied by the Russians in 1945 and then isolated by the destruction of
the only bridge leading to the town. After that, Pstra˛z˙e became the
largest closed Russian garrison town in Poland, serving ten thousand
soldiers and their families. In the 1990s, it was reacquired by the Polish
army, but was not transformed into civil town, and remains an urban
training ground for Polish troops.
The town of Borne Sulinowo is the best known of such postgarrison
towns in Poland. It has been well described and thoroughly researched,
so I would like to focus on less known towns, such as Ke˛szyca Les´na
and Podczele. 3 Both of these postgarrison towns are within the scope of
the Institute for Western Affairs’ research activity.
Ke˛szyca Les´na lies in western Poland, near the town of Mie˛dzyrzecz.
In the 1930s it was a German troop base. After 1945 it was occupied by
Soviet troops, who enlarged the base area so that it became a settlement
with cinema, shops, sport facilities, and a few new apartment buildings
in the characteristic Soviet style. However, the base was well guarded,
and surrounded by vast pine forests.
Podczele is situated near the Polish health resort of Kołobrzeg, on
the Baltic Sea. Nowadays Podczele is formally a part of Kołobrzeg,
although it lies ten kilometres from the city outskirts, and lacks a real
1 Zakrytyje administrativno-territorial’nyje obrazovanija.
2 The garrison in Nowa So´l was the first to be left by Russian troops, in March 1991
(Po´łnocna Grupa Wojsk Radzieckich w Polsce, Kalendarium wyjazdu wojsk radzieckich
z Polski).
3 Podczele lies within the formal borders of the city of Kołobrzeg, and is also known
under the names Bagicz and Bagicz-Podczele.
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connection to it. Before 1992 it was a completely isolated garrison with
an airfield, surrounded by woods and moors, and with access to the sea.
This garrison town was built and developed as a German airbase
between 1935 and 1945. After the Second World War, Podczele became
a Russian airbase, quartering fighter and helicopter squadrons. Beside its
various other military functions, Podczele had an additional purpose – to
control the airspace above the Baltic Sea, and particularly to intercept
Eastern Bloc planes heading for the Danish island of Bornholm or the
Swedish coast.4 The Russians left the garrison on May 28, 1992 (Po´ł-
nocna Grupa Wojsk Radzieckich w Polsce). In 2002, a local newspaper
noted on that date the tenth anniversary of ‘‘the annexation of Podczele
to Poland’’ (Dziemba 2002).
1.2. Specification and Settlement Process
Former garrison towns were differentiated from other towns by
specific features:
1. For years they were closed areas, secret and isolated. As military
bases, they were external territories, excluded from local jurisdiction.
2. Garrison towns were settled by foreigners (with regard to the
surrounding region). In those towns lived not only soldiers, but also
staff, family members, and others; and that – in conjunction with the
isolation factor – established a specific local community.
3. When, in accordance with bilateral treaties, the Soviet personnel
of the garrisons were expelled and transferred to the former Soviet
Union, the result was a complete exchange of the entire community.
There was no mutual social contact; one group of inhabitants simply
replaced the previous group. Newcomers found bare buildings, empty
flats, left-behind artefacts, symbols, and remains of the previous ‘‘civili-
zation.’’ Contact with the previous population was indirect, through the
medium of the town’s infrastructure and symbols.
4. Garrison towns did not come into being as result of long histo-
rical processes. These are relatively young towns, built from the begin-
4 This function became more important after 1953, when a few Polish fighters
managed to escape to Bornholm.
Marcin TUJDOWSKI132
ning in order to be military bases. In effect their infrastructure, spatial
order, city landscape, etc., were unfamiliar to new settlers because they
did not look like traditionally formed towns. Contrary to normal set-
tlements, postgarrison towns lacked what would traditionally be regarded
as a centre in the form of a market square with town hall and concentric
streets; and there were no churches towers either. They basically lacked
the elements of the urban landscape that are familiar in the European
tradition.
Former garrison towns were not suitable for immediate settlement.
Usually these towns were left in a terrible condition, with their in-
frastructure demolished and with soil polluted by oil, gasoline, and
other pollutants. In addition there was the threat of explosives. In
1995, the Polish government established a Strategic Government Pro-
gramme to redevelop the properties that the Russian forces left behind.
This programme was aimed at assisting all the land recovery processes
using budget subsidies. Since 2001, a further programme has been
in operation for recovering and additionally detoxifying terrain polluted
by Russian forces.
Robert Park, cofounder of the Chicago School of sociology, attached
importance to homogeneous societies, which in his opinion acted as
a catalyst for harmonic social or neighbourhood interactions (Kotus
2005). Such homogeneity becomes established as a result of the
long-lasting inhabitation of the place by its population, the development
of later generations, and the transformation of the space. The creation of
similar localities was derived by Park from ecological processes; that is,
similar ecological factors are held to exert pressure on given places, and
result in similar localities with congenial social profiles.
In case of postgarrison towns there is the question of whether there
was ever a chance to shape such a similar relationship in the early stages
of settlement. It should be remembered that those localities were estab-
lished relatively quickly and artificially, without the very long-lasting
processes typical in the formation of historically established human
settlements. In postgarrison towns, settlers arrived over a short period of
time from various parts of Poland and became neighbours. This could
lead to social tensions and a variety of resulting processes, such as
conflict or cooperation.
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Also worth examining is the divide between monofunctional and
multifunctional settlements; Postmilitary towns are a special case be-
cause they are monofunctional in both phases of their development.
From the beginning they were planned and built to be first and foremost
military bases, though with an extended part for civilian inhabitants,
possibly including shops, kindergartens, schools and the like. Despite
that civilian part, the military function was primary. Yet when post-
military bases had been transformed to civilian settlements, it might be
expected that they would in a short time develop into fully operational
multifunctional towns; but this did not occur in any of the postgarrison
settlements. In this respect, the particular towns differ from one another.
Ke˛szyca Les´na is, from a formal or legal point of view, a rural
settlement. Yet there is no evidence of village life present:
– there are neither farmers nor agricultural terrain.
– the town has neither the elements of a rural society, nor a rural
style of life.
– the architecture is also atypical for a rural region – for example,
postmilitary barracks adapted as apartment buildings.
– the structure of the property is also atypical for the countryside:
some flats belongs to municipal housing cooperatives.
– there are two main social stratas: people who work outside of the
settlement and pensioners. Such a structure is more typical of a suburban
area than of a rural area. In addition there is also a third group
– part-time inhabitants, who have flats there but spend only vacation
time in the area.
Ke˛szyca Les´na is essentially a monofunctional settlement, perfor-
ming a mere handful of roles: It acts as a dormitory town for nearby
Mie˛dzyrzecz; it also has a recreational role as a resort surrounded by
woods and lakes. There is no kindergarten, no school, and no employers.
Podczele is in practice a kind of exclave. Formally, Podczele is
a part of the city of Kołobrzeg, but lies ten kilometres from the city’s
outskirts, and is geographically separated from the main city.
Podczele has its own self-governing body, an estate council (rada
osiedla), which operates within Kołobrzeg’s municipal government. Pod-
czele has limited functionality, and contains a school, shops, a post
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office, and a church, but no significant employers beyond the small local
businesses.
The previously mentioned Legnica represents another type of locali-
ty. Russian troops for years occupied a part of the city, contained within
Polish Legnica. The Russian part – known as ‘‘the Square’’ or ‘‘Little
Moscow’’ – was separated from the Polish part by a well guarded
concrete wall. After the Russian departure, this whole Russian ‘‘inner
city’’ was incorporated into Legnica itself, without any special con-
ditions or distinctions.
Borne Sulinowo is best known postgarrison town in Poland. This
town is the seat of the local government and the locality is multifunc-
tional, though with a limited labour market. In Borne Sulinowo there are
schools of different levels, a church and a cemetery, but there is a lack
of business opportunities which would guarantee employment for the
inhabitants.
All the localities mentioned here, in spite of the different official
forms they take, have some common features:
– they have only recently come under Polish jurisdiction.
– they have an atmosphere of historical secrecy and special status.
– they are geographically isolated (with the exception of the former-
ly Russian part of Legnica), far from other localities, surrounded by
woods, and far from industrial areas ...
– ... and so they have potential as tourist and recreational areas.
2.1. Growing in Established Space
The main problem which the settlers faced was the problem of
transforming the entire urban space. With regard to their former military
functions, those localities were strictly monofunctional, that is, sub-
ordinated to the army. Because of that, the first inhabitants had to deal
with rebuilding the full functionality of the former bases. This ran in
three stages (see figure 1):
(a) spatial and architectural solutions, though functional from the
military point of view (figure 1, ‘‘Function’’)...
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Figure 2. Podczele. Three layers of settlement can be seen: in the foreground, a new Polish
apartment block is visible; behind that, a typical Soviet concrete block; and in the distant
background, a German building.
Similarly, the location of the settlement can be considered from the
same three points of view.
Initial functional stage: Isolation was a highly desirable feature from
the military point of view. It was suitable for keeping garrison towns
secret. It is worth mentioning that these localities were removed from
maps and tourist guides. For example, Borne Sulinowo – although
inhabited by about fifteen thousand Russians – was completely removed
from canoe guidebooks, and its location marked as ‘‘an inhospitable,
marshy lake shore, unsuitable for camping.’’
Dysfunctional stage: Isolation meant obstacles to transportation, and
some psychological problems also occurred; to the initial civilian set-
tlers, the town seemed like a truly isolated and forgotten place. For
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Figure 3. An everyday paradox: people in their leisure time walking toward the beach
across a dangerous area. The warning on the sign reads, ’’Dangerous area. Entering may be
hazardous to health.’’
example, during sociological research in Ke˛szyca Les´na, local authorities
described problems with young families who did not want to live in the
postgarrison town because they felt isolated and ‘‘far from anything.’’
Restoring function stage: All these postgarrison towns took advan-
tage of their isolated location, and turned it into a tourist attraction.
One can see a specific side effect that arises from these localities
– a kind of dualism: On one hand there are bucolic circumstances, such
as the sea, lakes, woods, and a peaceful atmosphere. Postgarrison locali-
ties are advertised as ideal places for relaxation. On the other hand, there
is a constant threat from explosives and pollution. The landscape is filled
with abandoned military installations, like bunkers and hangars.
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Figure 4. A historical mélange in Borne Sulinowo: a building stylized as a guardhouse, but
commemorating both German and Soviet armies. It is noteworthy that the German soldier,
despite the carved date, comes from the First World War era. A Wehrmacht soldier might
be considered neo-Nazi propaganda. [Photo credit: Z. Mazur]
2.2. Technoscape
I use term ‘‘technoscape,’’ following John Urry, as an abbreviation
for ‘‘technical landscape.’’ Some authors add ‘‘posthuman technoscape,’’
but I will not go so far.
Here ‘‘technoscape’’ means the remains of a prior civilization – the
technological landscape left behind by those who were here before us.
The first months after the resettlement of the former military bases
was a time of euphoric removal and destruction of the entire previous
technoscape, which was considered the remains of the Soviet occupation.
For this reason, many facilities were demolished with full social licence.
But after the passage of some time, the technoscape became more
and more often considered to be a kind of heritage which deserved to be
preserved.
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Figure 5. Podczele technoscape: old Russian radios found in a base.
2.3. Adaptation of the Symbolic Sphere
The sociologist Florian Zielin´ski took notice of the so-called urban
ideological vesture – namely, memorials, monuments, and street names.
This comparison is reasonable, because the city can under some circum-
stances change its ‘‘vesture’’ – that is, the city can change its whole
symbolic matrix, if the situation warrants it (Zielin´ski 2005).
In case of the three postgarrison towns described here, we deal
with a triple change of ‘‘ideological vesture.’’ First there was saturation
with German military features, when the garrison towns were built.
Second, there was the exchange of German for Soviet garrisons in
1945, and another vesture change which brought in Soviet symbols.
The Russians created their own symbolic reality in these garrisons,
they built up own memorials, and they painted their own murals.
The third change of vesture ensued during the era of Polonization,
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Figure 6. A neopagan Germanic ‘‘algiz’’ rune, with oak leaves. This rune was carved by
Germans at the time when the garrison belonged to the German Luftwaffe. Its presence is
related to Germanic symbolism, which was reused by the National Socialist regime in the
Third Reich. Semantically, the sign would have been unintelligible to those not affiliated
with Nazi ideology, although that entire semantic sphere was officially supported by
German regime. The oak leaves function in Germanic symbolism as a sign of strength.
from 1992 onward. Polish settlers built their own chapels and renamed
the streets. Especially interesting are the street names in Podczele,
because they refer to names of the cities which were lost by Poland after
1945. Thus the street names commemorate Polish cities which were
incorporated into the Soviet Union.
2.4. Symbolic Reality
Here we investigate how a single object in Podczele completely
changed its symbolic vesture over time.
As commented on previously, postgarrison towns looked strange and
hostile to people who were accustomed to traditionally formed cities.
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Figure 7. A Soviet mural glorifying the Soviet air forces, found in the same building as the
carvings in figure 6, but from the time of Russian management. The mural presents
a heroic pilot and his war machine, marked with red star – a typical example of the
symbolism of the Soviet Army and its hero cult. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian
regime, so the symbolism used in social language was aimed at mass mobilization. This
mural also carried another message – it illustrated a desirable career path.
New landscape needed to be appropriated. Because of the obligatory
state-imposed atheism in the Soviet Union, the Russian-controlled garri-
son towns entirely lacked chapels, crosses, and churches. Even their
graveyards were different from those familiar in Christian culture. For
this reason, cult restitution was one of the first social requirements in the
new towns.
The role of the religious cult in spatial studies is often underes-
timated, but quite important, especially in Poland. Three approaches to
this aspect can be distinguished (Hervieu-Leger 2002):
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Figure 8. The same building, but as a Polish church for the local society. When the town
was left by the Russians, Polish settlers adapted this building as a church. Although the
crucifix is now in the most prominent position, the Soviet mural was not destroyed, but
rather intentionally renovated. This sequence of three photographs presents the complete
exchange of the symbolic vesture of the same building. It is noteworthy that previous
symbols were not removed or destroyed, but rather new ones were added, and so all the
symbolic layers remain individually stratified.
– The territorial modalities of the communalization of religion: this
approach considers how the religious community refers to the space in
which it was established.
– The geopolitics of the religion: this approach refers more to the
hard aspects, such as religious conquest and the power balance between
religious groups.
– The religious symbolizations of the space: One can ask, how
religious activity refers to the landscape, or how it comprises the
relationship between the religious world and the shape of the space.
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Hervieu-Leger also distinguished ‘‘church-type communalization,’’
especially in Catholic countries. This refers to the ‘‘parish civilization,’’
to the way that the Catholic parish embodies part of the administrative
form in Catholic localities. In case of the above-mentioned postgarrison
towns, things followed the ‘‘parish civilization’’ pattern. Because of the
lack of administrative power, and the kind of deprivation present locally,
the parish in part took over some of the process of local self-governing.
Here churches or chapels are not just places for accessing the spiritual
mystery, but also centres for local activity.
Symbolic accustomization can proceed by many means. It is es-
pecially visible in examples of monuments. In Ke˛szyca Les´na, the
Russians left a monument which is both monumental and controversial
in its aesthetics. It shows a Russian signaller pulling cables through
a front line. Until the 1990s, there was also a relief showing a battlefield
filled with tanks, planes, and explosions, but with the passage of
time all these details were painted over. The monument is regularly
renovated by local society, but with every renovation the military
significance becomes more blurred. Starting from a depiction of a Soviet
Army soldier, the monument was turned into a commemoration of
a solider of an unspecified army. A chronicle of the settlement was
carved onto a marble table, and so the monument came to embody
the local symbolic vesture. It has even been incorporated into Roman
Catholic rituals – during Corpus Christi, the monument serves as one
of the few Catholic altars.
In 2007, the Polish government passed an act concerning Soviet
monuments in Poland. According to that document, such monuments are
to be relocated and eventually destroyed. In Ke˛szyca Les´na this prospect
has united the locality, and people were ready to defend ‘‘their’’ monu-
ment. Local adolescents intended to put up some guards ‘‘just in case’’
(Broz˙ek 2007).
In Podczele, the Russians had left a monument to Lenin, but it was
decapitated by Poles. In a local hotel, volunteers spontaneously created
a kind of amateur museum, based on a random collection of objects such
as books, clothes, and specifically Soviet ornamentation that represented
the long-lasting Soviet stay in the base, and which also contained some
German exhibits.
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Figure 9. The Soviet monument in Ke˛szyca Les´na. As an example of a typical Soviet
monument declaring the glory of the Soviet Army, it was undoubtedly an important point
on the symbolic map of the Russian garrison town.
Localities in postgarrison towns face many obstacles, which often
create problems in the formation of the community bond. For example,
in Ke˛szyca Les´na an ill-considered decision to build a bitumen factory
was made. Because of the difficult production process involved, such
a plan usually raises the voices of dissatisfied inhabitants. 5 However,
in Ke˛szyca Les´na that did not happen. One can suppose that presence
of social movements comes only after social consciousness. There
are a few examples, such as NIMBY (‘‘Not In My Back Yard,’’
with its derivatives NIMD, NIMFOS, and others); LULU (‘‘Locally
5 Such protests have occurred in other Polish towns, including Konstancin, Kle˛czany,
Tenczynek, and Zabagnie. In each of these towns, people established social committees,
and demanded research and expert advice.
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Figure 10. The same monument, ten years after the Russian departure. It is an irony of
history that the monument of an atheistic regime becomes a field altar each Corpus Christi.
[Photo credit: Ke˛szyca Les´na Women’s Society].
UnwantedUndesired Land Use’’); and QUIMBY (‘‘Quit Urbanizing In
My Back Yard’’) – typical attitudes in areas where people settle to
escape from the cities; they want to live in a beautiful rural area, but at
the same time do not want to abandon the city lifestyle.
Such attitudes come to light whenever localities face undesired
investment, and they serve as a source for social activities. Yet in
Ke˛szyca Les´na, things did not happen that way. That may show a lack
of social engagement, and its sequel, a lack of mature community bond.
It is quite possible that because of the high unemployment rate in the
region, such anti-investment activity was not socially acceptable. 6
6 In the ‘‘Farmutil case’’ which occurred near Piła in Wielkopolska, the most
troublesome factory in the region is also the biggest employer. The result is that every act
of protest against the factory is repelled by the aggressive inhabitants.
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Social support is really crucial in case of neighbourhood and set-
tlement. Such support can be defined as ‘‘supportive, interpersonal
relations’’ (Al-Homoud and Tassinary 2004).
There are three main aspects to social support:
– personal (emotional) support;
– instrumental (functional) support;
– informational support.
As one can see, aspects of social support refer more or less to
attitude. Personal support helps to break feelings of desolation and to
strengthen the feeling of social belonging. According to interviews with
the first settlers, personal support was quite strong at the beginning of
the settlement, but has weakened over time.
Instrumental support refers to the willingness to engage in coopera-
tive behaviour, like the exchange of tools or services with other neigh-
bours. A change in its incidence has also been seen to occur among
postgarrison town populations, decreasing from a high initial rate to
weak cooperation.
Informational support is related to the circulation of information,
issuing local newspapers, and similar. There was a local newspaper in
Podczele, but it has been discontinued.
In the 1990s the huge enthusiasm and hope about making their
own place united all the settlers. But as time has gone on, some
obstacles have caused stratification. Apart from problems related purely
to infrastructure, some social tensions arose: unemployment, low levels
of social bonding, and the lack of a clear and comprehensible direction
of development. In the case of local labour markets, it very quickly
became obvious that isolation – which had seems to promise bucolic
circumstances for the settlement – ensures that such localities are
far from employers.
There is no investment in Borne Sulinowo or Ke˛szyca Les´na, and
commuting takes a significant part of the domestic budget. In addition,
Borne Sulinowo lies in a region of high unemployment, so one must
travel really far from the town to find a job; adjacent towns are
insufficient to fill the gap in the local labour market.
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3.1. The Future
The main challenge is to preserve future prospects for local society.
Every one of the discussed locations has similar problems:
1. A lack of local political subjectivity: although these postgarrison
towns are quite different from other settlements, as localities they have
no distinct status. Except in the case of Borne Sulinowo, none of the
postgarrison localities has its own administration, although they are
positioned far from any other towns. Flats in Ke˛szyca Les´na are just
a part of the house administration system in the larger town of Mie˛dzy-
rzecz, and all the infrastructural costs are the same as, or higher than, in
the bigger town – yet Ke˛szyca Les´na has no employment prospects.
Podczele, with an approximate population of five thousand, is a dist-
rict of Kołobrzeg – a town with forty-six thousand inhabitants. Yet
Podczele lies ten kilometres away from the larger city, and is much
more closely connected to adjacent smaller communes. Consequently, it
has no chance of being treated as well as others districts within the city.
Podczele, as a mere city district, and in spite of its specific needs as
a former garrison town, cannot be the subject of European Community
aid programmes. During sociological research performed in the town,
inhabitants expressed a feeling of deprivation on account of mistaken
local government policies.
2. Disastrous and inconsistent settlement policy: in the beginning, in
the 1990s, these isolated settlements were intended to be a place for the
underclass. The authorities in Kołobrzeg and Mie˛dzyrzecz planned to
remove ‘‘unwanted’’ social groups from the cities and settle them in
these post-Soviet forest garrisons. But such decisions were reversed
halfway, at a stage when some houses had already been settled by such
people. The strategy was changed, and the rest of the houses were
earmarked for tourist and dormitory purposes. This was a crucial failing.
The underclass inhabitants had demolished some buildings, and became
a source of problems for the other inhabitants – stealing and engaging in
antisocial behaviour. Other inhabitants, on account of such troublesome
neighbourhoods, refused to settle in postgarrison towns, just as tourists
did not want to spend vacations there. The main shortcoming was the
lack of consistency which led to an unacceptable mixing of functions.
The same settlement was to be a city dormitory, a tourist resort, and
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Figure 11. Graffiti in Ke˛szyca Les´na: ‘‘No prospects.’’
a kind of underclass ghetto. In effect it became none of these three,
although those first two intentions did not interfere with each other.
3. Limited functionality: at beginning of their settlement, it had been
acceptable that the postgarrison towns were monofunctional. But as time
passed, successive local authorities came up with no plans for further
development. Urban processes were halted halfway. The towns may
have limited functionality: first of all as dormitories for other towns; and
they provide some basic shopping facilities. But at the same time, there
are no employers, a limited range of school levels (such as having
a primary school, but no kindergarten), and no further subsidies.
There is in Poland one postgarrison town, which was inhabited so
unsuccessfully that it was nearly destroyed. During the Russians’ stay,
Kłomino had a population estimated at as many as fifteen to twenty-five
thousand inhabitants, consisting of Russian soldiers, personnel, staff, and
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Fig. 12 Kłomino, northern Poland: a desolated city.
Figure 13. Deserted flat complex in Kłomino.
Figure 14. Empty space in Kłomino: as recently as 1991, this was a town with
up to 25,000 inhabitants.
families.7 After the Russians left, Kłomino was never inhabited on such
a scale again. The whole town fell into ruins, and nowadays only about
forty or fifty people live there; the infrastructure decays further with
each passing year. It is a rare example of the decay of an entire city.
3.2. The Social Challenge
Social interactions in postgarrison towns have passed through
two stages:8
1. At the beginning of the settlement process, an atmosphere of
enthusiasm was typical; there was a very high level of cooperation, and
7 Information about the Russian population varies, because the base had secret status,
and no information was conveyed to Poles.
8 According to interviews conducted in Podczele and Ke˛szyca Les´na.
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the inhabitants willingly helped each other; sometimes there was com-
mon rebuilding of houses.
2. When the first stage of settlement had ended and the towns had
been established, the readiness to cooperate drastically decreased, and
individualism prevailed.
Currently a third stage is arising, as some local opinion makers
– priests, hotel owners, local councillors, village leaders – try to unite
the inhabitants around common projects such as the anniversary of
settlement. They attempt to establish a common ‘‘founding myth,’’ from
which community feeling might spring.
Specific stratification might be an explanation. There are three main
groups of inhabitants: those who live in postgarrison towns but work and
study outside of the locality; pensioners who live in the settlement, but
do not participate in local activity; and weekend inhabitants, owners of
flats who only visit the towns on weekends or in summer – and they do
not want to participate in the overall infrastructure costs, because they
use the flats for only a part of the year. These three groups have little or
no common ground.
All of the above-mentioned issues have prevented the processes of
urbanization and social development from completing. There is also
a rare opportunity for sociologists to grasp such local communities in the
act of developing. The main question which comes to mind is, whether
or not new generations – people who have been born or have grown up
in postgarrison towns – will ensure the demographic future. Nowadays
there is still only one generation which has chosen these postgarrison
town as a living place, but the key question is whether young people
will continue to stay in these towns, even if it becomes economically
unprofitable.
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Postcommunist Citizenship?
A Generational View of Social Microactivism
Based on Surveys Conducted in Poznan´
Marek NOWAK
Abstract. The problem of civil activism is analysed in the context of the
evolution of central European civil society. This evolution can be described
as a cyclic process of loss and gain of social identity. Such a way of tackling
the problem of citizenship seems to contrast the central European view of
civil society – as a subjectivity gained through mass activism of a revolutio-
nary character – with a view that is common in Western democracies
(Marshall 1992). Contemporary sociological research in Poland shows that
a ‘‘social non-movement’’ is one of the consequences of the transformation
project that has been going on for several years. To describe: this social non
-movement is to be understood as a crisis of cooperation and a proliferation
of individualistic strategies, together with lack of trust, not only in relations
between individuals, but also in relations toward most social institutions.
This phenomenon can also be clearly seen at a ‘‘microsocial’’ level in
neighbourly relations, and in the attitude toward collectively consumed
goods. The problem seems to be far-reaching, and should be seen from
a historical perspective. We suggest three types of cultural patterns which
belong to the past, but which still direct people’s behaviour.
These behavioral patterns we describe are found to vary with the age of
the respondents, which may indicate a change in perception of social
microactivism over the last few years. The elements of a suggested diagnosis
will be illustrated with the results of quantitative and qualitative research
projects which were carried out among the citizens of Poznan´ in 2003 and
2006. We show several results from these projects.
Theoretical Frame of Analysis
The issue of social activity seems to be one that differentiates
historically distinct societies. This thesis refers to some variant of
historical sociology and carries a number of metatheoretical assumptions
– for example, the assumption that societies develop as a consequence of
the influence of some inner factors. However, it is obvious from the
point of view accepted here that the developmental model of central
Europe deserves, as a specific and separate space of societal moder-
nization, specific interpretations. The term postcommunism is understood
as a type of order that is characterized by some ontological autonomy
which can be a subject of historical analysis. How far these differences
go, and where they come from, are the main questions of investigators
of Polish civil society.
Historical Assumptions of Central European Activism
In the point of view accepted here, we refer to the concept of longue
durée postulated by Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1999, 152ff.). We can
indicate three sources of the specific character of ‘‘mitteleuropean social
activism.’’ The first refers to the model of growing differences between
the eastern and the western parts of Europe which was outlined by,
among others, Immanuel Wallerstein (1988). The main content of this
model is related to the historical processes of society-building, and
involves considerations connected with the process of ‘‘world system’’
development from the sixteenth century onward.1
The second source is connected to the development of a ‘‘national
community’’ in the modern sense, which became real when the political
sovereignty of central European countries was regained after the First
World War.
1 According to Wallerstein (1988, 89-106), the factors which decide on position in the
world system are geographical discoveries and the tendencies toward specialization in
production that results from them. In addition, contrary to Wallerstein’s interpretation,
certain observations of various inner factors which are understood to be elements of
accumulating specificity are also decisive (Brzechczyn 1998).
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The third source is related to a regional variant of egalitarianization
and ‘‘communitization’’ which was a part of the project of ‘‘real so-
cialism.’’ In looking for the conceptual basis of the above viewpoint,
it is worth taking as a starting point the narration of Thomas H.
Marshall (Marshall and Bottomore 1992, 8), who in the 1950s indicated
three main stages of the development of the concept of citizenship
in the West.
The first stage – civil citizenship – is connected with the acknowl-
edgement of individual rights on the basis of a natural law. In the central
European experience, examples of civil citizenship occur in regional
political solutions such as the so-called Nobles’ Democracy in the First
Polish Republic during the eighteenth century. This stage covers one of
the earliest, prerevolutionary ways to find a formula to change a traditio-
nal and hierarchical society into a modern national community (in
French, le peuple).
The second stage – political citizenship – refers to the acknowl-
edgement and gradual propagation of political rights. In the central
European context, this stage referred to the temporary development of
a model of social participation based mainly on an attitude toward the
so-called national issue. The crux of this tactic of politicization involves
the consequences which arise from the weakening of the economic
position of the landed aristocracy and nobility, who until then had been
culturally predominant. Such consequences influenced the development
of the central European public sphere among developing towns with
diverse ethnic structures and significant social conflict.
The third stage – social citizenship – refers, according to Marshall,
to the concept of the welfare state. In central Europe, social citizenship
meant the realization of a communist utopia as a result of the political
consequences of the Second World War. However, both ‘‘communism’’
(1949-55) and later ‘‘real socialism’’ (1956-1989) sanctioned and con-
solidated far-reaching changes in social structure, and changed Polish
society from a peasant society into an industrial society. Special impor-
tance is attached to towns, which function as centres of industry and
places of mass social advancement. This fact indicates that there are
some aspects of ‘‘rusticity’’ in the model of town life, especially in those
towns where the process of urbanization proceeded very quickly.
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In our opinion the model of ‘‘socialistic social activism,’’ which
arose during the Polish People’s Republic (1946-89), and which of
course made reference to historical sources, seems of great importance.
Its traces are visible in the materials we gathered during our research,
and elsewhere.
All three types of historic considerations can be thought of as
overlapping but distinct features which are each specific cultural sources
of modern forms of central European activism. It seems possible to treat
such historical types of ‘‘civic activism’’ in general as a ‘‘toolkit’’ used
to build biographies of particular activists. This is to say that people’s
typical actions – and their ways of thinking – reflect what is inherit from
the past (as cultural inheritance), as well as ‘‘habits of the heart’’ or the
atmosphere of the epoch (as the impact of the present). In a particular
era, a particular action may be more, or less, common. More important-
ly, this variation could be measured.
What is social activism? Let us try to operationalize this term to
a quantitative point of view, by looking at the result of the quantitative
research (2004 data). 2
When we asked respondents the open question, ‘‘What does ’being
socially active’ mean to you?’’ they answered in three ways:
1. Most frequently, being socially active meant ‘‘being active for
society,’’ but ‘‘society’’ in this sense should be understand as something
closer to the local community, than to general society in the political
sense (44.06%) what will be discussed later.
2. ‘‘Doing something for others,’’ a response close in meaning to
‘‘doing social work’’ (35.62%).
3. ‘‘Working for an organization’’ (34.30%).
When we suggested possible answers to the same question, the most
common answer was ‘‘taking part in formal deliberation,’’ to which 86%
of respondents answered ‘‘yes, I think so.’’ This next most common
answers were ‘‘signing petitions’’ addressed to government or local
authorities (85%), and ‘‘responding when somebody needs help’’ (81%).
Significantly less often did respondents consider that ‘‘being active’’
2 We interviewed 401 inhabitants of Poznan´, selected by quota sample. The basic
criteria for selection were sex, age, and city district. Some problems were found in
achieving a representative sample. This can be seen in table 2.
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Table 1. Selected answers to the question, ‘‘What does ‘being socially
active’ mean to you?’’
Somebody is socially active, when they: Yes,I think so*
I don’t
know
I don’t
think so* %
take part in formal deliberations (formal
meetings) 86% 6.5% 7.5% 100%
sign petitions addressed to government or
local authorities 85% 6.5% 8.5% 100%
respond when somebody needs help 81.6% 7.5% 10.9% 100%
give money to those who need help
(participate in remedial charity action) 76.5% 10.5% 13% 100%
help neighbours 74% 13% 13% 100%
run as candidates for local or national power 71.7% 12.3% 16% 100%
participate in democratic elections 68.5% 9% 22.5% 100%
care about local environs 56.5% 15% 28.5% 100%
publicly present their own opinion on various
subjects 52% 20% 28% 100%
participate in a political party 47% 15% 38% 100%
take part in discussions between neighbours 40.6% 21% 38.4% 100%
have a positive attitude toward the
institutions of state democracy 33.4% 22% 44.6% 100%
regularly go to church 22.5% 16.5% 61% 100%
* These heading summarize the responses ‘‘I definitely agree’’ and ‘‘I rather agree’’
on one hand, and ‘‘I definitely disagree’’ and ‘‘I rather disagree’’ on the other.
means publicly discussing different topics relevant to society (52%), or
– surprisingly – ‘‘being involved in political parties’’ (47%). One in
three respondents agree that ‘‘being active’’ means ‘‘having a positive
attitude and orientation toward the institutions of state democracy’’ (the
Sejm, the Senat and the President). Maybe the most significant aspect
for us is the attitude to ‘‘political parties.’’ We can diagnose that Polish
people don’t trust politics, although it may reflect something more basic.
In our investigation, the most important point is the correlation
between age and attitudes toward being active. It should be emphasized
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Table 2. ‘‘Is participation in political parties a form of social activity?’’
(by cohort)
Is participation in political
parties a form of social
activity?
Cohort
1985 1972-84 1959-71 1946-58 1945 Row total
Definitely yes 44.0% 19.4% 27.9% 15.5% 24.4% 22.3%
Rather yes 16.0% 40.8% 25.6% 18.6% 18.9% 25.7%
Neither yes nor no 12.0% 12.6% 7.0% 20.6% 14.4% 14.5%
Rather disagree 20.0% 18.4% 16.3% 27.8% 25.6% 22.6%
Definitely disagree 8.0% 8.7% 23.3% 17.5% 16.7% 14.8%
Column total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
that there are correlations between the age of the respondent and their
way of answering the question, ‘‘What does ’being socially active’ mean
to you?’’ In particular, younger respondents more often indicated formal
affiliation then older respondents. For older people, being active more
often meant being personally helpful to others, or to society in general.
Let us now examine how people in different age groups answered the
question, ‘‘Is participation in political parties a form of social activity?’’
Comparing the oldest and the youngest respondents, we see a significant
difference: young respondents seem to agree that participating in poli-
tical party is kind of social activism.
In answer to the earlier questions concerning the nature of social
activism, older respondents had much less precise opinions, but more
often answered that this consisted of ‘‘reacting when somebody needs
help’’ (Spearman rho coefficient 0.230), ‘‘taking part in deliberation in
the neighbourhood’’ (Spearman rho coefficient 0.204), ‘‘caring about the
local environs’’ (Spearman rho coefficient 0.262), and ‘‘helping neigh-
bours’’ (Spearman rho coefficient 0.268).
Generally, the answers of older respondents more often addressed the
community – understood as charity work, work for the local environs,
and so on. Here, ‘‘social activity’’ means reacting when somebody needs
help – we help them because we know them – or ensuring cooperation
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Table 3. Correlation between cohorts and selected answers to the
question, ‘‘What does ‘being socially active’ mean to you?’’
Spearman rho coefficient
Somebody is socially active when they
By cohort
give
money to
those who
need help
respond
when
somebody
needs help
help
neighbours
give
money to
those who
need help
(partici-
pate in
remedial
charity
action)
By cohort Correlation 1.000 0.123* 0.230** 0.268** 0.133*
N 376 370 371 368 370
give money to those
who need help Correlation 0.123* 1.000 0.331** 0.371** 0.538**
N 370 375 371 368 371
respond when
somebody needs help Correlation 0.230** 0.331** 1.000 0.413** 0.371**
N 371 371 376 370 371
help neighbours Correlation 0.268** 0.371** 0.413** 1.000 0.356**
N 368 368 370 373 368
give money to those
who need help
(participate in
remedial charity
action) Correlation 0.133* 0.538** 0.371** 0.356** 1.000
N 370 371 371 368 375
* Significance level 0.05 (two sided).
** Significance level 0.01 (two sided).
between close neighbours. Why does this occur? Perhaps because of
feelings of mutuality which arise in shared living spaces.
We can find here the so-called traditional or conservative attitude,
which is more common among the older generation, but nevertheless
still exist in the younger – see table 3.
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It should be pointed out that there might also be traditional remnants
of ‘‘peasant culture’’ within this urban culture. The main generational
difference is that the older groups have a much more traditional defini-
tion of activism, sometimes even using the premodern sense of activism
as work for the local community.
When we investigate the relationship of ‘‘civic activism’’ in relation
to social protest (in the legal sense), older people – those above sixty
– are much less likely to mention this kind of action than are younger
people. This, in our opinion, describes a common generational experi-
ence. We can find, for example, correlations between age and the
experiences of civil activism, such as ‘‘putting up posters,’’ or ‘‘taking
part in demonstrations.’’
Answer to enquiries about participation in hunger strikes and
sit-down protest reveals a similar situation. Respondents between the
ages of 37 and 59 more often answer ‘‘Yes I did,’’ when asked
if they have ever participated in such action. Asking why they undertook
such behaviour shows that it was correlated with the ‘‘Solidarity re-
volution’’ at the beginning of the 1980s, and the wave of strikes
in at the beginning of the period of transformation (1987-90). Generally
the 1980s seems to have been a much more fruitful time for gaining
experience in opposing the state, or gaining ‘‘power’’ generally, than
do the 1990s. This regularity can be clearly seen in the collected
qualitative data.
The above-mentioned results serve as an introduction to the qualita-
tive analysis of generational differences in attitude toward ‘‘being ac-
tive’’ among citizens of Poznan´. Now we will describe three important
assumptions for such analyses.
Assumptions for Qualitative Generational Analysis
First Assumption
Here we understand ‘‘urban activism’’ as to refer to human actions
– based on communication, and on dyadic or triadic social interaction
– oriented toward the community. This model of activism is understood
in the context of potential spatial contact, which is typical of towns.
A feature of this activism in the limited range of action connected with,
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for example, places of living, working, and so on, and with solving
problems typical of urban life. Ethical motivations, though to varying
extents, are one of the most significant types of motivation.
This way of understanding activism does not reach beyond the local
community. It is, however, the most widespread such understanding, so
it is worth special attention.
Second Assumption
Now we introduce the next stipulation: the model of postcommunist
urban activism in a town differs between generations. This means
that the above-mentioned ‘‘toolkits’’ are used differently by people
from different generations. We can express this by indicating the con-
trast between generational visions of activism. To this end, we will
use the term ‘‘exit generation’’ to refer to people above 60, ‘‘peak
generation’’ to refer to those between 29 and 59, and ‘‘entry generation’’
for those under 29.
The crux of these differences concerns two dimensions. First, the
‘‘cohort dimension’’ refers to the perception of differences that result
from a respondent’s age and individual experiences in growing, matu-
ring, and aging. The second dimension refers to the ‘‘generational
concept’’ of Karl Mannheim or Helmut Shelsky: a generation’s
self-image has historical sources. A similar point of departure can be
found in studies of emigrants families, gerontological, and educational
studies. For example, from English-language studies of Russian society:
‘‘A social portrait of age cohorts in post-Soviet Russia’’ (Beliaeva 2006),
or ‘‘The next generation: Pragmatic perfectionists or romantics of con-
sumption’’ (Lisauskene 2007). The latter describes the cultural con-
sequences of transformation using Piotr Sztomka’s sociological inter-
pretation of ‘‘trauma.’’ The young generation, in this sense, has a chance
of differentiating itself from the older generation, other than simply by
age. The empirical question is, ‘‘How different are they?’’
Third Assumption
The last assumption refers to the perception of a second type of
difference – the appearance of a generation in Shelsky’s sense – among
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people in their twenties. We can verify the hypothesis which refers to
the significant generational difference which resulted from the transfor-
mation of the system in the 1990s.
What is ‘‘activity’’ in terms of generational perspective?
Exit Generation
Let us start the analysis with the oldest of our three generations. The
first noteworthy feature is the respondents’ rejection of a mercantile
attitude toward social activism: social activism is procommunity action,
undertaken out of concern for others’ interests. The contents of this
activity can be divided into two main areas. The first of these can be
described using the most traditional interpretation of ‘‘being a citizen’’ in
a conservative, traditional society.
According to one respondent (W54M66), ‘‘... in my opinion social
activism means just acting out of concern for others’ interests, not
asking for money, but simply following human and patriotic principles,’’
and an active person is understood as ‘‘... one who desires to act out of
concern for others’ interests from the bottom of their heart, and who
doesn’t ask for any money for their action.’’ This understanding arises
from being involved in creation of the Solidarity social movement at the
beginning of the eighties, and the activity of the sightseeing movement
(PTTK, the Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Agency).
Another response (W49K62): ‘‘In my opinion, being active means
being sensitive, seeing someone as human, whether they are a new-born
child or an old person passing away.’’ This is a reflex of the Christian
ethic, in the traditional way. Both varieties of ‘‘social affiliation’’ (that
is, relations with the political events which occurred from the end of the
sixties and the beginning of the seventies to the ‘‘Solidarity’’ period)
involve opposition to the state, and a strongly accented ethical subject.
Helping others is a condition of being more human. We can call it the
‘‘traditional’’ or ‘‘conservative’’ type of social affiliation.
The second area we examine in relation to the exit generation’s
response involves that equation of social activity with action in formal,
centralized organizations. We often observe references to certain or-
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ganizations that were subordinate to the state. Such references are
a widespread regularity, typical of the Polish People’s Republic. We can
describe such responses as the ‘‘substitutive type.’’3 An activist is a per-
son who (W50M75) ‘‘... does socially useful work [or work useful to
the state].’’ Such work may refer to biographical experiences from the
fifties: ‘‘At that time the trade unions created different committees (...)
for example ... [a committee concerned with] the lack of bread being
baked. They were searching for stores of floor in bakeries, and I par-
ticipated in those committees,’’ or a later involvement as a juror in court.
There are further examples available, such as activism concerning work
in labour councils, youth organizations, or the units of the Polish United
Workers’ Party.
We should add that membership in parties which are supervised by
the state can be treated as one of the sources of ‘‘civic competence,’’ in
the case of at least some of the examined activists. This certainly affects
the notion of organized activity.
Peak Generation
Understandings of activity among the peak generation depend mainly
on the respondent’s profession. Reference to the ‘‘missionary’’ character
of actions is rare.
The following response, from a teacher (M56), may seem to be
symptomatic of a certain type of activity: ‘‘Social activity is an af-
ter-work activity in fields that are not connected to professional work.
I think social activism includes all our activities which influence society.
So, social activism may include both all our after-work activities, as well
as our tasks at work. Of course, it all depends on your profession.’’
Thus, a socially active person is one who ‘‘wants to take up various
activities connected with society,’’ and the opposite of activity is ‘‘...
being insensitive to what surrounds us.’’
3
‘‘Substitutive type’’ in this sense means being a substitute for a natural process such
as the ‘‘creation’’ of a social group or civil institution by the state. Edmund Wnuk-Lipin´ski
uses this word to describe the strategy of government under ‘‘real socialism’’
(Wnuk-Lipin´ski 1991). From another point of view, a ‘‘substitutive institution’’ is one built
in opposition to the state, or simply in substitution for the state (Burton 2004).
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We can call this type a ‘‘professional type.’’ Like the above-mentioned
teacher, we can find here several managers of community centres for the
elderly and housing-estate administration workers. Here the active focus is
on the development of professional activity via new subjects which result
from a current situation – perhaps a current necessity – or from an ethical
motivation, for example, work for the benefit of poor children (in the case
of a teacher), or a work in the administration of a housing estate.
The second type – important in the case of the peak generation – can
be called the ‘‘community type.’’ The issues are as follows:
(1) on one hand, the activity which benefits society is not considered
to necessarily involve putting aside personal interests. So the activity
may include drawing a salary. The activity is regarded as a professional
activity producing goods that are consumed collectively;
(2) on the other hand, often the same kind of work which a respon-
dent equates with social activity is also as a way of living. In other
words, there are a number of strategies involving taking part in works
that are undertaken by others, and which include elements of collective
action. The choice of strategies always, or almost always, includes
constructing an external context which is defined as ‘‘social welfare’’ or
‘‘work for the benefit of the others.’’ To repeat, as far as the subtext is
concerned, this type of activity includes a collective interest and an
individual interest overlapping in some way. Here we may speak about
a liberal collective context that appears as a separate sphere from
professional work, and as an element of life strategy chosen by the
person. A fifty-six-year-old female respondent (W34K56) describes
activity as follows: ‘‘[Social activity] simply means taking part in
everything you can manage, for the benefits of society and your close
and distant relatives. It means helping people solve problems which they
can’t solve themselves. It means helping the state and individuals. It also
means acting to improve things. Sometimes, your help should be unpaid,
but sometimes it should be paid, because then the help can be done
properly.’’ She added, ‘‘As far as I am concerned, there are hardly any
personal benefits [to such activity], material or otherwise ... there are no
material benefits. What’s more, you have to devote your own time. So, it
all depends on your ambitions ... That’s why I keep at it.’’ The respon-
dent said that she was a milk bar owner – so, not someone professional-
ly connected with administration or local authorities.
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Entry Generation
With this generation, we are again considering social activity in the
context of affiliation – the perception of activism as operating within the
scope of a legal entity. One of the younger respondents, a law student,
states, ‘‘I think that [social activity] means acting in an organized group,
for example, neighbourly communities, political parties, associations, or
foundations.’’ Comparing with the substitute participation of institutions
we have seen earlier, a difference is that here we are concerning with
rank-and-file initiatives. In other words, the difference includes the
appearance and development of the third sector in Poland. The above
respondent’s experiences concerned free services provided within the
framework of acquiring professional competence. The formal status is of
great importance here. Provision of such services is treated as a com-
ponent of professional biography, which develops naturally from volun-
tary work to employment, and which it is especially important in the
case of lawyers. We will refer to this as the ‘‘voluntary type’’ of action.
Broadly interpreted, what we are dealing with here is a change of
status in social activity, starting from the ethos of activity for the good
of our country, through activities performed outside working hours and
for the benefit of the community to which we belong, and ending with
social activity as a particular stage of professional work.
This process of change can be seen as an element of a linear pattern
of modernization, which starting from a communal form, and develops
via individual activities, and ends with professional practice that is based
on the structures of third sector associations. Yet it is hard to imagine
these stages as stages of development of an activist’s biography. Instead,
we can speak here of a break, rather than a continuity, in the cases of
both the exit generation and the peak generation.
It should be emphasized that respondents’ answers also include more
traditional ways of understanding social activity. These ways refer direc-
tly to the substitutive type of action: a twenty-four-year-old respondent
(M3024) replies ‘‘To be socially active? It means, well ... when
somebody takes part in activities for the benefit of society, and they
undertake work that isn’t directly connected with their everyday profes-
sional responsibilities, study, research, or family duties. And in their
spare time outside working hours, they act for others’ benefit, for the
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benefit of society.’’ We can also observe the inconsistency of opinions
and the lack of order in understanding social activity.
A twenty-two-year-old female (K3123) respondent adds, ‘‘To be social-
ly active means working for the benefit of others, including people we
know – for example helping a neighbour – and strangers, like taking part
in charity work and other social actions.’’ Participation in elections is
also included.
Finally, we can add that the types of social action that refer to all
three generations are those that concern activities resulting from religion
and from widely relevant politics. Here the motivations are of a more
universal character. However, this kind of activity was of little interest
to us, due to its character.
Summary
In general, the phrase ‘‘postcommunist microactivism’’ refers to
(1) the diagnosis of a crisis of social engagement which we have
described for the moment as ‘‘social non-movement’’ (Nowak 2005).
This crisis concerns the generational structures we have analysed. The
research we have conducted leads to the next point;
(2) the collapse of forms of communal activism (in the traditional
sense), which results from the period of Solidarity, and previous to that,
from the conservative ethics of the intelligentsia of central Europe.
A good illustration of this tendency is the quasi-experiment we used in
our quantitative research (Nowosielski 2007);
(3) Communal activism is replaced by different forms of activity
which we describe as ‘‘community type’’ activity. The status of these
types is illustrated by the process of privatization. Activism is an
individual choice and individual strategy. We should add that this
understanding of activism involves both performing social activity
alongside normal professional work, and combining ethical elements,
such as helping weaker people, with the pursuit of interests which the
subject may regard as being both to his own advantage and also for the
benefit of others;
(4) The young generation add to this tendency a formula of volun-
tary work, which is both (a) treated as a way of helping others, and (b)
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an element of the professional portfolio or a part of an individual’s
curriculum vitae;
(5) A general tendency typical of the postcommunist model of
microactivism is (a) an eclectic selection of form and content of con-
tributions, indicating a constant initial stage in the development of
the standard of social participation, and (b) an overlap of different
forms deriving from separate cultural sources. As far as the youngest
generation is concerned, the problem is evidenced by semantic chaos.
We can observe here, at the same time, those terms which are typical
of a ‘‘substitutive’’ understanding of activity in a monocentric state,
and political citizenship – such as participation in an election, or
in the work of a political party – and the elements of the model
which Thomas Marshall connects with the development of social citizen-
ship in western Europe.
Significantly, the ‘‘roles’’ of microactivism are constantly evolving,
and at this moment it seems impossible to find one dominant model.
Perhaps this is exactly what we mean by ‘‘postcommunism.’’
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Activization – a Tool for Social Inclusion
in the Context of Polish Cities?
Michał NOWOSIELSKI
Abstract. This paper describes the link between social inclusion and ac-
tivization in the urban context. After presenting a theoretical discussion on
social exclusion and the possible contribution of activization to fight inequa-
lities, it focuses on describing a community approach toward inclusion and
activization. Such an approach aims at emphasizing collective, shared
aspects of social problems that affect people’s lives, and at helping members
of communities to band together using specific programmes designed to
solve these problems. Some German and Polish examples of activization
programmes and their role in social inclusion will be described. However, it
seems that in the context of Polish cities, activization is still underestimated
as a tool of social inclusion.
Contemporary cities are the scene of a peculiar struggle – the
struggle for the engagement and participation of their residents in the
life of their neighbourhoods and districts. The great passive masses who
merely wait for changes to happen in their lives are sometimes perceived
as only a kind of ballast that prevents urban development. In most cases,
the passivity of the residents is connected with their economic, racial,
educational, and sometimes political exclusion. Inactivity is often a re-
sult of social inequalities, which manifest themselves in an especially
strikingly manner in the urban context.
The aim of this paper is to describe a possible approach to fighting
social passivity as a part of more complex inclusion programmes. The
struggle for social engagement in such an approach is only a part of
a broader programme of district or neighbourhood revitalization, which
includes improvement of economic status, the rebirth of communities,
the development of infrastructure, and so on. First of all, a set of
theoretical assumptions on social inequalities, exclusion, and their rela-
tion to passivity in the urban context will be discussed. Second, the idea
of a community or district approach toward inclusion and activization in
the urban context will be introduced. Third, a positive example of
a complex programme of inclusion and activization – the German
Soziale Stadt programme – will be described. Fourth, three parallel
Polish programmes will be critically described.
Inequality is an inherent feature of every society that exceeds a basic
level of development. In the history of humanity, only the simplest
social formations have been characterized by the minimal degree of
inequality. Yet the growing differentiation of societies shows that a lack
of equality is an immanent feature of every society. Inequality has
various sources – Malcolm Hamilton and Maria Hirszowicz (Hamilton
and Hirszowicz 1995, 6-7) state that there are three basic features which
differentiate individuals and give a basis for social assessment. These are
privileges, prestige, and power. Each of these features can be analysed
separately, but we should remember that the character of this distinction
is mostly analytical. Both social deprivation and privileges usually
consist of a scarcity or excess of possibilities in one’s hands – the
possibility to satisfy one’s needs, to evoke social respect, to influence
one’s life, and so on. In other words, social inequality in one of the
dimensions usually entails inequality in other dimensions.
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To describe this phenomenon of concentration of life possibilities,
sociologists use different categories: deprivation, marginalization, and
exclusion. The concept of deprivation, especially relative deprivation,
relates to the psychological feelings of an individual who perceives that
they possess far less socially desirable goods than other similar people. 1
It seems that the terms ‘‘marginalization’’ and ‘‘exclusion’’ are more
useful in the analysis of social inequalities. However, as Wnuk-Lipin´ski
(2005, 271) puts it, these terms are not equivalent: ‘‘The idea of
marginalization relates more to the location of an individual at the
peripheries of important parts of public life, while social exclusion is far
more sharp and relates to a lack of the possibility of taking part in those
important parts of public life.’’ Also, ‘‘socially excluded people are those
who want to participate in the mainstream of social life and in the
division of national income – but either they don’t know how, or they
experience some serious obstacles which they can’t independently over-
come. Marginalized people are those who sometimes participate and
sometimes don’t, and their temporary participation can’t be transformed,
without external help, into more permanent forms of participation in the
mainstream of public life’’ (Wnuk-Lipin´ski 2005, 272). For such reasons,
it seems that for the purposes of this text the term social exclusion is
more suitable.
In the cited work, Wnuk-Lipin´ski emphasizes exclusion from public
life and the public sphere, ideas which will be especially important in
our further analyses. Of course, we should also keep in mind that there
are other meanings and interpretations of this term. Anthony Giddens
(2004, 347) proposed a four-dimensional model of social exclusion: the
first dimension – the economic – is caused by unemployment; the
second dimension (which is in fact a consequence of the first one) is
scarcity in the sphere of consumption; the third is political; and the
fourth, social – meaning the inability to participate in social networks,
and a lack of contact with others. We may complete this list with other
sorts of exclusion, such as cultural and spatial exclusion (this latter
referring to exclusion from particular spaces, which is visible especially
in the case of districts reserved for people with the appropriate social
status).
1 Relative deprivation is a concept well described in a book edited by John
C. Masters and William P. Smith (1987).
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Marshall Wolfe (1995, 82) has proposed six other dimensions of
exclusion, namely exclusion from
1. earning a livelihood;
2. social services, welfare, and security networks;
3. consumer culture;
4. political choice;
5. the bases of popular organization and solidarity;
6. obtaining an understanding of what is happening to society and to
oneself.
Among the features that can be treated as both a stimulus of and
a reinforcement of social exclusion are poverty, disability, race, sex, age,
and place of residence (Lister 2007, 72-93). These specific characteris-
tics of social exclusion – being handicapped in a few dimensions,
combined with the tendency toward gradual accumulation of different
social problems – are sometimes said to constitute a ‘‘spiral of poverty,’’
and together they make exclusion one of the most important social
issues of the contemporary world. It is an issue with which modern
society is not able to cope, and yet at the same time is not willing to
accept (Bauman 1998, 4-10). Among those social groups that don’t
experience social exclusion, there is a natural tendency to push aside the
irritating sight of the poor. As Bauman (ibid., 12) observes, ‘‘Unneeded,
unwanted, pushed away ... so where is their place? First of all, as far
away as possible, and out of sight. The most important thing is to
remove them from the streets and other public places used by the decent
citizens of the consumer world. Not to let them to settle in a respectable
neighbourhood.’’
Contemporary urban agglomerations furnish a particular example of
such practices. Such places are sometimes described using the metaphor
of ‘‘divided cities,’’2 which accurately indicates two interconnected is-
sues. The first issue is related to the division or ‘‘ramification’’ of
distinct life trajectories of the excluded and other members of society
(Warzywoda-Kruszyn´ska 1998, 38). The second issue is related to the
fact that the spatial aspect of the urban exclusion is coming more and
more into prominence – the poor are becoming concentrated in specific
2 See the works edited by Richard Scholar (2006), and by Susan Fainstein, Ian
Gordon, and Michael Harloe (1992).
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places or districts, resulting in ghettoization. Such places are described
by colloquial expressions as being ‘‘dodgy’’ or ‘‘dangerous’’ districts, but
sociologists call them ‘‘enclaves of poverty’’ (Warzywoda-Kruszyn´ska,
Grotowska-Leder, and Krzyszkowski 2002, 135) or ‘‘impoverished neigh-
bourhoods’’ (Warzywoda-Kruszyn´ska 1998, 45).
Such places are typified by the accumulation of bad conditions:
economically, infrastructurally, ecologically, and socially. People living
in enclaves of poverty are unemployed or earn sufficiently little to
benefit from social welfare. The residences they live in are dilapidated
and undeveloped – they may lack basic facilities (such as hot water,
heating, and sewage systems), as well as equipment such as furniture.
Usually such places are overcrowded. Their environs may also be
undeveloped – there may be a lack of basic (or nondefective) infrastruc-
ture, with roads and pavements in bad condition; the area might be
lacking in public spaces which could serve for recreation, such as
children’s playgrounds, parks, and sports grounds; and the commercial
infrastructure may be poorly developed. The residents’ sense of security
may be relatively low. Often one can observe the disintegration of social
bonds among people living in enclaves of poverty.
Apart from these objective constraints, the position of excluded
individuals within the social and political systems tends to be peripheral,
despite the fact that most of them may possess the full set of formal
rights associated with citizenship. Both the levels of traditional political
participation (for example, voting, party membership, and similar) and
the intensity of involvement in the activities of civil society (such as
NGO membership, engagement in protest activities, etc.) seem to be
lower (Verba et al. 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). There-
fore, there seems to be a strict correlation between economic deficits,
participation, and influence deficits, which can lead to further worsening
of the position of the economically disadvantaged and, on the other
hand, to a crisis of legitimacy of public institutions in the eyes of these
individuals. In other words, far from being a merely economic issue, the
participation levels of the economically excluded constitute a vital social
problem from the perspective of the functioning of the political and
social systems. These participation deficits seem to stem from four
major sources:
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– Practical constraints: insufficient means for fulfilling basic needs
on an everyday basis, and low social capital levels do not allow
individuals to go beyond the mundane activities of labour (Parry, Moy-
ser, and Day 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Gilliatt 2001).
– Cognitive boundaries: poverty and exclusion lead to the reduction
of self-esteem and social aspirations, thus reducing the motivation for
activity and social mobility (Hoggett 2001; Kincaid 1973).
– Identity boundaries: poverty leads to a negative stigmatization
and does not constitute a positive basis for creating social identification
(Cohen 1997). Apart from that, it is a strongly heterogeneous category
that does not allow easily for the development of ‘‘we’’ thinking
(Jenkins 1996).
– Political boundaries: The political system and the public authori-
ties treat the poor as objects rather than as the active agent of politics
(Rademacher and Patel 2002).
This tendency toward self-removal from the social and political
system is visible even at the district and neighbourhood level.
Despite the weakness of the social bonds involved, exclusion should
be interpreted as a phenomenon experienced socially, rather than in-
dividually. Enclaves of poverty with their specific accumulation of
economic, social, and political barriers affect entire communities. This is
why the fight against exclusion should be more focused on its collective
aspects. However such practices are rather rare.
Looking at specific programmes aiming at social inclusion – at least
those which involve the active contribution of the excluded – it is clear
that the individualistic approach is dominant. This is a ‘‘liberal’’ model
of social inclusion which consists of stimulating individuals into taking
up different kinds of activity, with the aim of uprooting them from the
social margin. Most activization programmes teach people strategies for
surviving in an unfriendly environment, and for changing it. None-
theless, it is still the individual who is responsible for making this effort,
and it is this individual who can potentially benefit from the success of
the programme. Yet the community remains excluded. One might even
say that the community becomes more impoverished, in the sense that it
loses the social capital of the neighbourhood or district. Individual
strategies of social inclusion ‘‘rob’’ communities of their most active
individuals. Those who remain are powerless, and unable to effect any
kind of social change.
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The solution to this problem might be strategies of activization
which connect both the affected individuals and their communities. This
means making communities (neighbourhoods, housing estates, and dis-
tricts) the subject of social welfare and social work. The idea of district
social work (Stadtteilbezogener Sozialer Arbeit) developed by the In-
stitute for District Social Work and Counselling (Institut für
Stadtteilbezogene Soziale Arbeit und Beratung) in Essen is a fine exam-
ple of such a strategy. It focuses on paying attention to the collective,
shared aspects of social problems that affect people’s lives, and on
helping members of the communities to band together using programmes
aimed at solving these problems. The basic means to achieve this goal
are the strengthening of neighbourly bonds, and mobilization of the local
potential for action. This can be accomplished by making communica-
tion between neighbours more effective, and by improving organization
– especially self-organization – which can accelerate the mobilization of
people and other resources (Hinte, 1998).
Maria Lüttringhaus notes that the strategy of district social work
should be founded upon six basic rules:
1. Wants-orientation: asking members of excluded communities the
question, ‘‘What do you want?’’ instead of ‘‘What do you need?’’
2. Activization: Asking what contribution members of the excluded
community can make toward obtaining the goals that they themselves
have defined.
3. The use of resources that are available in the district or neigh-
bourhood.
4. The integration of action and resources at all levels of activity.
5. The creation of networks of important social actors, projects, and
resources.
6. Improving the infrastructure of the neighbourhood.
The strategy of district social work is in fact a combination of
social work, activization, and revitalization. However, activization in
this context has a double meaning: The first meaning is the typical
one, and implies employing individual strategies of reintegration to
the labour market. The second, and more interesting from our point
of view, sense of social activization is the revitalization of communities.
This requires engaging individuals and communities in deepening social
and political participation, as well as increasing self-organization and
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the development of social bonds and a sense of community with other
residents.
Such a complex strategy of social inclusion of city residents is rather
uncommon. One of the few examples of such a strategy is the Socially
Integrated City programme (Soziale Stadt) introduced in Germany at the
end of the 1990s.3 The basic principle of the programme is to combine
the traditional approach to revitalization with the idea of social ac-
tivization. An intended consequence of the programme was to be the
integration of the residents from the so-called districts with special
developmental needs (Stadtteilen mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf)
into society, by first reviving the social bonds within them, and then the
bonds between them and the rest of society. Multilevel actions (at the
federal, state, city, district, and neighbourhood level) were employed by
the programme to improve
– the economic situation of the residents, and their quality of life;
– the infrastructure of the districts;
– social engagement and participation;
– social bonds among residents;
– the economy of the districts.
From our point of view, the most important of these aims is the
activization and increasing participation of residents. The programme
used two sets of techniques – direct and indirect – that were intended to
help the redevelopment of social engagement. Direct techniques were
those such as
– activization surveys;
– social help;
– counselling;
– formal and informal meetings, and discussions among the re-
sidents;
– streetwork;
– creation and development of social networks;
– organization of parties, picnics, parades, and other events;
– mediation and conflict resolution.
Some indirect techniques were also employed:
– publishing district newspapers, posters, leaflets, and websites;
3 Where not otherwise indicated, information on the Socially Integrated City Pro-
gramme is from the Soziale Stadt web page, http:www.sozialestadt.de.
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– preparation of press releases for local media;
– creation of logos and slogans for both the whole programme and
its parts.
A very important role in making residents more engaged was played
by the District management system (Quartiersmanagement) (Franke and
Löhr 2001), whose main role was to create a network of communication
and agreement. The social proximity of management personnel to the
residents, along with the fact that they were embedded in the local
context, were crucial factors in achieving success. Apart from that, their
role involved including residents in planning and realizing specific
actions. Accepting responsibility for specific tasks was especially impor-
tant in increasing the participation of individuals and communities.
However, an analysis of the prevailing outcomes of the programme
thus far shows that its ambitious aims have proven difficult to fulfil. The
revitalization of the infrastructure and outlook of the district was the
easiest part of the project. The other changes were much harder to
accomplish. The authors of the process themselves say that although
there is a distinct improvement in social activity among residents, it was
achieved by cooperation with those who objectively were least affected
by social exclusion. Those who most needed help failed to identify
themselves with the aims and actions of the programme.
Nevertheless the Soziale Stadt programme may be treated as a posi-
tive example of the broad, complex approach toward social inclusion and
activization. The combination of the improvement in economic status,
the rebirth of the community, and the development of the infrastructure
with activization is especially interesting and stimulating. Looking at
Polish programmes of inclusion in the urban context, it is easy to notice
that there are really no programmes with such a broad and complex
approach. Usually the approach of programmes that are involved in
changing urban reality is conventional, and their scope is limited to the
revitalization of districts, neighbourhood, or single streets. This means
that their emphasis is placed on changing the look and infrastructure of
the urban space. Such tendencies are visible in most Polish cities. Rarely
do municipal officials pay attention to other aspects of making urban life
more tolerable.4 Where programmes have other objectives, they are
4 A reaction to such an approach can be seen in the title of an article by Tomasz
Tosza, describing the revitalization programme in Jaworzno: ‘‘Revitalize people, not
stones’’ (Tosza 2004, 162-174).
Activization – a Tool for Social Inclusion in the Context of Polish Cities? 179
usually aimed at another target, having been developed to fight against
poverty and the economic dimension of exclusion. This lack of com-
plexity results from a one-sided approach to the problem of social
exclusion. It seems that social activization – understood as an increase in
social participation and engagement, and the development of self-or-
ganization and a sense of community with other residents – is usually
underestimated as a tool used for social inclusion. Taking that into
consideration, it is worth looking closer at some selected activization
programmes which have been implemented in Poland.
The first is the ‘‘Sun on Wschodnia Street’’ programme (Słon´ce na
Wschodniej).5 The aim of this project, run by the White Crows Foun-
dation (Fundacja Białe Gawrony), is the social and cultural revitalization
of Wschodnia Street in Ło´dz´. There are two basic goals: The first to
emphasize the beauty and exceptionality of Wschodnia Street, which is
sometimes called ‘‘Piotrkowska Street’s ugly sister.’’ It is an untidy and
vandalized neighbourhood, typical of tenement house districts. The place
appears unfriendly to visitors, passers-by, and residents. Its social image
is very poor. Yet it has great potential – the houses are dilapidated, but
beautiful. As the authors of the project put it, ‘‘Our street has also more
cultural facets: Reymont lived opposite this gateway during the time he
spent gathering materials for ‘‘The Land of Promise’’ (Ziemia obiecana);
nearby Agnieszka Osiecka wrote her lyrics (...) But the culture on
Wschodnia Street is not just history. There are still a few important
cultural institutions (...). When you take a closer look at Wschodnia
Street, you notice that it is a kind of microcosm, a complete ecological
system. You can buy anything here: American and Swedish clothes,
cheap TVs; you can eat a cake, unlock your SIM card, and drink a beer.
(...) We have two teahouses, where you can talk your head off all day
long. Every year Wschodnia Street is visited by a Gypsy band.’’ But the
beauty and the potential of Wschodnia Street needs to be uncovered. The
visitors and passers-by need to experience its exceptionality, and the
residents need to appreciate it.
5 Where not otherwise indicated, information on the ‘‘Sun on Wschodnia Street’’
programme is from the White Crows Foundation web page, http:www.bialegawro-
ny.org.
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The second goal is to fight against the social and economic exclusion
of the residents by increasing their participation in the life of the street.
A series of workshops called ,,Mutual Help’’ was introduced to show
residents possible ways of helping each other. This help could involve
exchanging different resources – like skills, time (using a time bank
system), and things that are no longer needed. Encouraging neighbours
to be more active and, more importantly, creating networks of co-
operation is a way of ‘‘bolstering their courage and power to undertake
their own ventures, and to show them some goals that are possible to
reach.’’
Although its main stress is on culture, the Sun on Wschodnia Street
is an interesting example of combining a few targets – revitalization,
activization, and inclusion. Of course the scope of actions is rather
limited, but it helps to grasp its urban character and emphasis on
neighbourly relations and bonds.
A second example of Polish activization ideas is the Dialogue
project, run by the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (Fundacja
Rozwoju Demokacji Lokalnej). 6 Although its geographic range is wider
than that of the Sun of Wschodnia Street – it is being implemented in
four Polish cities (Białystok, Kielce, Opole, and Rzeszo´w) – its goals are
more limited. It is intended mainly to increase the participation of
citizens in local public matters and the public sphere, and to develop
dialogue between citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and local
government. However, this is impossible without creating lively com-
munities, so the project aims also to develop better relations and co-
operation between neighbours.
The tools and techniques used by the Foundation in Support of Local
Democracy are in fact imported from America, and adopted to the Polish
context. The first and most important technique is dialogue – meetings
and brainstorming sessions that are intended to produce an exchange of
ideas or concepts. ‘‘As a result of the exchange of arguments, our
opinions are changing. When we take other points of view into con-
sideration, we have an opportunity to look more broadly at various
matters. We get to know each other better. A real, authentic social bond
6 Where not otherwise indicated, information on the ‘‘Dialogue’’ project is from the
Foundation in Support of Local Democracy web page, http:www.frdl.org.pl.
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is coming into being between diverse people who previously were not
familiar with each other’’ (Krzemionka-Bro´zda).
This dialogue technique helps to make the communication between
different social actors (individuals, social groups, organizations, and
local government) more successful. The effective flow of information
helps to solve and avoid social conflicts. As a further result, strong and
lasting social relations are developed.
Two other and more specific actions implemented by the Foundation
in Support of Local Democracy are the training of local leaders – es-
pecially the young (by means of the Youth Leader Academy and
Volunteer Centres) – and the initiation of specific community develop-
ment programmes. This latter is especially important from our point of
view because of its local, urban character. It consists of implementing an
American-style ‘‘neighbourhood watch’’ in selected neighbourhoods.
Common actions undertaken by individuals to make their neighbourhood
safer means a deepening of social integration. Apart from that, setting up
the neighbourhood watch programme required establishing cooperation
between neighbour groups and other actors, like the police or city guard.
The last programme analysed here is the CAL or Local Activity
Centres association (Centra Aktywnos´ci Lokalnej), 7 which is the first
Polish community development programme that was designed to stimu-
late the growth of local and neighbourhood communities. The general
aims of the programme are
– ‘‘creating a community of action and spirit – locally, regionally
and nationally’’;
– encouraging activity on the parts of the residents and the ani-
mators;
– self-organization – helping others to help themselves;
– participation, and giving a sense of real influence to participants
– ‘‘to give this to the participants in our programmes, and they
should give it on to their partners and the people with whom they
work’’;
– ‘‘solidarity and integration – social networks, associations between
people, and building a supportive community.’’
7 Where not otherwise indicated, information on and quotations from the ‘‘Local
Activity Centres’’ project is from the CAL web page, http:www.cal.org.pl.
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However, achieving such goals needs a special approach which is more
complex than the approach found in other activization projects.
There are three basic assumptions which seem to be the foundations
of the programme: The first is to employ a holistic approach – when
preparing a strategy to resolving diverse social problems, CAL ought to
take into consideration all of the important factors that may affect the
community. A broader context of analysis (extending to culture, poverty,
ecology, economy, education, safety, and so on) and of actions may
bring better results to a community which is constantly affected by those
factors. This of course means that before undertaking specific actions,
a diagnosis of the local community’s condition needs to be carried out.
The aim of such a diagnosis would be the identification of problems and
needs that are important in the specific social environment.
The second is a social-ecological approach, which means empha-
sizing the significance of social space. The existence of a space which is
open for both residents and the agents of diverse social institutions, and
in which they are equal partners, is crucial for the realization of the
project. This space may be the office of some social organization,
a community cultural centre (dom kultury), a social help centre, or
a school – the most important point is to have a real, permanent location
for regular meetings.
The third assumption, however, is the most important: CAL should
aim at making not only individuals, but rather whole communities – and
their social environment – more socially active. This community ap-
proach brings a broader perspective of social activity, understood not
only as actions taken by individuals interested in improving their en-
vironment, but first and foremost as cooperation within the community.
Although the CAL project exists nationwide, it has a network struc-
ture. As Paweł Jordan states, ‘‘Building a network organization is an
extremely efficient way of spreading verified solutions, using developed
methods of action, without repeating the same mistakes, while sharing
diverse valuable experience. Creating diverse types of cooperation net-
work and connection may be the future of social development in Poland,
yet it is still underestimated’’ (Jordan).
Every CAL centre has its own programme and specific aims. The
centres provide mediation between the institutional structures of the state
and local government, and the formal (NGO) and informal (community
group) structures of local civil society.
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In accordance with its credo ‘‘Help others to help themselves,’’ CAL
was designed to supply local communities with know-how, rather than
with other material resources.
The main specific technique used by CAL is informal education:
teaching local leaders and animators, and stimulating free exchange of
experiences and discussion between participants. Local leaders and ani-
mators are, in a way, local agents of social change. Their actions are
used to prompt other residents to participate in the life of their neigh-
bourhood.
The CAL project is exceptional not only because of its complexity,
but also because of its self-conscious character. It involves elements of
social research, such as diagnosis and, even more importantly, evaluation
(Skrzypczak 2006, 171-172). The main outcomes of the project have
been the development of a very efficient programme of local leader
training, and a quite active network of local CAL centres. Still other
outcomes, especially at the local level, were differentiated, and in many
cases hard to measure.
The Polish programmes of social inclusion and activization which
have been presented here are of course only examples, but they have
been chosen to show a general tendency. Their analysis clearly shows
that Polish programmes of social activization in urban contexts are
poorly developed, and they have several important shortcomings that
need to be emphasized.
First of all they are fragmentary – they are usually focused on one
dimension of social exclusion. One can hardly ever find more complex
approaches toward the problems of socially excluded people, approaches
that would combine activization with other ways of changing neigh-
bours, districts, and the lives of their residents.
In most cases they are fragmentary and limited to a relatively small
range, such as street, neighbourhood, or district. There is a lack of
broader projects that – like CAL – would be designed as tools for
changing urban reality in different cities and towns. There are many
interesting and successful programmes, such as the Sun on Wschodnia
Street, but it should be emphasized that they don’t give the opportunity
to propose standardized methods and techniques of social activization
and inclusion. They have been planned and implemented as specific
programmes for specific needs and problems that affect some of the
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urban spaces and social environments. Such approach is in fact
self-limiting, and gives no opportunity to developing more universal
tools.
This shortcoming is even reinforced by the fact that in most of the
cases, the activization strategies are not based on solid research into the
state of Polish social urban activity and its peculiarities. Sometimes they
are based on Western experiences, but most commonly they are planned
on the basis of the creativity and the imagination of the authors of the
project. In both cases, the result may the application of incongruous
means for specific aims. The danger of such inaccuracy is even greater
when we take into consideration the fact that most of the programmes do
not use any kind of evaluation of either specific techniques or of the
overall approach.
Rarely is there cooperation between social activists who aim to
develop social activity, and academia. The lack of such cooperation
seems to result from a reciprocal distrust and a lack of communication
between activists and scholars.
The last shortcoming is the fact that the state, as well as most of the
local governments, do not have any strategies for social activization and
social inclusion. The activists are implementing their programmes in
kind of institutional void. Of course in many cases there is cooperation
between NGOs implementing inclusion programmes and municipal go-
vernment, but this is a relatively rare situation, which usually results
from the initiative of the NGOs.
It seems that the latter shortcoming may be the source of the whole
problem. The fact that it is the NGOs that are main actors of activation
and the stimulation of inclusion, and not the agendas of the state and
municipal governments, is a crucial one, which causes a deepening of
fragmentation in approaches toward these important social problems.
Only cooperation between the state, local government, NGOs, and the
communities has a chance of succeeding in bringing about the dialogue
that is necessary for developing more sophisticated programmes which
aim to change urban reality in Poland. Without such a dialogue, without
cooperation at different levels, and without a broader perspective, no
change is possible. Only changes implemented from above in coopera-
tion with those from below, and only changes which affect all the
spheres of life important to the excluded, will bring positive effects.
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Political Activity in Public Spaces:
Awakening, Stagnation, or Fall?
Sandra HUNING
Abstract. This paper draws on concepts of modernity and postmodernity,
and related spatial orderings in order to understand recent transformations of
the political use of public spaces. It argues that political activities are more
and more organized as deliberative, open processes in which new media play
a crucial role. Participants share situations rather than an identity, and
creative interventions such as culture jamming question the legitimacy of
power as manifested in urban space. The paper concludes that in spite of the
translocal and ahistorical references which both new architecture and an
increasing number of city users tend to be showing in urban space, political
activities are adapted to local conditions, contradicting scholars who have
declared the end of place.
During the 1990s, an intense debate went on among urban planners
and sociologists in Germany about ‘‘public space’’ (öffentlicher Raum) in
cities; Selle (2002) provides a summary. Many researchers claimed that
urban public spaces had lost important functions which are essential for
a well functioning and integrative society, for example Feldtkeller
(1995). There were basically two arguments. On the one hand, it was
stated that increases in graffiti, vandalism, petty crime, and nonconfor-
ming behaviour – such as groups of people drinking alcohol or begging
– had led to insecurity among passers-by in urban spaces (Witte 2002).
On the other hand, scholars argued that the privatization and regulation
of urban spaces, such as through CCTV systems or private security in
places such as shopping malls, would – in combination with the obser-
vable trend toward the commercialization of public spaces – necessarily
be accompanied by the exclusion from certain places of certain social
groups suspected of nonconforming behaviour, andor a lack purchasing
power, for example groups of young male adults, or homeless people.
Underlying both arguments was the fear that public spaces were beco-
ming more and more dysfunctional.
However, at the same time that these debates were taking place, the
forms of appropriation and use of public spaces seemed to be constantly
diversifying, and some German planners today even complain about the
overuse of public space. This paper focuses on the political use of public
space and how it has been transformed in recent years. Due to a lack of
empirical data, it is difficult to quantify changes – but several trends can
be observed which seem to make a closer look worthwhile, rather than
focusing solely on the perspective of loss and decline. In the following,
after narrowing the understanding of public space to the scope addressed
by this paper, the way that the planning of public spaces has changed in
an era of what has been labelled as ‘‘postmodernity’’ is sketched. Then
the paper outlines new trends in the political use and appropriation of
public space in cities. The conclusions will discuss the relationship
between both. This paper is not intended to deliver any final results.
Rather it aims to take some initial steps toward a framework for a more
comprehensive discussion, and toward naming issues which need to be
considered.
In German urban studies, there are several definitions of public
spaces, none of them uncontested. Discourses in political and social
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theory about the public, the public realm, or the public space have been
inspired by political philosophers and sociologists such as Hannah
Arendt (1967) and Jürgen Habermas (1969). Urban sociology has been
enriched by the works of, for example, Hans Paul Bahrdt (1983), and
more recently Christine Weiske (2003), and Walter Siebel (2000). Plan-
ners, architects, and urban designers – such as Andreas Feldtkeller
(2002), Rob Krier (2003), and Klaus Selle (2004) – also deal with public
space with regard to its material form. All of these authors have also
been influenced by international scholars, taking into account definitions
in other national or regional contexts beyond the German debate, es-
pecially the works of Jane Jacobs (1993) and Richard Sennett (2000).
For the purpose of this paper, the focus is on urban places which are
– at least in general – accessible to anyone at any time of day: streets,
public parks, and squares, as well as some public transportation hubs;
but excluding shopping malls, parliaments, and sports stadiums. Of
course, this claimed ‘‘accessibility’’ is debatable: roads are typically
off-limits to pedestrians at all times of the day, and squares may be
closed to car traffic. However, in principle, no one can be excluded from
the use of these places; they are potentially available for unlimited
private and public use and appropriation. For this reason, they have the
potential to be ‘‘loose spaces’’ (Franck and Stevens 2007).
The Concept of Postmodernity in Urban Planning
The idea of postmodernity has been frequently subject to debate.
Precisely speaking, already the concept of modernity is questionable. Its
definitions are manifold. They agree, more or less, that an instrumental
rationale is characteristic of modern society (even though they might be
contradictory in their details, and fully acknowledge that functional
differentiation already started in the medieval period). Spatial orderings,
which are strongly linked to social formations and activity patterns, have
been produced to create modernity – or the feeling of it – in the form of
certain places and urban settings, as a common framework for individual
and social experience. In this context, planning has tended to be func-
tionalist and technical. Only slowly has the political dimension of urban
planning become more fully understood, as it became a common sense
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notion that designing space is not only, and not even foremost, a func-
tional problem, but also one of social and economic relations in a city,
of cultural and symbolic values, and of aesthetic sensation. Obviously,
the process of ‘‘reflexive modernization’’ (Beck, Giddens, and Lash
1996) has gone far beyond a transformation in the planning profession.
The so-called condition of postmodernity – as far as this concept can be
usefully employed as specific historical-geographical condition (Harvey
1990) – has captured all sectors of Western societies.
‘‘Among the shared key-themes of many accounts of the postmodern condition are
included a new radical scepticism about the role of scientific knowledge; a new
concern with aesthetics rather than morality; enhanced reflexivity on the part of
individuals about their identity and the grounds for their conduct; a magnified
importance for mass media in the framing of everyday life; an intensification of
consumerism, the demise of socialist politics and its replacement by the local and
personal politics of new social movements’’ (Savage and Warde 1993, 138).
Postmodernism in architecture has been discussed primarily as an
aesthetic project (Hajer 1995). Architecture now claims ‘‘to celebrate
multivalence (many meanings) over univalence (one meaning), and to
promote a fresh aesthetic borrowing from different architectural styles
from various historical periods’’ (Savage and Warde 1993, 139). The
urban fabric is seen as ‘‘necessarily fragmented’’ (Harvey 1990, 66).
Interchangeable new urban spaces, such as out-of-town hypermarkets
and shopping malls, have emerged, and during the 1990s were discussed
as ‘‘nonplaces’’ (Augé 1994). Such ‘‘nonplaces’’ – in contrast to places
– are accused by their critics of an indifference toward local context, and
characterized by the fact that they more or less playfully combine
motives from different historical and cultural backgrounds. Planning
nonplaces has been called ‘‘imagineering’’ (Hassenpflug 1998), to point
out that this kind of planning does not overcome the (modern) in-
strumental rationale, but that it adds another facet to it: aesthetization is
not an end in itself, but is seen as a means to symbolize a city’s status,
and to create a setting for social or individual experience which evokes
feelings of comfort and emotionality; this is true for public as well as for
private producers of space, who compete for innovative and ever-new
kinds of temporary and extraordinary urban sceneries.
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‘‘Whereas the modernists see space as something to be shaped for social purposes and
therefore always subservient to the construction of a social project, the postmodernists
see space as something independent and autonomous, to be shaped according to
aesthetic aims and principles which have nothing necessarily to do with any over-
arching social objective, save, perhaps, the achievement of timeless and ‘disinterested’
beauty as an objective in itself’’ (Harvey 1990, 66).
As a consequence, urban entertainment destinations have been very
successful in the 1990s (Roost 2000, 2003; Tessin 2003) both as ele-
ments of urban development strategies in inner cities and as magnets for
attracting visitors. Moreover, the inner city has been seen as a city’s
business card, symbolically displaying the economic power of the com-
panies within the city (and thereby of the city as an economic headquar-
ters), or showing off its built and cultural heritage (Kuklinski 2003). In
a global perspective, a homogenization of planning and design strategies
can be observed in the sense that similar ideas – such as the construction
of spectacular architecture (‘‘starchitecture’’), or city marketing inno-
vations such as city ‘‘branding’’ – are applied in many large cities,
although they certainly lead to quite different outcomes at the local
level. Critics argue that the addressees of these planning measures are
not local residents as citizens, but rather large businesses and tourists,
with the notion of international competition as ideological backbone to
these approaches. The criticism is that these places invite citizens to act
as tourists and to merely consume the city, but not to act as responsible
individuals. Liveable places (it is claimed) need citizens, not spectators.
However, recent changes in the appropriation of public spaces show that
these have by no means been reduced to a consumerist function, but are
increasingly also strategically used for certain kinds of political com-
munication, information, and protest by new social movements, arts
projects, and local initiatives.
Political Action in Public Spaces
Although there is hardly any comprehensive data available, there
is no doubt that creative new forms of political mobilization can be
observed. For a long time, the main political uses of public space
were demonstrations and manifestations. During the French Revolution,
Political Activity in Public Spaces: Awakening, Stagnation, or Fall? 193
people reconquered urban public spaces for their own unplanned and
independent political action, and a political ‘‘street public’’ (Straßen-
öffentlichkeit; Kaschuba 1991) demonstrated against the representative
public and festival culture of royal anniversaries. While earlier bourgeois
emancipation figures had been strongly related to deliberative settings in
certain places (the agora, or later, city squares and town halls) and to
a specific kind of civic attitude, the politics of the streets became the
tradition of non-bourgeois population groups as physical movements in
space which were accompanied by new means of communication and
representation. In response to the fact that the workers’ protest move-
ments had only very restricted formal political influence, communication
was less logical-deliberative, than emotional-affective. Demonstrations
were ritualized, and collective representations in language (slogans,
speeches), appearance, and ritual symbols supported the activities as
symbolic actions (Korff 1991). A political message would be transported
through a number of participants, walking formations, clothing, posters,
buttons, flags, acoustics, gestures, interaction with the audience and the
police, as well as the treatment of spaces and objects. The German Third
Reich made instrumental use of the labour movement tradition, and
initiated pseudopolitical mass events in public space, aiming to unite the
people with strict choreographies for the affirmation of Nazi politics
(Ehls 1997). After the Second World War, the tradition of demon-
strations and political protest in the street was continued in West
Germany, for example by student protests in the late 1960s, and new
social movements in the 1970s and 1980s; and in the GDR by govern-
ment-led affirmative demonstrations in urban space, which was specifi-
cally designed for this purpose – see, for example, the Leipzig demon-
stration plan (Topfstedt 1994). Demonstrations here and there were in
their different ways affirmative and oriented toward creating collective
identities.
The global justice movement has extended this pattern by combining
elements of both the democratic agora and the revolutionary ‘‘street
public’’ in its strategy to protest against current globalization politics. In
many countries the movement has contributed to the reappropriation of
public spaces in cities for political purposes, not only as symbolic mass
action toward one goal, clearly defined by a central agency such as
a party or a trade union. Rather, political activities are more and more
Sandra HUNING194
organized as a deliberative, open process. This new type of social
movement is characterized by the way that it ‘‘break[s] with ‘‘we-ness’’
and collective identity,’’ and its members share a situation or an ex-
perience, rather than an identity (McDonald 2004, 583, 589). It is
organized as a network, and cooperates on the basis of common goals
which are agreed upon by its members, but it does not represent its
members in the traditional sense.
Not only the self-perception of the global justice movement differs
from that of its predecessors: its strategy in using public spaces also
shows new concepts. The 2001 G8 countersummit in Genoa, for exam-
ple, was organized by members of different initiatives and groups who
were part of the international global justice movement and came toge-
ther only for the purpose of preparing the countersummit (Huning 2006).
Thousands of people travelled from all over the world to assemble in the
spot where political leaders were meeting. The countersummit consisted
of a three-day Public Forum for discussion and communication, two
large demonstrations, and one day of ‘‘thematic squares’’ (piazze
tematiche) including a symbolic attack on the red zone (zona rossa – the
area surrounding the G8 venue, which was closed to the public). The
organizers stressed the importance of the Public Forum because they
considered a demonstration without constructive debate as inefficient.
The demonstrations were accompanied by players, clowns, orchestras,
and bands, but also by violent protests and destructive actions, from the
so-called black bloc. The thematic squares spread around the red zone.
Each square was occupied by associations who pursued similar goals
and agreed on similar forms of protest. This spatial dispersal of the
movement was supposed to symbolize and represent the different
streams within the movement; plurality was not suppressed, but suppor-
ted. Starting from the thematic squares, a ‘‘virtual and political’’ siege of
the red zone was started in the afternoon by using balloons, paper
aeroplanes, music, speeches, and other devices, with the intention of
overcoming the barriers (Klein 2001). The countersummit involved both
assemblies for deliberation, and protest movements in the streets, to aim
at the recovery of civil rights and political influence.
Of great importance for this (international) cooperation – which has
undergone a kind of homogenization since its beginning in the
mid-to-late 1990s – are new media, such as the Internet and mobile
telephones. These have also been a crucial factor in the emergence of
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another phenomenon of political mobilization, the so-called smart mob.
‘‘A smart mob is a group that, contrary to the usual connotations of
a mob, behaves intelligently or efficiently because of its exponentially
increasing network links. This network enables people to connect to
information and others, allowing a form of social coordination.’’ (Wiki-
pedia, http:en.wikipedia.orgwikiSmart
–
mob, 5 November, 2007).
One early example was the organization of spontaneous raves in illegal
or secret places, but smart mobs can obviously be also key to political
action. A specific type is called a ‘‘flash mob,’’ in which people appear
suddenly in a public space, undertake a common action for a short
period of time, and then disperse again. They do not necessarily have to
assemble: the important characteristic is that they show up in one
defined space, at a certain time. For example, the NGO attac has called
on its members to participate in flash mobs at the central station of
Berlin and other cities: to show up at a certain hour – say, three minutes
past twelve – hold up a sign with a random number (e.g. 147) for
exactly three minutes, and then disappear again. This was meant to raise
people’s awareness of and draw their attention to the plans for the
privatization of Deutsche Bahn.
Within the reclaim the streets movement, carnival elements are
applied during ‘‘anti-capitalist action days’’ (Brünzels 2000), and these
creative interventions intend to question the legitimacy of power as
manifested in urban space. Parties, concerts and playful staging of
criticism – sometimes even as a parody – confront the normality
of a central business district or a pedestrian zone. Synchronic activities
take place in several cities, which make single temporary events part
of a global agenda. This concept is more frequently applied in combined
political-cultural events, such as Earth Day and Live Aid, but is also
found in Social Forums and other kinds of international and national
protest activities. The Internet and other means of communication make
this parallel action possible, and mass media enable others, who cannot
participate in person, to share the experience in front of the TV or
the radio.
Many characteristics of political activities in public space are shared
by other new cultural forms of appropriation: carnival elements, the
switch from spectator to activist, and the temporality of activities. One
form has been called ‘‘culture jamming’’ (Carducci 2006). Here well
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known symbols and brands are altered and used to send a critical
message, generally contesting the idea of consumer society and ad-
vocating change. Facilitated by software and the Internet, commercial
messages are imitated and satirized in order to raise consumers’ awa-
reness of illegal or ecologically alarming practices. For example, a logo
of a company is slightly altered and printed on bags containing material
about the social, ecological, or other failures of the company, which
are then distributed in the street to passers-by, who – supposing that
it contains promotion material – only realize upon taking a closer
look that this bag is meant to challenge their attention. This approach
is supposed to be part of a ‘‘postmodern consumer culture’’ which
emerged in the 1960s when consumers started to realize that con-
sumption could be a means of autonomous identity formation. Brands
which claimed ‘‘authenticity’’ of their products were favoured. ‘‘Culture
jamming’’ has been interpreted as a form of conflict between consumers
and brands (Carducci 2006, 122), as brand veneers have started to
crumble and the ‘‘backstage’’ of a brand has been questioned. Culture
jamming takes place in public space, but also in the media and in
commercial settings. One example is the case of an Austrian artists’
project, which in 2003 published the news that the Karlsplatz in Vienna
was to be renamed ‘‘Nike Square,’’ and had been sold to Nike. They
erected a Nike monument and an information centre called the ‘‘Nike
Info Box.’’ The media coverage of this activity induced strong op-
position to the supposed acquisition. The fact that many people took
this message seriously and reacted to it, highlights people’s increased
awareness of the commercialization of public space. Many citizens
and initiatives were mobilized to protest against the apparent sell-out
of the Karlsplatz (Löw, Steets, and Stoetzer 2007, 133f). Only days
later, Nike disclaimed the news.
To sum up: Political demonstrations and manifestations today are not
primarily built upon collective identities, but also focus on individual
creativity and engagement. The results are open, and they aim at
regaining democratic space for citizens, rather than strengthening one
representative organization. Playful elements are integrated into the
activities, and anyone can participate or make the change from spectator
to actor; and anyone who passes by is addressed. Places in the city that
can be appropriated to this purpose are the same places that were used
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for more traditional demonstrations (which of course still take place
also): central streets, squares, and pedestrian zones. Their accessibility is
comparably high, which produces a high number of passers-by; it is easy
to generate visibility. Membership is not a precondition for participation,
nor is agreement on a certain political goal; rather, the willingness to
reflect upon current political and economic issues is essential.
Discussion: A ‘‘Postmodern’’ Use of Public Space?
Ever since the 1990s, very big events and smaller temporary settings
seem to have become more important in the use of public spaces. They
transform spaces such as central squares and streets, parking lots, and
train stations into extraordinary urban scenes, which are constituted by
a specifically designed physical framework – whether meaningful in
itself, or adapted to or rearranged for the situation – and the participants
who, intentionally or involuntarily, become part of the setting. Some
events take place on a regular basis, some only once; some activities
would be considered as private, and some as public; some are local
events, while others parallel worldwide happenings.
Something else that these events have in common is that they
introduce new forms of participation. Quite frequently, people – be they
group members or passers-by – are not only addressed as consumers, but
are invited to take an active part in the event. They are free to exchange
the role of the spectator for the role of an active player, or the other way
around. The self-orientation of the kind which has been claimed to be
a central characteristic of postmodern societies (Schulze 2003), has got
rid of context – in the sense that it allows immediate points of contact
without paying attention to conventions, knowledge, or tradition. The
codes used are easily understood, and rapid decoding lowers barriers to
access and participation. These rather ‘‘situationist’’ approaches reflect
postmodernists’ rejection of meta-narratives (Harvey 1990, 9), and do
not attempt to transcend the ‘‘ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity,
and the chaotic’’ (Harvey 1990, 44). Just as ‘‘imagery is created and can
be manipulated’’ and ‘‘local authorities try to present their own area as
appealing,’’ (Savage and Warde 1993, 146), so new social movements
and cultural projects also employ public spaces as stage and scenery for
their claims.
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Although there are certainly no causal relations between the design
of public spaces and the activities that take place here, correlations
between the meanings attributed to public space by planners and city
users can be observed. This paper described changes in the planning and
appropriation of public space which tend to point toward more playful
approaches, and to the emergence of translocal references on both sides.
In a globalized era, local urban space tends to gain importance as
a setting for political deliberation and cultural representation, which both
challenge actual conditions, power relations, and national and inter-
national policies. In spite of the translocal and ahistorical references
which both new architecture and an increasing number of city users tend
to be showing, these are adapted to local conditions and contradict
scholars who declare the end of place.
Conclusion
An evaluation of recent developments in public space depends very
much on one’s own normative contention, but also on the context in
which the development takes place. The question whether the transfor-
mations described above can be seen as an ‘‘awakening,’’ as a ‘‘stag-
nation,’’ or as a ‘‘fall’’ of public space cannot be positively answered
here. One reason for this is the lack of data. Another one is the
complexity of the question. This paper provided a first explorative
framework for analysis, suggesting that it would be better to speak of
a transformation of the use and appropriation of public spaces – which
implies both risks and chances for future developments – than of
awakening, stagnation, or fall. The trends described above give only
a general overview and do not take into account specific historical,
economic, cultural, social, political, or even ecological circumstances
that might relate to cities; The combination of these factor is likely to
significantly influence the local outcome of recent trends. But only an
empirical in-depth study will be able to generate a more nuanced
understanding of the meaning of public spaces today for political action.
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